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A JEFFERSONIAN REPUBLIC BY
HAMILTONIAN MEANS: VALUES,
CONSTRAINTS, AND FINANCE IN THE
DESIGN OF A COMPREHENSIVE AND
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN
"OWNERSHIP SOCIETY"
ROBERT HOCKETT*

I. INTRODUCTION: FROM "PROGRAMS" TO "SOCIETY"
Use of the phrase "ownership society" to designate an end state
toward which one believes that American policy should strive entails
certain commitments. The usage cannot mean merely that public policy
ought to seek to bring about a society in which some people own some
things; we have lived in that society, without interruption, since the first
days of our republic. Nor can use of the phrase contemplate merely a
society whose law recognizes, vindicates, and protects property rights;
again, that has been a central feature of our polity since its first days under
our present constitution. To what, then, can the notion of an "ownership
society" refer? It must refer to a society whose members are publicly
conscious of the individual and the societal value of ownership, and who
work systematically to propagate that value among themselves. The
"ownership society" ("OS"), that is, not only recognizes, preserves, and
protects ownership, but also it celebrates, fosters it, and spreads it. It is, in
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School. Thanks to Greg Alexander,
Anne Alstott, Jerry Cohen, Marc Fleurbaey, Richard Freeman, Michael Graetz, David Grewal, Henry
Hansmann, Doug Kysar, George Hay, Daniel Markovits, Jerry Mashaw, Bernie Meyler, Trevor
Morrison, Jed Purdy, Jeff Rachlinski, Sanjay Reddy, John Roemer, Vicki Schultz, Michael Sherraden,
Bob Shiller, Martin Shubik, Bill Simon, Peter Spiegler, Roberto Unger, and Brad Wendel for helpful
discussion as to various among subjects of this Article. Enduring errors endure as my own. Amy Ely
and Vysali Soundararajan provided first-rate substantive, as well as research, assistance.
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short, a latter-day rendition of that venerable American
Jeffersonian "yeoman republic."'

[Vol. 79:45

ideal, the

But making a society-shaping and enduring public commitment to
ownership promotion raises several antecedent practical tasks that must be
addressed both sensibly and sensitively if the project is to put down roots,
flourish, and endure. First, the project must be conceived, articulated, and
implemented in a manner consistent with the core values and political selfunderstandings of those who comprise the society that wills to be an OS.
Where the society has featured multiple such valuational and political
traditions over time, this task further requires that some synthesis of, or
overlapping consensus among, these traditions be derived and articulated:
an ideologically neutral yet nonetheless value-expressive language must be
wrought.
Second, the project of developing an OS must be designed and
pursued in a manner that makes optimal accommodation with, even optimal
employment of, the facts of ownership psychology and fundamental law as
we currently find them, however fixed or malleable they might be over
time. If citizens tend, either consciously or unconsciously, to be more
favorably disposed to the channeling of perceivedly "new" resources or
opportunities toward hardworking nonowners than to redistributing
portions of their own current holdings toward those same nonowners, an
OS-in-the-making does well to take heed. And if longstanding legal
distinctions between property rules and liability rules, 2 for example, are
such that the perceived public value of ownership is more fully realized in
and vindicated by the former than by the latter, then an OS-in-the-making
with that legal heritage ought again to take heed.
Finally, a society devoted to becoming or remaining an OS should be
mindful of, and learn from, its own programmatic past. It should find
lessons in its earlier and contemporary attempts-however successful or
unsuccessful, modest or ambitious, self-conscious or inchoate these
attempts have been-at fostering and broadening autonomy-conferring and
responsibility-rewarding ownership among its citizens. This task is
synoptic and synthetic like the first task, and strategic like the second task.
Indeed, its pursuit reveals the deep interconnectedness of the first two
1.
Much has been written on the Jeffersonian "yeoman republic." For contemporary accounts of
this ideological tradition, see, for example, LANCE BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION:
EVOLUTION OF A PARTY IDEOLOGY (1978); DREw R. MCCoy, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC: POLITICAL
ECONOMY IN JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA (1980).
2.
See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienabilitv:One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). See also infra Part HI.
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tasks. For the effort to understand, interpret, and explain past and present
OS-redolent programs and proposals, their political and implementary
successes and shortcomings, is in effect an effort to draw explicit
conceptual and programmatic syntheses from the thus far implicit and
fragmented would-be OS's ideological, psychological, legal, and policy
expressions as thus far incompletely realized.
The present Article is the next step in a sequence begun by a
predecessor article devoted to the first two aforementioned tasks, 3 and is
intended to discharge what I have here enumerated as the consummating
and more complex third task. It is meant to conduct the aforementioned
work of programmatic synthesis, in a manner that does justice to and makes
effective use of the antecedent work of valuational, psychological, and
legal synthesis. While the first article developed a unified American selfunderstanding and vocabulary from three dominant strands of American
ideological tradition, then translated that self-understanding into a
systematic, normative vision of ownership and ownership-spreading
consonant with American endowment psychology and legal tradition, this
Article develops a comprehensive national project of ownership-spreading
from a constructive interpretation of America's fragmentary and
programmatic history as an OS-in-the-making. Interpreting this history in
light of the political, psychological, and legal theory developed in the
previous article yields at least two critical benefits to those of us who wish
to build an authentically American OS.
First, this Article empirically corroborates the theory of the
predecessor article. It demonstrates the latter's overlapping ideological
consensus and its charted psychological and legal constraints actually at
work in both the politics and programmatics of past and present ownership
promotion policies.
largely
an underlying-and
Second, this Article uncovers
generalizable-financial form at work in the most successful and enduring
American OS policies and programs tried to date. That form gives the
fullest, most direct expression to the political, psychological, and legal
constraints mapped in the predecessor article. It also suggests the lines that
can "connect the dots" of our past, more piecemeal programs in a manner
that will lend coherence, completeness, and a full project consciousness to
our future efforts. That is in part to say that it offers further means of giving
See Robert Hockett, Whose Ownership? Which Society?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2005)
3.
[hereinafter Hockett, Whose Ownership?]. The series is completed with a sequel to the present Article
assessing the prospects of a "global" OS.
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full articulation to a detailed, comprehensive, national plan to foster an OS
that is true to our fundamental values, endowment sensibilities, and legal
traditions. This plan can be described as broadly "Hamiltonian" in spirit
both in its emphasis on financial engineering as a preferred means and in its
recognition, in respect of ends, that a contemporary American OS will offer
the private and public benefits of individual freedom, civic responsibility,
through ownership of more kinds of assets than
and productive activity
4
arable land alone.
In Parts II and III, the Article first quickly reprises the political,
psychological, and legal synthesis developed in the predecessor article. Part
II briefly lays out the basic contours of American self-understanding, where
an OS consonant with fundamental American values is conceived in its
basic structure as an "efficient equal-opportunity republic" ("EEOR"). The
EEOR emerges as a polity in which core exogenous opportunity and risk
endowments are spread widely, and endogenous benefit and burden
holdings are allocated by complete and neutral markets that honor and
remunerate productive, responsible effort. Part III briefly summarizes the
translation of the EEOR into American legal and endowment-psychological
terms. This part shows how most opportunity and resource endowmentseven many of those traditionally conferred or protected by affirmative
legislation or by traditional contract or tort doctrine-are best vindicated
through property or quasi-property rules rather than liability rules. Further,
it shows that exogenous endowments are best spread by financial
engineering techniques that (a) spread perceivedly "new" opportunities and
"undeserved" risks, and (b) channel opportunities and risks in ways that
transparently encourage and reward responsible and productive effort.
Part IV sketches the general financial form of opportunity- and riskspreading programs suggested by the syntheses summarized in Parts II and
III. That form boils down to the American OS's direct provision of, or
"jump-starting" of the private provision of, credit insurance, reinsurance,
debt securitization, and "complete" risk-trading markets as preferred means
of spreading ownership and risk in a manner consistent with the American
EEOR's fundamental values, endowment heuristics, and legal traditions.
Schematizing this general form prior to the interpretive programmatic
history of Part V helps bring conceptual coherence to the latter, hence to
4. This Article works toward a reconciliation of that great divide-the Jeffersonian and
Hamiltonian clash over how best to ensure an enduring and more perfect union-that split our country
in its earliest days and continues, in significant measure, to divide us today. For further discussion on
that divide, see, for example, STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC McKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 257-450
(1993); FORREST MCDONALD, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 255-325 (1979).
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our patchwork OS history itself. More importantly, it allows us to locate
and close gaps in that fragmented history, enabling us to unify our efforts
and undertake the programmatic task of building a full and authentically
American OS-a "Jeffersonian republic by Hamiltonian means."
Part VI derives specific recommendations from the Part IV financeinformed historical interpretation of Part V, and finally, Part VII concludes
with a reflection on the historic significance of what we shall have
achieved in bringing about a truly comprehensive American OS.
II. VALUES REVIVED: THE AMERICAN OWNERSHIP SOCIETY AS
AN EFFICIENT EQUAL-OPPORTUNITY REPUBLIC
An implementable and enduring American OS must cohere with, and
ideally will deeply resonate with, our most cherished and cultureconstituting values. Those foundational values find expression in three
dominant strands of ideological or valuational tradition that recur
throughout American political and constitutional history. The three
traditions and their constitutive values converge upon a basic structure that
I call the "efficient equal-opportunity republic," or "EEOR.- 5 The EEOR is
a schematic ideal; the closer that a society comes to approximating it in its
basic outlines, the more fully that society conforms to or resonates with the
core American values.
A. THREE POLITICAL TRADITIONS: Civic REPUBLICAN, CLASSICAL

LIBERAL, AND PRAGMATIC CONSEQUENTIALIST
The first strand of American political tradition is the Civic Republican
("CR"), which has prized collective self-government by civically engaged,
productively responsible, and materially independent-though, outside of
deliberative community, potentially hyper-acquisitive or overreachingcitizens. 6 The aforementioned traits are underwritten by roughly equitable
allocations of certain basic resources-material "stakes"-that afford
citizens satisfaction only insofar as they use them prudently and
productively. But differential luck-in particular, luck in the genetic
lottery-enjoyed by republican citizens can threaten these "roughly
equitable allocations" over time, giving rise to tendencies toward
plutocracy, and ultimately, societal dysfunction and political instability.
Yet some means of redressing those long-term disequilibria can
5. For a more detailed treatment of the subjects in this part, see Hockett, Whose Ownership?,
supra note 3, at Parts II, HI.
6. See id. at Part II.
A.
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superficially appear to threaten some republicans' cherished resourcerooted independence. Thus, there has historically been some ambivalence
over the proper "balance" to be struck between "liberty" and "equality" in
7
the CR tradition.
Prototypic images of the ideal polity that have appealed to CR thinkers
over time include the preimperial Roman Republic as idealized by some of
its historians, 8 the northern Italian city-states of the early Renaissance as
idealized by their historians, 9 the northern European republics of the early
modern period as idealized by their apologists, 10 and of course, Jefferson's
fabled "yeoman republic" as envisaged not only by Jefferson but also by
many of the American founders.' 1 CR thinking, idealized images, and
The EEOR addresses and aids in resolving this ambivalence. See infra Part II.B.2.
See, e.g., POLYBIUS, THE HISTORIES (W.R. Paton ed. & trans., William Heinemann 1960)
(n.d.); TACITUS, AGRICOLA, GERMANIA, AND DIALOGUS (R.M. Ogilvie et al. eds. & trans., rev. ed.,
7.
8.

Harvard Univ. Press 1980) (n.d.); VIRGIL, ECLOGUES, GEORGICS, AND AENEID (G.P. Goold ed., H.

Rushton Fairclough trans., rev. ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1999) (n.d.).
9. See, e.g., FRANCESCO GUICCIARDINI, DIALOGUE ON THE GOVERNMENT OF FLORENCE
(Alison Brown ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1994) (n.d.); FRANCESCO GUICCIARDINI, THE
HISTORY OF ITALY (Sidney Alexander ed. & trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1969) (1561); NICCOLO
MACHIAVELLI, DISCOURSES ON LIVY (Harvey C. Mansfield & Nathan Tarcov trans., Univ. of Chicago
Press 1996) (n.d.); NICCOLo MACHIAVELLI, FLORENTINE HISTORIES (Laura F. Banfield & Harvey C.
Mansfield, Jr. trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1988) (n.d.). See also MACHIAVELLI AND REPUBLICANISM
(Gisela Bock et al. eds., 1990); HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, MACHIAVELLI'S VIRTUE (1996); J.G.A.
POCOCK, POLITICS, LANGUAGE AND TIME: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY 80-147
(1971); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE
ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975) [hereinafter POCOCK, MOMENT]; J.G.A. POCOCK, VIRTUE,
COMMERCE, AND HISTORY (1985).
10. See, e.g., VISCOUNT BOLINGBROKE, POLITICAL WRITINGS (David Armitage ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1997) (n.d.); JAMES HARRINGTON, THE COMMONWEALTH OF OCEANA AND A SYSTEM OF
POLITICS (J.G.A. Pocock ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1992) (1700). For accounts from popularizers of
these thinkers, see JOSEPH ADDISON, CATO (1996); ALGERNON SIDNEY, COURT MAXIMS (Hans W.
Blom et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (n.d.); JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, 1
CATO'S LETITERS: ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS, AND OTHER IMPORTANT SUBJECTS
(Ronald Hamowy ed., Liberty Fund 1995) (1755). See also JOYCE OLDHAM APPLEBY, ECONOMIC
THOUGHT AND IDEOLOGY IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND (1978); J.C.D. CLARK, ENGLISH
SOCIETY 1660-1832 (2d ed. 2000); ISAAC KRAMNICK, BOLINGBROKE AND HIS CIRCLE: THE POLITICS
OF NOSTALGIA IN THE AGE OF WALPOLE (1968); QUENTIN SKINNER, LIBERTY BEFORE LIBERALISM
(1998). See generally POCOCK, MOMENT, supra note 9, at 333-505.
11.
See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 154 (enlarged ed. 1992); BERNARD BAILYN, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1970); ELKINS &
MCKITRICK, supra note 4; POCOCK, MOMENT, supra note 9, at 506-52; JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL
MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996); GORDON S. WOOD,
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787, at 1-124, 391-467 (1969); GORDON S.
WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 95-225 (1991). See also DOUGLASS G.
ADAIR, THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY: REPUBLICANISM, THE CLASS
STRUGGLE, AND THE VIRTUOUS FARMER (Lexington Books 2000) (1964); APPLEBY, supra note 10;
JOYCE APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER: THE REPUBLICAN VISION OF THE 1790S
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values have continued to figure prominently in American public policy, and
to a somewhat lesser extent in American legal tradition since the
founding. 12 They are particularly conspicuous in Americans' undiminished
commitment to the core values of civic engagement and personal
responsibility, as manifested rhetorically in celebrations of patriotism, hard
work, small business, and "the family farm."' 13 This is demonstrated at
length in the predecessor article, and is further borne out in Part V of this
Article.
The second strand of American political tradition is the Classical
Liberal ("CL"). It has prized constitutionally bounded democratic
decisionmaking as to properly "public" matters by mutually respectful,
though again potentially overreaching, autonomous citizens who in turn
bear exclusive sovereignty over essentially "private" matters. 14 Private
matters are matters directly involving citizens' valuational decisions as to
what constitutes "the good life."' 15 Public matters are matters that properly
(1984); JOYCE APPLEBY, LIBERALISM AND REPUBLICANISM IN THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION (1992)
[hereinafter APPLEBY, LIBERALISM AND REPUBLICANISM].

12. See Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 3, at Part B.A. See also infra Part V. CR has
enjoyed a revival in academia over the past fifteen years. See, e.g., Jerry Mashaw, As if Republican
Interpretation, 97 YALE L.J. 1685 (1988); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493
(1988); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-government,
100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539
(1988); Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988). For recent philosophic
work with a republican cast, see PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND
GOVERNMENT (1997); PHILIP PETrT, THE COMMON MIND: AN ESSAY ON PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIETY, AND
POLITICS (1993); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); MICHAEL P.
ZUCKERT, NATURAL RIGHTS AND THE NEW REPUBLICANISM (1994). Academic work reflecting the CR

commitment to "deliberative democracy," its self- and society-constitutive roles, and its political virtues
and vices has also grown prodigiously in recent years. See, e.g., DEBATING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
(James S. Fishkin & Peter Laslett eds., 2003); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY
AND DISAGREEMENT (1996); CARLOS SANTAIGO NINO, THE CONSTITUTION OF DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY (1996). For a proposal aimed at bringing a greater degree of reasoned, CR-redolent
deliberation back to American electoral politics, see BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN,
DELIBERATION DAY (2004); ETHAN J. LEIB, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A PROPOSAL

FOR A POPULAR BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT (2004). Probably the most influential contributor to the
revived interest in deliberative politics and rationality is Juirgen Habermas. See, e.g., JURGEN
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND
DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996) (1992); JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, VOLUME 1: REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY (Thomas

McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1984) (1981); JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE
ACTION, VOLUME 2: LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON (Thomas

McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1987) (1981).
13. See Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 3.
14. See id. at Part II.B.
15. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 19-20, 29-40 (1993) [hereinafter RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM]; JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 358-65 (rev. ed., 1999) (hereinafter
RAWLS, THEORY].
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concern all citizens in the shared project of cooperatively maximizingsubject to some rough equalizing-the volume of that sphere of private
autonomy available to each citizen in pursuit of the good life as each sees
it. 16 Just as the familial estates or households that make up the CR polity
require allocations of basic resources to retain their responsible
independence, so the individuals who make up the CL polity require basic
formal and material opportunities to operationalize and retain their17
autonomy, that is, to conceive and pursue their visions of the good life.
And just as CR accordingly features tensions between the ideal of
independence and the means of retaining rough equity in the allocation of
basic resources,
CL features superficial tensions between "liberty" and
"equality." 18
CL draws upon a smaller repertoire of ideal images than does CR,
perhaps because CL thinking attained prominence only after the
mythological views of past "golden ages" had become more widely
suspect-roughly, during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries-than it was during the salad days of CR. But attractive images
are nonetheless available, for example, Rousseau's Geneva, Hume's
Edinburgh and London, and Rawls's "social union of social unions." And
many contemporary democracies with constitutionally guaranteed bills of
civil (that is, individual autonomy) rights approximate ideal liberal
polities. 19 Like CR thinking, CL thinking has been prominent in American
public policy since the time of the Declaration of Independence and the Bill
of Rights, and is even more prominent in recent decades in American
16.

See, e.g., RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 15; RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 15.

The class of public matters roughly coincides with what economists-many of them inheritors of the
CL tradition-classify as public goods. See Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 3, at Parts IB,
ll.C, Iu.
17. Rawls famously labels these "primary goods." RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 15, at 54-55,
78-81, 348, 358-65. Ronald Dworkin calls them "resources." Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part
1: Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185 (1981); Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2:
Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283 (1981) [hereinafter Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part
2]. Amartya Sen calls them "capabilities." Amartya Sen, Equality of What?, in EQUAL FREEDOM:
SELECTED TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 307, 327-28 (Stephen Darwall ed., 1995). Richard
Arneson refers to them as "opportunit[ies] for welfare." Richard J. Arneson, Equality and Equal
Opportunity for Welfare, 56 PHIL. STUD. 77, 85-88 (1989); Richard J. Arneson, Liberalism,
Distributive Subjectivism, and Equal Opportunityfor Welfare, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 158 (1990). G.A.
Cohen calls them an "access to advantage." G.A. Cohen, On the Currency of EgalitarianJustice, 99
ETHICS 906, 907 (1989). See generally Robert Hockett, The Deep Grammar of Distribution:A Metatheory of Justice, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1179 (2005).
18. See, e.g., RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 15, at 4-5. This Article addresses and
works toward resolving these tensions. See infra Part l.B.

19.

See Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 3, at Part ll.B.
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public law. 20 It has been particularly conspicuous in Americans'
undiminished commitment to individual liberty (or privacy or personal
autonomy) and the "pursuit of happiness," though this commitment
sometimes is viewed, by both CR and CL lights, as having led to
backsliding on the commitment to "life. 2 1 Again, this commitment to
autonomy and the "pursuit of happiness" is demonstrated in this Article's
prequel and further borne out in Part V.
The third strand of American political tradition is what I call the
Pragmatic Consequentialist ("PC"), which has tended to evaluate policies
less with a view to their resonance with idealized conceptions of the human
person and appropriate political structure than with a view to either or both
of two stripped-down evaluative focal points. 22 The first focal point is
aggregated wealth or welfare: all else equal, PC views as best that policy
which maximizes gross domestic product ("GDP") or somehow-aggregated
satisfactions.2 3 The second focal point, which in practice has tended
20.
Id. See also APPLEBY, LIBERALISM AND REPUBLICANISM, supra note 11; JOHN PATRICK
DIGGINGS, THE LOST SOUL OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1984); STEVEN M. DWORETZ, THE UNVARNISHED
DOCTRINE: LOCKE, LIBERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1990); LOUIS HARTZ, THE
LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT SINCE THE
REVOLUTION (1955); KRAMNICK, supra note 10. For contemporary academic argument with a liberal
cast, see, for example, BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); RONALD
DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY (2000) [hereinafter
DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE]; RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, TAKINGS]; CHARLES
FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG (1978); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974); RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 15; RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 15; JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY
OF FREEDOM (1986); ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1985);
JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS (1993).
21. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993); MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN
WESTERN LAW (1987); EDWARD KEYNES, LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND PRIVACY: TOWARD A
JURISPRUDENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS (1996); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH
OF ABSOLUTES (1992). The quoted language in the text alludes to the foundational statement of

American political values, CR Jefferson's CL Declaration of Independence, which reads as a virtual
abstract of the foundational work of modem CL, John Locke's Second Treatise on Government. See
THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Declaration by the Representatives of the United States of America, in General
Congress Assembled (1776), reprinted in WRITINGS 19 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984); JOHN LOCKE,
Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).

22.
23.

See Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 3, at Part H.C.
See id. See also JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND

LEGISLATION (1789), reprinted in JOHN STUART MILL & JEREMY BENTHAM, UTILITARIANISM AND
OTHER ESSAYS 65, 86-89 (Alan Ryan ed., Penguin Books 1987) [hereinafter UTILITARIANISM]
(describing welfare as "utility" or "happiness"); J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49
ECON. J. 696 (1939) [hereinafter Hicks, Foundations] (describing wealth as "compensation"); J.R.
Hicks, The Valuation of Social Income, 7 ECONOMICA 105 (1940) [hereinafter Hicks, Valuation]
(same); Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility,
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sometimes to play second fiddle to the first, is that of fairness. All else
being equal-and in particular, all else equally conducing to maximal
GDP-PC favors that policy which conduces to the fairest distribution of
some politically salient benefit or burden, for example, opportunity or
risk.24
PC thinking traffics less in ideal imagery than does CL thinking, and
even less so than does CR thinking. Insofar as pictures do figure into the
thinking of PC advocates, images of the United States during boom
periods-for example, the earlier nineteenth century and post-Civil War
years, and more recently the 1950s and 1990s-probably are those that are
most often viewed as replication-worthy. 25 PC thinking figures prominently
in much contemporary policy discourse throughout the industrialized and
"post-industrial" worlds, at least as prominently as do CR and CL
thinking.2 6 Certainly it is conspicuous in American political life, as
evidenced by such slogans as "equal pay for equal work" and "it's the
economy, stupid." Nonetheless, CR and CL images and ideals continue to
exert a strong allure in, among other places, contemporary "social issues"
and "culture wars" debates.
It will prove helpful in charting a range of fundamental consensus
among the three traditions that PC can instructively be viewed as a
"stripped-down" or "streamlined" version of CL, which in turn can be
viewed as a streamlined version of CR.2 7 The PC maximization focal point
probably derives from the respective CR and CL values of responsibility
49 ECON. J. 549 (1939) (same); Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism,Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J.
LEG. STUD. 103 (1979) [hereinafter Posner, Utilitarianism](same); Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and

Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980)
[hereinafter Posner, Efficiency Norm] (acknowledging that "wealth-maximization" is policy made
pursuant to the Kaldor-Hicks criterion).
24. Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 3, at Part I.C. It has at times been argued that, in
view of the postulate of diminishing marginal utility of income, utility-maximization is not only
consistent with, but also is indeed best wrought by "fairness" conceived as income-equalization. See,
e.g., R.M. HARE, FREEDOM AND REASON 112-36 (1963); ABBA P. LERNER, THE ECONOMICS OF
CONTROL (1944); JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1861), reprinted in UTILITARIANISM, supra
note 23, at 272, 335-36; A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1962); HENRY SIDGWICK,
THE METHODS OF ETHICS 388-427 (London, MacMillan 1874); J.A. Mirrlees, The Theory of Optimal
Taxation, in 3 HANDBOOK OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 1187 (Kenneth J. Arrow & Michael D.
Intriligator eds., 1986); J.A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38
REV. ECON. STUD. 175 (1971). This claim is to be distinguished from the argument offered in Part

Il.B.3 that equal opportunity is consistent with ethically cognizable efficiency, just as fairness is to be
distinguished from income equalization. See infra Part ll.B.3.
25. See Hockett, Whose Ownership?,supra note 3, at Part .C.
26. Id.
27. For a fuller discussion of the claims made in the next several paragraphs, see id. at Parts 11,
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(conceived as productivity) and pursuit of the good life (conceived as
wealth or welfare).28 The fairness focal point likely derives from the CR
and CL values of rough equality in exogenous endowments, with "fair"
equating to equal distribution of that for which one is not responsible,
another aspect of CR responsibility and CL autonomy. 29 And the
ambivalent relations between the focal points reflects PC's inheritance of
CR's and 30 CL's quandaries over the superficial liberty/equality
conundrum.
As noted above, the gradual morphing of CR into CL, and of CL into
PC, have not resulted in abandonment of CR or CL as systems of social
valuation, notwithstanding PC's prominence in economic policy
discourse. 3 ' Nor have they ultimately solved the perennial (though again, as
we shall see, superficial) conundra of liberty and equality endemic to CR
and CL, or the associated measurement difficulty endemic to CL. But the
morphological history does, happily, afford assistance to those who seek to
reconcile the traditions in an effort to design an OS that is consonant with
American values and seek to solve or sidestep the dilemmas contained or
concealed in the three American valuational traditions. This is what we
effect in schematizing the EEOR, which serves as the most broadly
appealing ideological template for an American OS.
B. THE JOINT PRODUCT OF OUR THREE TRADITIONS: AN EFFICIENT
EQUAL-OPPORTUNITY REPUBLIC

The unified national self-understanding to which the three American
valuational traditions converge amounts to a vision of what I call an
EEOR.3 2 The EEOR, like the three traditions that it synthesizes, gives
expression to an integrated cluster of ethical, political, and economic ideals.
Those ideals incorporate a view of the human person (or citizen), a
coordinate view of the proper role of social organization, and thus a view
about appropriate political, economic, and legal arrangements.
28. See infra Part I1..1.
29. See infra Part I1B.2.
30. See infra Parts n.B.2, 1.B.3 (proposing means of defusing this conundrum).
31. One can witness the prominence of "values," "social issues," and "culture war" concerns in
contemporary political controversy.
32. See Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 3, at Part il.
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1. Owner-citizens as Responsible Agents
All three American political traditions effectively construe citizens as
ethically autonomous, boundedly responsible agents. 33 Responsible agents
substantially affect their own well-being by explicitly or implicitly
formulating and pursuing individual conceptions of the good life. But they
also are affected and constrained in doing so by features of the
environments into which they are born. Their inherited social and familial
relations, capacities, and resources permit agents wide, but nonetheless
limited, latitude in altering or exiting their environments.
It is critical to note in this connection, however, that respect for
others' agency entails more than respect for their freedom to choose and to
act. It also entails a right to demand that they respect others as they
themselves expect to be respected. And it entails respect for their living
with many of the consequences of their choices and actions. It entails, that
is, our holding others-again, boundedly-responsible for their actions and
to one another. To let others too often "off of the hook," for example, with
the observation that "she could not help it" or "he was simply looking out
for his interests," would be to view them and their fellows not as equally
respect-worthy agents-active and mutually respectful forgers of fate-but
as rightful tyrants or chattels, patients or addicts, or passive objects of fate
and of others. 34 We would be viewing them more as our pets or our betters
than as our peers.
The appreciation of boundedly responsible agency ultimately
underwrites the CR view of citizens as independent and resource-using,
but, outside of community, as nonetheless corruptible, potentially hyperacquisitive beings. These citizens' corruptibility and hyper-acquisitiveness
are modulated, in the CR view, precisely as they respond, and are thus
33. See JAMES E. BLOCK, A NATION OF AGENTS: THE AMERICAN PATH TO A MODERN SELF AND
SOCIETY (2002). See also Hockett, supra note 17, at 1216-19 (describing the construal of "distribuees"
as agents as the modem trend in theories of distributive justice). The CL tradition tends to emphasize
agency while sometimes attending less carefully to responsibility, while the CR tradition tends to
reverse that order of emphasis. See Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 3, at Parts II, III; Samuel
Scheffler, Responsibility; Reactive Attitudev, and Liberalism in Philosophy and Politics, 21 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 299 (1992). This Article aims to restore an equal emphasis on both aspects of the ethically
viewed person. That symmetry of emphasis is conceptually more consistent than is emphasis placed
only on one aspect of the essential unity that is responsible agency. Further, restoring equality of
emphasis is practically more consistent with the American valuational tradition and the aim of building
an "ownership society" true to that tradition.
34. See Hockett, supra note 17. See also DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 20, at 285303; Robert Hockett, Three (Potential)Pillarsof TransnationalEconomic Justice: The Bretton Woods
Institutions as Guarantors of Global Equal Treatment and Market Completion, 36 METAPHIL. 93
(2005); Daniel Markovits, How Much Redistribution Should There Be?, 112 YALE L.J. 2291 (2003).
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rendered responsible to others who are their rough equals in dignity,
capacity, and vulnerability. The appreciation of boundedly responsible
agency also underlies the CL view of citizens as autonomous but
potentially overreaching persons who at times attempt illegitimately to
externalize costs by taking more than their legitimate shares of benefits or
otherwise ignoring the interests of others-persons who must therefore be
held publicly to account. Responsible agency does not, on the other hand,
figure prominently into the PC tradition. But nor is there anything in that ad
hoc and minimalist tradition that need contradict agency. 35 Indeed, we shall
see that the PC values of "fairness" and "efficiency" are best understood by
reference to responsible agency.
2. Responsible Agency as Equal Opportunity
The consensus view of citizens as boundedly responsible agents
suggests a view of ethically and politically salient assets-what we shall
see in Part III constitute the stuff of ownership-as resources or
opportunities that citizens themselves autonomously value. Assets are what
citizen-agents deploy in seeking their self-formulated ends, in "pursuing
happiness." Salient liabilities, in turn, are the converse-resource deficits,
handicaps, and risks. Resources or opportunities, then, are the material
correlates of agency itself; they are the stuff of which worthwhile lives, as
conceived by agents themselves, are 36made. They are accordingly that in
which ownership rights should inhere.
It is critical in this connection that just as the autonomy that we value
in responsible agents is responsible autonomy, so are the resources or
opportunities that we view as appropriately held by responsible agents
appropriately allocated resources or opportunities. Opportunity-equality is
the material correlate of agents' mutual responsibility, as opportunity shorn
of equitable allocation is liberty shorn of responsibility-libertinism.3 7 One
is not responsive to the agency of others, one does not think or act
responsibly toward them, insofar as one explicitly or implicitly demands
35. Utilitarianism, on the other hand, at least in its nonveiled form, would contradict it by
treating citizens as patients or addicts. See DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 20, at 303;
Hockett, supra note 17, at 1265-68, 1272-74. PC, however, merely borrows a maximizing imperative
from Utilitarianism; it is not coextensive with it. This Article returns to this matter in considering CR,
CL, and PC views on property rules versus liability rules. See infra Part IlI.
36. Part Ill is devoted to the more precise legal contours and psychological significance of
ownership in the EEOR or American OS.
37. "Libertarianism," as articulated without regard to the pattern of exogenous endowments by
thinkers such as Richard Epstein and Robert Nozick, is irresponsible liberalism-attending to agency
while disregarding responsible agency. See EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 20; NOZICK, supra note 20.
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greater exogenously given opportunity than they. Call this the "equal
opportunity principle" ("EOP").
As abstract propositions, these claims, like the construal of citizens as
boundedly responsible agents, all are consonant with the constitutive
valuations of the CR, CL, and PC traditions, hence of the American
tradition. CR projects an equilibrium of roughly equally empowered
persons who would take all that they could were they not constrained by
others' equal graspingness and a consequent political settlement. CL in turn
extols an equilibrium of equal freedoms-practical, not merely theoretic
freedoms-held by equally respect-worthy and thus mutually respectful
agents. And PC settles on the focal points of fairness and efficiency in its
assessments of public policies that effect allocations of benefit and burden;
while fairness and efficiency, in turn, are best construed as properties of
allocations that reflect equality of opportunity and differential results of
differential responsible choice. In theory, then, if not always articulately,
all three American political self-understandings effectively commit
themselves to equal "real" or "material," not just formal, opportunity.
3. Practically Reconciling and Realizing Responsible Agency and Equal
Opportunity
It might be thought that there cannot exist a consensus view among
CR, CL, and PC on the matter of responsible liberty's entailing equal
material opportunity. For Part II.A itself took note of "ambivalence" even
within CR, CL, and PC over material equality. The appearance, however,
of disagreement within these traditions is misleading; it is the product of
insufficient attention to two related factors.
The first factor is a semantic ambiguity. "Resource" or "opportunity"
can be taken to denote anything that enters into a "production function,"
irrespective of the circumstances under which the producer has acquired
that "input." The terms can also be taken to denote only such inputs for the
possession of which the producer is not actually responsible. 38 When the
terms are employed in the first sense, the claim that resources (or, less
frequently, opportunities) should be "equalized" can appear to do injustice
to the American EEOR value of responsibility.
In order to eliminate the semantic ambiguity and thus one source of
the apparent ambivalence over equal opportunity, I employ the modifier
"ethically endogenous" to designate resources and opportunities for the
38. We tend generally to understand "opportunity" in the latter sense and "resource" in the
former sense, though both may be understood in either sense.
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39
enjoyment or holding of which agents can reasonably be held responsible. 40
I employ "ethically exogenous" to designate those for which they cannot.
Ethically exogenous opportunities or resources are "windfalls"; deficits
therein are "hard luck." Ethically endogenous opportunities, resources, or
deficits therein have been "earned" or are "deserved."

The second factor responsible for apparent ambivalence within
traditions over the matter of equal opportunity as a material correlate of
boundedly responsible agency is implicit in the endogeneity/exogeneity
divide noted above. It is also implicit in the characterization of agency
itself as "bounded." It is the problem, at least at the margins, of drawing the
boundary. I call this the "tracing" problem-the problem of tracing
portions of one's holdings separately back to ethically endogenous choice
and ethically exogenous circumstance. Where the problem gives rise to
disagreement, I shall sometimes call it the "boundary dispute,"-borrowing
the suggestive language of the American homesteading era discussed below
in Part V.
The tracing problem bears both conceptual and empirical aspects,
though both aspects intermeld. The conceptual aspect of the problem comes
in part with our uncertainty in "borderline" cases over what is appropriate
to hold people responsible for. First, there is uncertainty over whether
responsibility should be understood by reference to choice or by reference
to what might be called "ratification." 4 1 Second, there is uncertainty over
See Hockett, Whose Ownership?,supra note 3, at Part I.
39.
40. Id.
I adopt the term "ratification" here from the law of contract for what I think will be obvious
41.
reasons. The choice-versus-ratification controversy is rooted in the perceived disrespect of agency
entailed by not holding one responsible for such conditions as one might not have chosen, but with
which one nonetheless identifies. Forcing an equal distribution upon an ascetically minded cripple, for
example, notwithstanding that cripple's belief in the virtue of a life of self-denial, is thought by some to
be disrespectful of the ascetic cripple's agency, even if the cripple did not choose the handicap, and
even if the cripple's belief in the virtue of self-denial is in the nature of a "virtue made of necessity"-a
convenient rationalization or endogenous preference. Ronald Dworkin and T.M. Scanlon probably are
the best known adherents to what I am calling the ratification view. See, e.g., DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN
VIRTUE, supra note 20, at 285-303; T.M. Scanlon, Preference and Urgency, 72 J. PHIL. 655 (1975);
T.M. Scanlon, Jr., The Significance of Choice, in 8 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 149
(Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1988). For an antiratification perspective, see AMARTYA SEN, THE
STANDARD OF LIVING 11 (1987) (aruing that fulfillment of desires of the "slave" or "tamed housewife"
cannot be treated in the same way as fulfillment of desires of the better placed); Cohen, supra note 17.
We need not resolve the choice-versus-ratification dispute to continue with the EEOR. For one thing,
the problem is restricted in scope. For another, it seems fair enough simply to regard ratification in most
circumstances as itself a choice, a choice of attitude. Certainly, that would seem to be the view most in
harmony with the conception of citizens as agents, though we might make allowances in marginal cases
similar to those we make for addiction. For more on endogenous preferences, see GARY S. BECKER,
ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES (1996); JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES (1983); JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE
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what choices actually are "freely" made. Insofar as choice is the touchstone
of the analysis, the conceptual aspect of the tracing problem mingles with
the empirical aspect. The problem is that there appear to be differing
degrees of true freedom, hence of agency, inhering in differing choices.
One is not simply free or unfree; one is more free or less free in making
one's choices. The concept of responsibility is thus subject to problems in
its application familiar to students of the "logic of vagueness" since the
time of the Sorites paradox.4 2
Compounding the Sorites side of the empirical aspect of the tracing
problem is the fact that most resources or opportunities that one holds or
faces are the product of many concatenated occurrences involving both
chance and choice. Thus, even were it easy, in a binary manner, to describe
any one choice simply as either freely made or somehow forced, it
nonetheless would be daunting to parse out (a) some fractional subset f of
one's holdings attributable solely to one's responsible choices, and (b) a
complement 1-f of that subset attributable simply to fortune. This must be
added to the concern that it might be difficult or even impossible, owing to
interpersonal utility comparability and interitem commensurability
difficulties of the sort elaborated in Part II.B.2, to attach a specific
monetary value to such portions for purposes of determining adequate
compensation for the exogenously underendowed. It is unsurprising then
that there is at least some degree of surface disagreement not just in the
American political traditions, but in most political traditions over criteria
for assessing who should ideally be entitled to what.
Such difficulties should not, however, obscure the fact that there is
broad agreement within and among the American political traditions over
the basic principles here stated. Our disagreements are primarily over the
application of these principles in particular circumstances, that is, over the
empirics of what is actually earned and what is the mere product of good or
ill fortune. 43 We can exploit that fact on behalf of an American OS in two
SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY (1979); ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER:
MONEY AND HAPPINESS IN AN ERA OF EXCESS (1999); DAVID GEORGE, PREFERENCE POLLUTION: How
MARKETS CREATE THE DESIRES WE DISLIKE (2001); Hockett, supra note 17.

42.

The Sorites problem is the well-known conundrum concerning how many grains of sand it

takes to constitute a beach, how few hairs Socrates must have had on his head before he would have
been considered bald, etc. Logicians have by now developed sophisticated techniques for handling
predicates with vague contours, including "fuzzy logics," which now are proving fruitful in artificial
intelligence and other cybernetic fields. For more on the usability of such nonstandard logics for
purposes of welfare economics and normative legal and political theory, see Robert Hockett, Primary

Goods, InterpersonalComparisonsand NonstandardLogics, ECON. & PHIL. (forthcoming 2006).
43.
There is significant empirical corroboration of this claim itself. See, e.g., NORMAN FROHLICH
& JOE A. OPPENHEIMER, CHOOSING JUSTICE: AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH TO ETHICAL THEORY
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ways. First, we specify some classes of holdings that we all broadly agree
to be both measurable and ethically exogenous in the holding, then rest
EEOR ownership prescriptions in part on that range. 44 Second, we design a
Walrasian market mechanism, 45 set in motion within that range of
agreement, which honors citizens as boundedly responsible agents and the
EOP as allocation principle. In doing so, the mechanism yields another
benefit: it mitigates the measurement difficulties noted in Part II.A that
were there seen to be partly responsible for the magnitude of the tracing
problem.
a. Core Opportunity Endowments
We begin the process of sidestepping the boundary dispute by briefly
characterizing four classes of basic opportunity endowment that nearly all
Americans, whether adherents primarily of the CR, CL, or PC traditions,
will agree are ethically exogenous in the holding.
The first such class comprises opportunities for early education.
Boundedly responsible agent-citizens begin their lives as children. The
younger a child, the less responsible that child is for opportunities to learn,
to develop capacities to learn and do more, and to develop a sense of
control over and responsibility for that child's own educational future. As a
matter of unadulterated principle, such opportunity should be enjoyed by
all children as equitably as possible. That is a core American value. 46
The second class of exogenous opportunity endowment comprises
genetic determinants, insofar as we are able to determine them, of
successful life-planning, wealth-making, and happiness-pursuit. Such
determinants include all-but only-such aspects of basic human health
(1992); PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS (Barbara A. Mellers
& Jonathan Baron eds., 1993); TOM R. TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY (1997);
ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: THE NEW SCIENCE OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY (1994);
Kjell T6rnblom, The Social Psychology of Distributive Justice, in JUSTICE: INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES 177 (Klaus R. Scherer ed., 1992).

44. We can simply bracket those classes of holdings over which we disagree. A similar strategy
is employed, to helpful effect, in John E. Roemer, A Pragmatic Theory of Responsibility for the
Egalitarian Planner,22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 146 (1993). See also JOHN E. ROEMER, EQUALITY OF
OPPORTUNITY (1998).

45. The significance of the market's being "Walrasian" is elaborated later in this Article. See
also Hockett, supra note 34, at 100.
46. If San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez was correctly decided as a matter of
law, then the "law" applied there is not in keeping with American values. See San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that inequalities in school financing traceable to wealth
disparities among municipalities, hence to differential wealth of the families domiciled in different
school districts, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution).
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and functioning as are not attributable to decisions for which we reasonably
hold ourselves and others accountable. Birth with a handicap or
predisposition to debilitating illness warrants community effort to mitigate
the debilitating effects of the same.4 1° Debilitation wrought by substance
abuse, reckless driving, etc., does not require a similar response-though of
course it may reasonably elicit voluntary charitable assistance. Health,
basic functional capacity, and education can be regarded as elements of
"human capital."48 Equalizing early educational and basic health
endowments equalizes access to ethically exogenous human capital.
The third class of ethically exogenous opportunity endowment can be
characterized as access to nonhuman capital. We can think of the right to
equal access to such capital as the equal right to capitalize on one's own
diligence, an equal right to wealth-creating opportunity. 49 An equal right to
wealth-creating opportunity-to work diligently in satisfying others' wants
and to profit thereby-is a right to productive capital. Human capital is of
course productive in the requisite sense; that is, the sense in which it is
"capital." But it is doubtful that individually held human capital constitutes
the principal portion of capital that individual agents use for the purposes
of production and profit. 50 Access to ownership of or participation in firms
and other wealth-creating consortia or networks surely is at least as
important.5 1
47. This value bears a venerable pedigree in the American self-understanding, as expressed, for
example, in the image of westward travelers allowing the old, very young, and infirm to ride in wagons
while the able-bodied walked beside them. This Article leaves open the question of how we should
determine how much compensation is owed. The best theoretical and practical answer thus far seems to
be the Arrovian-spirited one offered by Dworkin. See DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 20, at
307-19. See also Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM.
ECON. REV. 941 (1963); Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue Revisited, 113 ETHICS 106 (2002). See
infra Part In.B.3.b (noting ways in which we can incrementally improve upon that answer).
48. For a wide-ranging study of the importance of educational capital to an agent's long-term
earning prospects, see GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION (3d ed. 1994).

49. "Wealth" in this context is characterized somewhat narrowly: the right to wealth-making
opportunity would be the right to produce to satisfy others' wants and be remunerated and profit
therefrom. "Wealth" could also be understood more broadly, such that a right to equal wealth-creating
opportunity would be an equal right not only to produce remunerably for others, but also to produce the
happiness in one's self that results from the exercise of one's capacities-a very "Greek" form of
happiness. See generally JULIA ANNAS, THE MORALITY OF HAPPINESS (1993). Here, the remuneration

understanding of wealth is emphasized pursuant to Part 11's aim to identify an overlapping consensus
among the three traditions of American political self-understanding.
50. This statement assumes that such apportionment, or measurement, is possible. See infra Part
II.B.3.b.
51. There is no need to resolve disputes between followers of the heterodox "economists," Julian
Simon on the one hand and Louis Kelso and Mortimer Adler on the other, as to whether "knowledge
capital" or "machine capital" represents the "larger" portion of the value created through productive
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It is potentially more difficult to trace out the ethically exogenous and
ethically endogenous elements of nonhuman capital than of human capital
holdings. Unlike genetic endowments and early education, most nonhuman
capital holdings are held by adults, and adults have lived and acted long
enough for both responsible choice and nonresponsible circumstance to
concatenate and intermingle over time. Nevertheless, there are some
elements of nonhuman capital holding that all can agree to be attributable
to fortune, not effort. Large nonhuman capital inheritances or bequests are
an obvious example. They are nonhuman capital counterparts to genetic
endowments. To recognize that many such large holdings of nonhuman
capital are attributable to luck in the birth lottery need not commit us to
attitudes of envy or even to plans of confiscation, moreover. 52 We can view
the recognition instead as minimally committing us to channeling newly
discovered, opened, or potential pools of capital toward those who have not
been born into large holdings already. Examples here would include newly
usable segments of the electromagnetic spectrum, minerals found on the
seabed or under public or private lands, new resources eventually found
through publicly financed space exploration, and new cost-saving and
wealth-creating opportunities opened by the public facilitation of new
forms of insurance against risks that antecedently impede enterprise and
53
wealth development.
The fourth and final class of ethically exogenous opportunity
endowment is the opportunity to shed or share ethically exogenous risk
through trade or collective action. The idea here is that some misfortunes
which strike after birth and that are not reasonably foreseeable during
adulthood are misfortunes for which the victims are not responsible. Such
misfortunes are regarded, under the EOP, as joint misfortunes, at least
unless and until there is opportunity for equally exogenously endowed
agents to trade voluntarily their shares of such misfortunes in keeping with
their differential valuations, ex ante, of compensation claims contingent
upon their occurrence. The intuition finds expression in the venerable
organization. See Louis 0. KELSO & MORTIMER J. ADLER, THE CAPITALIST MANIFESTO 36 (1958)
(arguing that "technological improvements shift the burden of production from workers to capital
instruments"); JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ULTIMATE RESOURCE 2 (rev. ed. 1996) (arguing that "human

imagination" is the "principal" productive factor). This Article takes the perspective that both are
critical, and what matters most is access on equal terms-"equal" understood by reference to ethically
exogenous endowments.
52. The envy charge is leveled in Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109
ETHICS 287 (1999).
53. Such opportunities are counterparts to the "new" resources distributed widely and equitably
to the previously less resourced by, for example, the Homestead Act and the National Housing Act. See
infra Part V (providing detailed treatment of these and other financially cognate programs).
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American tradition, before the widespread availability of farmers'
insurance, of "barn-raising" for a neighboring farm struck by lightning
Insofar as we work to equalize core endowments, we advance the
cause of that EEOR which is the joint product of our fundamental values
and is the template of our American OS. We also facilitate the creation and
operation of that complete and neutral market described immediately
below. This market constitutes an ideal EEOR resource-allocation
mechanism which further diminishes the tracing problem and enables our
opportunity-equalizing efforts to yield a "multiplier effect" in realizing the
EEOR and advancing the cause of responsible agency.
b. Market, Measurement, and Distribution Mechanism
The next step in sidestepping the boundary dispute and fully realizing
the EEOR is to specify the structure of an asset- and risk-allocation
mechanism that does justice to (a) the EEOR's understanding of citizens as
boundedly responsible agents, (b) opportunities and risks as the material
correlates of agency, and (c) the EOP as the appropriate allocation
principle. It happens that the best such mechanism also neutralizes the
measurement conundra that historically have exacerbated the tracing
problem.
Here, in abbreviated and idealized form, is the mechanism elaborated
in the more theoretically oriented first article. 54 Assume first a substantially
"complete" market, a forum in which all and only desired, voluntary
trading occurs.5 5 Assume that trading is in, first, all goods and services that
can practically be made available and that anyone values; hence, that are
politically cognizable as ethically interesting distribuenda. Assume that the
trading is in, second, contingent claims to compensation upon the
occurrence of any eventuality that anyone disvalues, payable by anyone
54. See Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 3, at Part III.C.
55. Market "completeness" in this sense of all and only desired trading includes trading in
contingent claims. For the classic sources on the role of contingent claims in completing markets, see
GERARD DEBREU, THEORY OF VALUE (1959); J.R. HICKS, VALUE AND CAPITAL (2d ed. 1946); Maurice
Allais, Gniralisationdes Theories de L'Equilibre Economique Gingral et du Rendement Social au

Cas du Risque [A Generalizationof Theories of GeneralEquilibrium and Optimality in the Presence of
Risk], II ECONOMETRIE, COLLOQUES INTERNATIONAUX DU CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE
SCIENTIFIQUE 81 (1953); Kenneth J. Arrow, Le R6le de Valeurs Boursibres par la Ripartition la

Meilleure des Risques [The Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of Risk-bearing], II
ECONOMETRIE, COLLOQUES INTERNATIONAUX DU CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE
SCIENTIFIQUE 41 (1953). For fuller treatment on market completeness, see MICHAEL MAGILL &
MARTINE QUINZII, 1 THEORY OF INCOMPLETE MARKETS (1996); Robert Hockett, Just Insurance

Through Global Macro-hedging: Information, Distributive Equity, Efficiency, and New Markets for
Systemic-Income-Risk-Pricing and Systemic-Income-Risk-Trading in a "New Economy," 25 U. PA. J.

INT'L ECON. L. 107 (2004).
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willing to take the opposite sides of these, what amount to cautious "bets"
on the disvalued contingencies.
Assume further that this market is "neutral" in an ethically rich sense.
It is neutral, first, in that each participant enters it with an initial
endowment of ethically exogenous desired assets equal to that with which
everyone else enters it. It is neutral, second, in that regulatory norms
effectively prevent such collusively, strategically, or expropriatively
opportunistic behaviors as would effectively result in some participants
coming to possess greater or lesser holdings or "price-affecting effective
demand powers" than would be traceable to such ethically exogenous
initial endowments and their ethically endogenous transaction histories
alone. 56 This mechanism straightforwardly instantiates in broad outline the
ownership-allocation regime prescribed by our synthesized American
EEOR tradition.
The mechanism honors citizen-participants as responsible agents.
They transact voluntarily pursuant to their own, autonomous relative
valuations of items and contingencies that they prefer and do not prefer in
keeping with their pursuit of happiness. The mechanism, via the neutrality
imposed upon it at the outset and retained throughout, also equalizes what
is ethically exogenous--or that which is not traceable in the holding
directly to a responsible choice-while nonetheless allowing holdings to
vary over time with ethically endogenous responsible transactional
decisions. Holdings at time T,, that is to say, are traceable to equalized
holdings at To and voluntary choices thereafter, including labor-expending
decisions.
c. Ethically Intelligible Second-Bests
The "complete" and "neutral" market schematized above constitutes a
stylized, ideal asset-allocation mechanism in the EEOR that is the template
for an OS consonant with core American values. Three challenges,
however, might appear to stand in the way of its realization, and thus
ultimately of both its capacity to enable us to sidestep the boundary dispute
and its suitability as a workable basic structure for the American OS. We
can, however, dispel these challenges.
56. This Article notes an ethically more satisfactory justification for much of current contract
doctrine, antitrust norms, and other forms of market regulation. See infra Part M. This Article also sets
aside, for the moment, the question of the means by which the first aspect of market-neutralizationendowment equalization-is effected, and the "problem of future generations." We turn to those matters
later in the Article. See infra Parts Ill-V.
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The first challenge is the matter of equalizing the aforementioned
"core endowments" to afford some degree of market-neutrality. If we have
to equalize those holdings, then it might be thought, since they are
heterogeneous, that we have to commensurate them. But how are we to do
that prior to the operation of the equal-endowment grounded market
mechanism? It is after all that mechanism itself which affords ethically
satisfactory commensuration-that is, social valuation/indexing pursuant to
a process in which each citizen bears an "equal vote" by dint of each
individual's entering that market with an equal initial endowment. Market
neutrality might, with the help of regulatory norms, be rendered selfperpetuating once attained. But how is it to be attained when the market
itself affords the measure of market-antecedent neutrality?
Were we able to start all over, of course, this problem would be
substantially diminished, if not indeed eliminated by simply giving each
citizen an equal allotment of coupons with which to bid on unowned
resources. 57 But even short of starting over, which it seems we likely
cannot do, there is a plausible second-best solution. First, note that the core
endowment types discussed above are limited in number, relatively easily
quantified, and equitably distributed by type, and thus in minimal, if any,
need of commensuration. If we distinguish between "beneficial" and
"burdensome" core assets, we see that this is particularly so of the
beneficial ones, early education and inherited nonhuman capital. The
burdensome ones, by way of some contrast, are a bit more difficult since
they include physically inalienable "internal resources." The hardest one is
genetically poor health or handicap. But many such deficiencies can
themselves be valued by reference to current prices affixed to their
mitigation-prostheses, medicines, etc. There seems no harm in beginning
to address such deficits with compensation equal to the going rates. Other
such deficits are not so readily mitigated. There the best that we can do is
probably to estimate the compensation that would be afforded by insurance
policies that typically are or would be purchased against such contingencies
58
by average persons of average means if such policies were available.
Clearly there is more guesswork here, but it need not be a shot in the dark.
57. Such is envisaged in Dworkin's "clamshell" auction. See Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2,
supra note 17, at 283-90.
58. See DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 20, at 307-50; Hockett, supra note 17, at
1318-22. For articles proposing "real" rather than "hypothetical" such insurance, see Hockett, supra
note 55; Alexander Tabarrok, Trumping the Genetic Tarot Card, 9 CONTINGENCIES 20 (1997). See also
John H. Cochrane, Time-Consistent Health Insurance, 103 J. POL. ECON. 445 (1995) (discussing the

costs of health insurance for long-term illnesses).
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While the first challenge is rooted in "neutrality," the second
challenge is rooted in "completeness": Is it reasonable to require that "all
and only desired trading" occur? Is that possible, and would we even want
it? Wouldn't we have to abandon our market-inalienability norms and
"commodify" everything? 59 And if not, can the mechanism do what it has
been charged to do?
This challenge is more easily addressed than the challenge directed to
neutrality. We begin with its desirability side and again look first to the
core opportunity endowments of Part II.B.2.a. All of these are subject, in
principle, to unobjectionable market-valuability already. Next, we consider
what else might be traded-"all that enters into agents' happiness-pursuit."
It is easy enough simply to bracket out of market transactions such things
as we should not wish to see commodified-babies or organs, for
example. 60 We need not worry here over disputes at these margins of
commodifiability. The mechanism does its work quite well through trade of
the many more goods and services that all of us agree ought to be tradable.
That concludes the desirability side of this challenge.
The feasibility side of the challenge comes in the transaction and
information cost barriers to market-completion in the technical sense. Is it
reasonable to suppose that all parcelings of ownable and tradable goods and
payment-claims defined in terms of all specifiable contingencies, can be
tradable? 6 I Here the short answer is that the problem has no real purchase
in the present context. The answer to the third challenge, discussed below,
shows that more complete and more neutral markets are always more
consistent with the EEOR's constitutive values than are less complete and
less neutral markets. There is, that is, an ordered set of second-bests that is
ordinally equivalent to the sets of more complete and more neutral markets.
So all we have to do is to move farther-as far as we are able-in the right
direction to become the best that we can be.
59.

The classic contemporary objection to "commodification" is found in Margaret Jane Radin,

Market-inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987). See also ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN
ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993); MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996).

Contemporary protests of commodification revive objections raised repeatedly in the past, including
two classic Victorian-era objections. THOMAS CARLYLE, PAST AND PRESENT (Richard D. Altick ed.,
N.Y. Univ. Press 1977) (1843); JOHN RUSKIN, UNTO THIS LAST AND OTHER WRITINGS 155-228 (Clive
Wilmer ed., Penguin Classics 1985) (1862).
60. The allusion is to Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby
Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978). The Landes and Posner article, among others, prompted the
objection in Radin, supra note 59.
61. See infra Part I1I.A. This question reemerges in connection with the discussion of the legal
dimensions of owning.

HeinOnline -- 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 67 2005-2006

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:45

The third challenge, just anticipated, is this: if you cannot achieve full
completeness and neutrality of the sort that characterizes the mechanism
that assists in realizing the EEOR, might it be that seeking more
completeness and more neutrality than you presently have could, ironically,
take you farther from that ideal goal? After all, isn't one feature of the
EEOR its putative "efficiency," and hasn't Oliver Hart, in this connection,
proved that movement in the direction of market completeness falling short
of full completeness can constitute movement toward Pareto-inferior endstates?62 We can reply intuitively here, reserving technical treatment for
another venue. 63 The intuitive reply is that the claim that there might be no
second-best here trades crucially upon an ethically uninteresting conception
of efficiency; the "best" to which it makes appeal, that is to say, is simply
not cognizable even as "good," let alone as best. The only politically
cognizable conception of optimality, by contrast, is one in respect of which
it happens that any forward movement on the completeness or neutrality
fronts results in forward movement on the only ethically intelligible
efficiency front. We complete the argument below, for it is best made in
connection with a fuller treatment of the last remaining value we have
noted to be constitutive of our EEOR: efficiency.
4. Equal Opportunity as Politically Cognizable Efficiency
The final step in deriving a unified political understanding from the
three constitutive American traditions is to show that PC fairness and
efficiency, despite much misleading or misinterpreted discourse upon the
point,64 areenoato
not at odds but fully complementary. Showing this resolves
superficial ambivalences not only within the PC tradition, but also within
the CR and CL traditions. For PC fairness properly construed is a rule of
thumb to which CR and CL themselves are committed by dint of their
commitment to the EOP; and efficiency properly understood, in turn, is a
material entailment of success in the pursuit of fairness properly
understood. One upshot, then, is that CR, CL, and PC readily reduce to one
political understanding-our EEOR-at least where ownership is
concerned; for efficiency is the last remaining subject upon which we have
not yet shown the traditions to be reconciled. Another upshot is that
ordered sets of variably complete and neutral markets, and the ordered set
62.

See generally Oliver D. Hart, On the Optimality of Equilibriumwhen the Market Structure Is

Incomplete, 11 J. ECON. THEORY 418 (1975).

63. See Robert Hockett, On the Ordinal Equivalence of Market-completeness, Market-neutrality
and Ethically Cognizable Efficiency (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
64.
See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 24-31 (1970); ARTHUR M. OKUN,
EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADE-OFF (1975).
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of variably efficient markets, are ordinally equivalent-meaning that our
concern about the realizability of a satisfactory second-best rendition of
that ideal market, which is the EEOR's preferred asset-allocation
mechanism, is also laid to rest.
The first step of the argument is to show that CR and CL are
committed to PC fairness. "Fairness," both in its everyday connotation and
in its denotation of the salient attributes of "fairness-promoting" PC
legislation and adjudication, means impartiality or even-handedness. To
render circumstances fair is to "level the playing field"-to remove barriers
or burdens that people face or suffer through no fault of their own.
Common synonyms of "fair" in this sense are "equitable" and "just."65 But
"fairness" in this sense, then, means nothing more or less than conformity
with the EOP. To treat parties impartially is to treat them as equals for
purposes of the treatment-that is, to eliminate inequities that are
exogenous to the purposes of the treatment. To be evenhanded with people
is to treat them impartially.
Second, fairness, in the equal opportunity sense, is efficient in the only
sense in which "efficiency" bears ethical significance. The argument here
bears both a negative and a positive aspect. First we will explicate the term
"efficiency," and then consider the negative and positive sides of the
argument that efficiency on any understanding, if stripped of fairness
considerations, is normatively otiose.
"Efficiency," in the everyday sense of the word, connotes the
maximization of output given a stipulated input, or the minimization of
input given a stipulated output. It means, roughly, "more" for "less." 66 The
more technical understandings of "efficiency" familiar to welfare
economists are reducible to variations on that theme. Pareto-efficient
distributions of goods or ills to persons are best understood, intuitively, as
distributive "input" vectors the aggregate "utility" scalars deriving from
which cannot be raised without lowering the individual utility of at least
one person. 67 Pareto efficiency accordingly is understood implicitly as the
65. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 633 (8th ed. 2004).
66. More strictly, but in less satisfactory sloganeering, it means: either "more" for "the same or
less," or "the same or more" for "less."
67.

See VILFREDO PARETO, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 103-80 (Ann S. Schwier &

Alfred N. Page eds., Ann S. Schwier trans., Augustus M. Kelley Pubs. 1971) (1927); VILFREDO
PARETO, THE MIND AND SOCIETY: A TREATISE ON GENERAL SOCIOLOGY, VOL. 4: THE GENERAL FORM

OF SOCIETY 1459-74 (Arthur Livingston ed., Andrew Bongiomo, Arthur Livingston & James Harvey
Rogers trans., Dover Publications 1963) (1935). Of course, the Pareto principle is intended to afford
technical means of sidestepping interpersonal utility comparison and with it, the standard argument
runs, aggregation. But leaving aside for present purposes that the standard argument runs aggregation
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maximization of (somehow, and covertly) aggregated utility, as constrained
by, and thus consistent with, the "veto" power wielded by anyone who
stands to suffer a utility loss in the event of some departure from some
status quo. It is this intuition, at any rate, that renders the Pareto criterion
ethically salient to those who make normative appeal to it; for why,
otherwise, should "we," self-interested utility-maximizers that we are in the
world of classical choice theorists, be interested in the heightened utility of
68
one who is not "us"?
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is yet closer to the workaday understanding
of "efficiency." Distributions are efficient in the Kaldor-Hicks sense if
there is no departure from them that would render some parties'
forthrightly aggregated gains-"wealth"-greater than other parties'
aggregated losses. 69 The guiding intuition again is that the welfare output
functions that
of a given distributive input is, given the welfare-production
7°
we have to work with, the "highest" that it can be.
Now note that efficiency on any of these understandings is
normatively vacuous unless it is understood by irreducible reference to
fairness. This is absolutely crucial, yet surprisingly often ignored. The point
can be made from both negative and positive directions. First, from the
negative direction, it is well established-though still, mysteriously,
and comparison together, the Pareto criterion trades for its ethical salience on an intuition which
implicitly imports aggregation. There is no reason for "society" to be interested in a Pareto-efficient
social choice rule dictating increases in the utilities of some so long as no one else's utilities are
diminished thereby, unless society itself is seen as thereby benefiting in some sense. That is the only
sense in which the principle can be ethically interesting, and it is of course an aggregative sense, as the
terms "society" and "social choice" indicate. For a fuller discussion on the analytic distinction between
interpersonal comparison and aggregation, see Hockett, supra note 17, at 1222-33. See also JOHN E.
ROEMER, THEORIES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 16-50 (1996); AMARTYA K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE

AND SOCIAL WELFARE (1970); Claude d'Aspremont, Axioms for Social Welfare Orderings, in SOCIAL
GOALS AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF ELISHA PAZNER, 19, 19-76 (Leonid
Hurwicz, David Schmeidler & Hugo Sonnenschein eds., 1985); Amartya Sen, On Weights and
Measures: Informational Constraintsin Social Welfare Analysis, 45 ECONONOMETRICA 1539 (1977).
68. See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW & F.H. HAHN, GENERAL COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS 5-6 (1971)
(discussing Edgeworth's and Pareto's settlement upon what now is known as the "Pareto criterion" as a
satisfactory conception of intelligible optimality).
69. For further discussion on Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, see Hicks, Foundations,supra note 23;
Hicks, Valuation, supra note 23; Kaldor, supra note 23; Posner, Efficiency Norm, supra note 23;
Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 23. The aggregation and assumed interpersonal comparability
imported with it enters via the "compensation principle." One compensates by affording utility equal to
that which is lost in the change for which compensees are compensated. Note the common root "coin,"
that is, "with," that is shared by both "comparison" and "compensation."
70. One "produces" welfare, in the Pareto and the Kaldor-Hicks senses, by distribution
operations. Those are the variable inputs, so to speak, while peoples' utility functions are the fixed
inputs.
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insufficiently observed-that mere maximization of an aggregate, be it of
welfare or of wealth, shorn of attention paid the fairness of the means by
which that aggregate is maximized is simply fetishism. 7 1 It is the pointless
pursuit of a valueless substance. It is critical to understand that the claim
here is not that maximization shorn of fairness is not good enough. It is that
it is not good at all; it is not so much as cognizable as "good," not
intelligible as something that "we" should collectively seek or "trade" for.
To hold otherwise is ethically on all fours with an argument that all public
policy should be framed with a view to maximizing the amount of bluecolored surface space in the universe. It just is not "good," in any sense to
enlarge something that is altogether severed from and thus has nothing to
do with anybody's equal moral agency. Yet that "something" is precisely
what "utility" and "wealth" are when treated as social ends in themselves,
detached from the ethical status of the modes of their production-in this
case, from their conformity with the EOP.72 Wealth and welfare, then, must
be understood by reference to principles of fair opportunity on the part of
responsible agents to engage in wealth- or welfare-creation before they can
be intelligible as values at all. They are "wealth" or "welfare," as
distinguished from a large endorphin count, or low C-fiber count, or from a
vast blue-colored surface space-a lifeless, insipid material substanceonly in so far as such is the case.
Now from the positive side, recall that the EOP requires not only that
ethically exogenous holdings of that from which satisfactions are derivedmaterial opportunities-be equalized, but also that ethically endogenous
such holdings be permitted to vary with responsible effort. But this means
that "satisfaction," "welfare," or "wealth" will be "maximized" in the only
ethically intelligible sense of those words-precisely insofar as the inputs
of "satisfaction-functions" are distributed in accordance with the EOP.
Agent-citizens are permitted to, and face all incentive to "produce" and
indeed "maximize" their own satisfactions under the EOP, which requires
that they be permitted to retain what they produce by their own efforts out
of exogenously given, fairly allocated resources. So "aggregate"
satisfaction will be "maximized" in the only sense in which satisfaction71.
See Hockett, supra note 17, at 1260-65, 1269-83. For a classic articulation of the argument,
see Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 191 (1980); Ronald Dworkin, Why
Efficiency? A Response to Professors Calabresi and Posner, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563 (1980). See also

Sen, supra note 17.
72.

A cognate, though distinct, insight is operative in Douglas Kysar's criticism of the tenuous

process/product distinction relied upon by advocates of sundry ethically problematic positions in regard
to a variety of legal-cum-policy disputes. See Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The
Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARv. L. REV. 525 (2004).
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maximization is ethically noteworthy. Every agent's satisfaction will be the
highest that it can be, consistent with the EOP. That, of course, states an
efficiency condition-a happiness-productive efficiency condition-that
bears ethical significance. And it appears to state the only such condition.
Once this is established, we see that there is no need to fret over the
theoretic coherence of the concept of a second-best where marketcompleteness and neutrality are concerned. Greater completeness and
neutrality mean greater honoring of productive, responsible agency and
equal opportunity as valued by the American EEOR. And they also mean,
therefore, greater efficiency in the only sense in which "efficiency" names
a core American EEOR value. So our EEOR will seek to render markets
more complete and neutral, both by fostering the spread of markets in more
goods and services-including risk-bearing services-and by seeking to
spread ever more widely the holding of more ethically exogenous, wealthproductive material opportunities, beginning with the "core endowments"
characterized above.
C. OPERATIONALIZING THE EEOR: ONWARD TOWARD OWNERSHIP

It is, then, at least roughly apparent that the EEOR, which is our
shared American political self-understanding, is, in effect, some kind of
OS, at least insofar as ownership is understood by reference to control over
the disposition of certain basic resources. Boundedly responsible citizens,
as agents whose autonomy in fashioning their own lives and pursuing
happiness with ethically exogenous material opportunities is to be honored,
are owners. They own their own lives, so to speak, in that they hold
exclusive rights to control and develop those lives, as consistent with the
equal self-owning rights of others.7 3 And those agents must be recognized
to own-rightfully to control the disposition of, the material correlates ofthe opportunities and resources that go into building those lives as well.
The fruits of those resource and opportunity inputs-what we have called
the ethically endogenous element-also properly belong to agents and also
must be owned. Such are what our agent-citizens autonomously and
rightfully bring to, and take from, that idealized market which allocates
goods and services in the EEOR, as sketched above. All of these are
analytic entailments of the construal of citizens as boundedly responsible
agents whose holdings can be ethically assessed in keeping with the EOP.
73. The equal rights qualifier spares the thesis of self-ownership from such objections as Cohen
raises against Nozick. See G.A. Cohen, Self-ownership, World-ownership, and Equality, in JUSTICE
AND EQUALITY HERE AND Now 108 (Frank S. Lucash ed., 1986); G.A. Cohen, Self-ownership, Worldownership, and Equality: PartI, 3 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 77 (1986).
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But this is, of course, only to begin to explicate the sense in which the
EEOR is an OS. Ownership is more than holding and controlling. It is
psychologically experienced, and legally secured, holding and controlling.
And there are differing forms and gradations of such experienced and
legally secured holding and controlling in American law and psychology.
Putting flesh on the bare bones of ownership in an American OS, then,
requires more than simply saying that ownership and what is owned are to
be understood by reference to the American political values of boundedly
responsible agency, ethically intelligible efficiency, and equal opportunity.
Those are the broad political-valuational features of a recognizably
American ownership society. Filling in the more specific legal,
psychological, and therefore ultimately programmatic details requires that
we take into account both the more detailed material realizations of the
constitutive American ideals and the "path-dependent" features of
American possessory sensibility and law themselves.
III. CONSTRAINTS RECONSIDERED: ASSETS, OPTIONS, AND
ENDOWMENTS IN THE EFFICIENT EQUAL-OPPORTUNITY
REPUBLIC
An enduring American OS, then, must cohere with more than the core
American political values. It should also make optimal accommodation
with, even outright use of, the defining features of ownership psychology
and ownership-contouring law found in contemporary America. It is of
course possible that those features evolve, or are affirmatively malleable by
concerted effort, over time. But there also is reason to doubt this, in light of
the facts that (a) endowment psychology and law, as is borne out below, are
bound up with ideological tradition, which changes only quite gradually
when at all; (b) substantial empirical evidence suggests that some aspects
of possessive psychology might even be "hard-wired"; and (c) ownershipdefining law, which appears to be symbiotically related to ownership
ideology and psychology, generally evolves slowly in a common law
system. So in building an American OS we will do well to treat American
endowment psychology and law, like the American political traditions, as
givens, working with, rather than against them. That general strategy
recommends a number of ownership promotion strategies that are likely to
work most effectively in the project of constructing an American OS.
Those strategies in turn are broadly divisible into strategy families
responsive to ownership's links with EEOR-defined bounded agency on the
one hand and its links with EEOR-defined responsibility on the other.
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A. LEGAL OWNERSHIP, AGENCY, AND ENDOWMENT PSYCHOLOGY

As observed in Part II, the American EEOR construes citizens as
boundedly responsible agents who develop themselves and build
worthwhile lives out of "inputs" of a certain kind-raw materials or basic
resources. Those materials or resources are best viewed as "real options" or
"material opportunities"-the outward correlates of agency itself.
1. Owned "Assets"
The notion of a resource, option, or material opportunity in ideological
terms translates into that of an "asset" in more specific legal or financial
terms.7 4 A deficit relative to some baseline endowment of such assets is,
symmetrically, a liability, as the negative correlate to an opportunity is a
risk. Resources are agency-enhancing, hence "asset-like," in degrees.
Those degrees are situated along several metrics or dimensions, all of
which are intelligible by reference to an ordinally equivalent scale of
degrees of agent autonomy.
A resource is more "asset-like," more autonomy-conferring, as it
becomes more generative, yielding further resources. These further
resources allow more choices to be made and the consequent realization of
greater autonomy. Land, machine tools, and other capital goods that
appreciate in value over time are prime examples.
Cognate with, but analytically distinct from an asset's capacity to
generate more resources, is its liquidity-the rate at which it can be
75
exchanged for or converted into other assets, money in particular.
Liquidity thus rides on the preferences and valuations of others. Greater
liquidity, like greater generativity, translates into a greater sphere of
choice-making autonomy.
Similarly, an asset becomes more "asset-like" with its amenability to
parceling-to spatial and temporal subdividing. If you cannot only sell
your house outright but also rent it to others, in part or in whole, again your
74. A deficit relative to some baseline endowment of such assets is, symmetrically, a liability, as
the negative correlate to an opportunity is a risk. See Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 3, at Part
IV.A. 1.
75.
See, e.g., MARTIN SHUBIK, I THE THEORY OF MONEY AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 399427 (1999). See also JAMES TOBIN, MONEY, CREDIT, AND CAPITAL 12-14 (1998) (emphasizing,
however, only the temporal rate at which the asset can be converted to cash).
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sphere of choice-hence autonomy-is widened; hence again, your asset is
more "asset-like.

76

Cognate with, but again distinct from its amenability to parceling, is
an asset's capacity to be detached or abstracted from objects and specified
in terms of performance. Call this the "abstraction effect." The abstraction
effect is well underway in contemporary accounting and finance, wherein,
for example, accounts payable and other rights to future performance are
counted as assets. This Article will note below, however, that the law has
not quite kept up.
77
Resources also are more asset-like insofar as they are more durable,
reliable, or secure in either a physical or legal sense. Rapid erosion,
uninsurability against loss, or inadequate legal protection, for example,
results in a diminution of the autonomy realized through holding an asset,
hence a diminution of that asset's "asset-likeness."
Finally, and again relatedly, for reasons that appear to be rooted in
law, psychology, or both, as we shall see below, resources appear to
function more as assets according to the extent to which they are "hard"
and already accumulated, in a rough and ready physical or temporal sense
that perhaps regrettably eludes orthodox financial intelligibility. Stocks,
that is, appear to our psychology and law to be more "asset-like" than do
flows. 78 We shall return to this puzzling distinction below.
76. James Tobin also singles out what he terms an asset's "divisibility" as a fundamental
attribute. He limits his discussion, however, to fractional unit sizes along the single dimension of simple
quantity. See TOBIN, supra note 75, at 15.
The ability to parcel and abstract is, in part, a function of the legal system's regime of property
and contract, though it is also a function of the information and related transaction costs of complex
estate- or entitlement-delineation. For discussion of the significance of parcelability for the property
regime, see Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property:
The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus
Governance: Two Strategies of PropertyRights, 31 J. LEG. STUD. 453 (2002); Thomas W. Merrill &
Henry E. Smith, The Property/ContractInterface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773 (2001). For discussion on
information costs and their import for the property regime, see Henry E. Smith, The Language of
Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105 (2003).
77. Durability is related to, but nonetheless distinct from, Tobin's "predictability." See TOBIN,
supra note 75, at 16-20, 23-26. "Predictability" refers to the degree to which an asset's cash value at
future dates can be accurately anticipated. Id.
78. Pursuant to the endowment effect and cognate heuristics documented by experimental
economists, wealth that one holds appears to be "worth" more than wealth that one might or will hold in
the future. This Article does not distinguish among endowment effects, loss-aversion, or willingness-toaccept and willingness-to-pay gaps. Nor does it distinguish between these and the more conceptually
distinct, though nonetheless empirically entangled, phenomena of status quo bias, commission/omission
disparity, or disposition effects. There is, of course, a vast and growing literature on these and cognate
subjects. See, e.g., Colin F. Camerer, Individual Decision Making, in THE HANDBOOK OF
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 587, 665-70 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995); Daniel
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2. Assets as Property
As observed above, assets conduce to EEOR agents' autonomy-to
the freedom of agents in realizing their own visions of the good life-only
to the degree that agents may control or rely upon the disposition of those
assets. 79 And as the mention of legal security above suggests, such control
or reliability is guaranteed-not subject to challenge, or to violent
expropriation, or violation by other agents with competing claims-only by
a system of individual rights to resource control, recognized and enforced
by agents jointly. Thus, an OS in essence is an assembly of mutually
cooperating agents operating under a mutually agreed system of legal
entitlements to resource disposition. Ownership, therefore, is not mere
possession; it is legal, and legally vindicated, possession.
Legal possession, however, is more than mere legal entitlement, as
thus abstractly stated, in American law and endowment psychology. For
both the law and citizen owners distinguish between different kinds and
degrees of entitlement and possession, such that some kinds or degrees
contribute more fully to agent autonomy than others.
Legally speaking, the most salient distinction between kinds of
entitlement probably is that between entitlements protected by property
rules on the one hand and liability rules-generally contract and tort-on
the other. 80 The former, by requiring the actual or would-be taker or
violator of another's entitlement to pay a price set by the original holder of
the entitlement, in theory affords the original holder a greater sphere of
choice, including the choice not to be dispossessed or disentitled at all.
Such rules accordingly delimit a greater degree of autonomy in the
disposition of resources on the part of the resource holder.
Liability rules, by contrast, in reserving the determination of
appropriate compensation to agents of the citizenry's legal system itself, in
effect hold back an increment of resource-dispositional autonomy from
Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion,
and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1991); Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, in
ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 75 (Colin F. Camerer, George Lowenstein & Matthew Rabin
eds., 2004). See also ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (Richard H. Thaler ed., 1993); CHOICES,
VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000); JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982);
RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS (1991). For a popular, audience-targeted treatment
of these phenomena, see RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOxES AND ANOMALIES
OF ECONOMIC LIFE (1992).

79. On the connection between autonomy and control over assets, see TOBIN, supra note 75;
supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
80. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 2.

HeinOnline -- 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 76 2005-2006

20051

A JEFFERSONIAN REPUBLIC

entitlement-holders. Indeed, they go so far as to permit involuntary
disentitlement for a legally determined price. Insofar as a would-be
American OS aims to promote the autonomy value of the American EEOR
through legal asset-ownership, then, it will generally seek to foster, to the
degree practicable, the spread of entitlement to resources vindicated by
property rules over and above liability rules. We require a bit more nuance
than this, however.
At the level of implementation, as suggested by the "to the degree
practicable" qualifier, American law traditionally has limited the kinds of
asset vindicable by property right, as distinguished from contract right or
tort immunity. Roughly, it is rights as to the control or disposition of
physical objects, substances, or locations, for varying temporal durations,
that have been vindicable by property rules. Rights to or immunities from
the actions-specific performances-of other agents, by contrast, have
largely been vindicable only by liability rules-contract and tort,
respectively.
There is some tension between this legal tradition and the American
EEOR's value of boundedly responsible agency as expressed in ownership,
resource-control. This is so at least in the contemporary socioeconomic
context, in which assets as material opportunities or real options can
comprise more than physical spaces, objects, or substances. For many of
the assets that agents hold in contemporary commercial societies, involving
many complex transactions and plans made with a view to managing or
controlling an uncertain future, are expectancies. 81 And limiting the right to
own-to make property of-expectancies, as, for example, contract law
does in disfavoring specific performance and liquidated damages remedies,
accordingly limits EEOR agency's expression in ownership.
Unless there is some compelling EEOR-cognizable reason for this
limitation on expectancies as property, then, a would-be American OS
seeking maximally to vindicate autonomy (as consistent with
responsibility, discussed below) should respond in either or both of two
ways. First, it should seek particularly to spread the ownership of assets
traditionally protected by common law property rights: "hard,"
accumulated material objects or spaces. Second, it should seek, by statute if
need be, incrementally to extend property rule protection into the
81. Financial contracts drafted with a view to managing risk or responding to other future
contingencies-derivatives-are a salient case in point. And, as is clear from the discussion of that ideal
complete and neutral market which is the EEOR's preferred asset-allocation mechanism, supra Part H,
such contracts are a critical means of endowing agent-citizens in keeping with their life-planning
agency.
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traditional realms of contract (for example, in the case of stipulated
damages provisions) and even tort (for example, in cases of conversion and
nuisance) by adjusting available remedies for breach of entitlement.82 The
desirability of working toward both of these ends is reinforced by
empirically documented features of endowment psychology, to which we
turn next.
3. Property's Psychology
It is not only American law that pushes us toward specific
operationalizations of EEOR agency as particular forms of entitlement to
material opportunity enjoying particular forms of protection. The
psychology of ownership also speaks to the matter. For it turns out that a
substantial body of empirical research supports the long-articulated
American intuition that asset-owning vindicated by property rules conduces
83
to the richest forms of actually lived and experienced responsible agency.
The empirical indicia of lived agency, that is, are more closely correlated
with legally secure, accumulated assets or stocks-the stuff of full-bore
property rule protection-than with merely statutorily or contractually
entitled income or flows.
The more specific findings include the fact that accumulated assetholding induces an orientation toward the future, including attitudes of
control thereover that tend to be self-fulfilling. Those lacking in such assets
are more present-oriented. Accumulated, propertized assets thus conduce
both to the enhancement of agency over time and to a "stakeholding"
mentality that encourages the taking of responsibility. These findings are
84
robust when controlling for differential incomes and propensities to save.
82. This strategy of course requires considerably more argumentation on its behalf than I can
give here, in view of the vast literatures devoted to defending liability rules in such contexts. Suffice it
here to note that those defended trade on a conception of efficiency repudiated in Part H, supra. And for
fuller argument, please see the predecessor article, Hockett, supra note 3, at 74-78.
83. See Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 3, at Part IV.A.2.
84. The causality, one might expect, should run both ways. An "investment mentality" seems
more likely to result in asset-accumulation than a profligate, "live for the moment" mentality. Studies
controlling for the bidirectional causal effect have found, nonetheless, that asset-holding itself fosters
investment attitudes that lead to more asset-holding. See Sondra G. Beverly, Amanda Moore McBride
& Mark Schreiner, A Framework of Asset-accumulation Stages and Strategies, 24 J. FAM. & ECON.

ISSUES 143 (2003); Gautam N. Yadama & Michael Sherraden, Effects of Assets on Attitudes and
Behaviors: Advance Test of a Social Policy Proposal, 20 SOC. WORK RES. 3 (1996); Amanda Moore

McBride, Margaret S. Sherraden & Suzanne Pritzker, Civic Engagement Among Low-income and Lowwealth Families: In Their Words (Ctr. for Soc. Dev., Working Paper No. 04-14, 2004) [hereinafter
McBride et al., Civic Engagement]; Amanda Moore McBride, Margaret Lombe & Sondra G. Beverly,
The Effects of Individual Development Account Programs: Perceptions of Participants(Ctr. for Soc.
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Relatedly, accumulated asset-holding also correlates to wider ranges of
actual choice-making, to actual perceptions of option-breadth, and,
apparently in consequence, to attitudes of independence. 85 It also, and
again relatedly, correlates to higher degrees of civic engagement, and
political participation, as well as to self-perceptions of social and political
efficacy. The same holds true of familial engagement and consequent
cohesion, and again the results are robust when controlling for differential
income flows.
Going more micro still, accumulated asset-holding correlates to
superior physical health, cognitive function, academic performance,
initiative, creativity, adaptability, flexibility, and emotional adjustment in
children. 86 Yet again the results are robust when controlling for income,
and intriguingly, all of these results have been at least partly replicated
outside of the United States, at least in European jurisdictions.
When attempting to conjecture as to the causal mechanism that
explains these correlations, it is, of course, difficult to disentangle
attributability to the mere fact of actual physical possession of what is
accumulated on the one hand, and attributability to the greater degree of
legal and societal security attaching to accumulated assets when-they are
treated as "property" rather than as contractual or government-conferred
entitlement to future flows-on the other. But for present purposes, we
need not fret over that difficulty, for the real point is that (a) the EEOR
value of responsible agency recommends ownership, (b) property rules
maximally confer ownership, and (c) empirical evidence indicates that the
principal indicia of the greatest degree of actually lived and experienced
agency maximally correlate with maximal-property-rule-protected-legal
ownership.
Dev., Working Paper No. 03-06, 2003); Margaret S. Sherraden et al., Overcoming Poverty: Supported
Saving as a Household Development Strategy (Ctr. for Soc. Dev., Working Paper No. 04-13, 2004).
85.
See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451 (2004);
James H. Stock & David A. Wise, The Pension Inducement to Retire: An Option Value Analysis (Nat'l

Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 2660, 1988).
86.
CAPACITY

See AMANDA MOORE MCBRIDE ET AL., CTR. FOR SOC. DEV., ASSET BUILDING: INCREASING
FOR

PERFORMANCE:

MEASUREMENT

AND

EFFECTS

(2004); McBride et al., Civic

Engagement, supra note 84; Deborah Page-Adams & Edward Scanlon, Assets, Health, and Well Being:

Neighborhoods, Families, Children and Youth (Ctr. for Soc. Dev., Working Paper No. 01-09, 2001);
Trina R. Williams, The Impacts of Household Wealth on Childhood Development (Ctr. for Soc. Dev.,
Working Paper No. 04-07, 2004).
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B. LEGAL OWNERSHIP, RESPONSIBILITY, AND ENDOWMENT HEURISTICS

The qualifier "responsible" prefixed to "agency" is what occasions
most challenge to fortifying agency by delimiting, vindicating, and
promoting legally recognized asset-ownership. The challenge arises
between vindicating and promoting, and finds expression in delimiting. For
in a world of scarcity, some efforts at promoting ownership among
nonowners can superficially appear to threaten-hence to violate the
vindication of-the entitlements of current owners.
In theory, the problem is readily dissipated; that was one upshot of
Part II.B. l's elaboration of responsible agency as entailing equal
opportunity. And even practically, the problem is largely soluble; that was
one upshot of the core-endowment-bracketing and market-making strategy
of Part II.B.2. But again, certain features of American law and endowment
psychology recommend some strategies of endowment-spreading and
market-making as likely to occasion cause less friction than others.
1. Endowment Heuristics Again
Qualifying such nouns as "agency," ''autonomy," and "ownership"
with the adjective "responsible" finds policy and legal expression in two
practically related but distinct sides of the owned-asset allocation process.
Call them the "endowing" (or "giving") and the "delimiting" (or "taking")
sides. Insofar as we circumscribe the prerogatives of legal ownership in
keeping with the equal agency or equal opportunity principle, we work
from the "delimiting" side, and might superficially appear to be impeding
agency or objectionably "confiscating" what is already owned. Insofar as
we act collectively to promote wider ownership of ethically exogenous
assets by more agent-citizens in keeping with the EOP, we work from the
"endowing" side and might superficially appear to be interfering with
responsibility, simply giving unearned "handouts," so to speak. When the
misleadingly labeled "unearned handouts"8 7 appear to be subsidized by the
(superficially) perceived "takings," dangers to the perceived legitimacy of
concerted ownership-promoting action are at their most pronounced.
87. They are misleadingly labeled because ethically exogenous endowments are not expected to
be, nor by definition could they be, "earned." Rather, they are deserved-entailed by our commitment
to the American value of equal opportunity itself. Rich indolent children's inheritances are unearned
handouts, and insofar as they exceed the child's legitimate share of the ethically exogenous endowment
as determined by the EOP, they are literally undeserved in a way that endowment-equalizing
compensations paid to poor children are not.
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Public delimitation and promoting of ownership in keeping with the
EOP will do well, then, as a strategic matter to take account of ownership
psychology in defining and fostering responsible ownership, just as we
noted in Part III.A that it should do in defining that which is owned. This is
simply a matter of prudence, of avoidable-cost avoidance. Law and policy
that accommodate owner psychology are law and policy that are likely to
enjoy the widest possible and longest enduring public support.
The principal feature of ownership-psychology that operates here has
already been encountered. It is the endowment effect just seen in Part H.A
to result in a perceived difference between "hard," "accumulated" wealth
on the one hand, and "soft," "merely entitled," or liability-rule-protected
future "income" on the other.88 Moreover, when attention turns from
ownership to responsible ownership, the endowment effect appears to
interact in "feedback" fashion with the Part III.A abstraction effect as well.
Limitations on the use and enjoyment or alienability of what one already
owns, that is, removing sticks from the bundle, as the favored simile would
have it, is itself seen as a "taking" of the endowment, even when current
possession as such is not threatened.
The practical and strategic consequence of the endowment heuristic,
both standing alone and in infusing the abstraction effect, is two-fold. And
again it operates at both the "taking" and the "endowing" sides of the
opportunity-allocation process. From the "taking" side, limitations on
future growth in or parceling of asset-holdings by those who are currently
surplus-endowed by EOP lights are likely to face less opposition than
"confiscations" of what already is held. From the "endowing" side,
endowment that takes the form of "refraining from (perceived) taking," or
of conferring more abstraction (parceling) rights, is likely to face less
opposition-appear less like a "handout" or "giveaway"-than will
endowment that looks on the surface more like an outright grant. The
policy-optimal strategy, then, in view of owner-psychology, will be the
opposite of that earlier-noted least optimal-the "taking and giving." It will
be the "channeling of (apparently) new (and apparently exogenous) wealth"
to, and the "refraining from taking or restricting of wealth" from, those who
by EOP standards are presently opportunity underendowed.
A classic case of "refraining" in recent years is the earned income tax
credit ("EITC")8 9 a program that has enjoyed widespread support even
among "conservatives." Its success stands in instructive contrast to the
88.
89.

See supra Part HI.A.
See 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2000).
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unpopularity of "negative income tax" ("NIT") proposals of the past,
surprisingly proposed by other "conservatives" of a Friedmanite cast,
which were perceived more as "givings" than is EITC notwithstanding
their orthodox finance-theoretic equivalence. 90 Suggested cases of the
"channeling of the new," for their part, were noted in Part II.B. More such
programs are elaborated in fuller detail in Part V below. For now, it
suffices simply to flag these two strategies. To some extent, they already
find expression, from time to time, both in law and in policy, although
there is much more room here for policy design, a fact upon which Part V
will capitalize.
Two other strategies are more incremental in nature than the
"rechannelling" and "refraining" strategies. Again they fall one each on the
"endowing" and "delimiting" sides of asset-allocation. On the endowing
side, the strategy is to condition collective endowment of the
underendowed upon recipients' acting in some manner easily characterized
either as "earning" the perceived "handouts" or as being otherwise
deserving of them on some ground explicitly tied to the endowed item's
ethical exogeneity. Requiring some manner of service-for example,
military or community service-as consideration for receipt then, or
requiring that recipients use endowed funds only for such "meritorious"
purposes as education, medicine, or productive investment, is a strategy
that both should be and increasingly already can be seen at work. We find
it, for example, in tax-favored Individual Retirement Accounts ("IRAs"),
Individual Development Accounts, proposed tax-favored "private health
accounts," "education accounts," and other programs that might be called
"Piecemeal Asset-Accumulation Programs." In essence, the endowment
itself is delimited in these cases in a manner that is commensurate with the
delimitation of the prerogatives of the already-endowed by that
unequal
"responsible"-hence, equal exogeneity,
aforementioned
endogeneity-qualifier.
On the "taking" side, the incremental approach is simply to refrain
from "confiscating" all of the attributes of the overage held by the
overendowed, and to skim what is skimmed from the overage off the less
tactile-hence, seemingly less "hard" or accumulated-"sticks" in that
"bundle" of rights which is property ownership. Hence, one does not
confiscate the property, but restricts or taxes its use or alienability, or
guaranties others some rights or easements in its use. Familiar examples are
90. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 161-76 (1962); James Tobin, Joseph A.
Pechman & Peter M. Mieszkowski, Is a Negative Income Tax Practical?,77 YALE L.J. 1 (1967).

HeinOnline -- 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 82 2005-2006

2005]

A JEFFERSONIANREPUBLIC

the estate tax, the imposition of public access rights to the electromagnetic
spectrum, and community reinvestment requirements placed upon
depository institutions. This line of strategy takes us more squarely to the
other, nonpsychological parameters within which ownership facilitation
must operate: the legal ones.
2. The Legal Endowment
As with "asset"-defining, ownership-delimiting subjects policy to
some of the path-dependent features of American law. As it happens,
however, path-dependence here proves rather helpful for purposes of
ownership promotion in vindication of the EOP. For the law appears to
incorporate within its constitutional and property doctrines many of the
same heuristics, rational or irrational, that characterize the psychology of
ownership. That means that the law permits precisely those strategies of
ownership delimitation in keeping with responsible agency that were just
observed to be prudent in Part II.B.
The standard forms that ownership delimitation takes in American law
are, of course, essentially of three types-restrictions on use and
enjoyment, restrictions on alienability, and limited expropriation, the latter
generally in the form of licensing fees or taxes. 9 1 Courts and legislatures
generally impose few if any limitations upon the legislatures' powers to
employ these methods.
Restrictions on use and enjoyment are widely accepted, with some
limited exceptions to be noted below. And few citizens seem to regard
them as threatening the United States' status as an ownership-protecting
polity. That acceptance probably reflects implicit acceptance of the
responsible ownership principle, which we saw above to entail a
commitment to the EOP.
Restrictions upon alienability similarly appear to be widely upheld by
the courts and accepted by the public, though there is sometimes more
controversy here. Prohibitions on vote-selling, self-indenture, prostitution,
organ-sale, and child-sale are familiar-and scarcely controversial--cases
91.
These are restrictions apart from limitations on security-provision of the sort observed in Part
1II.A. The latter restrictions do not come into play much when we speak of ownership delimiting in
keeping with the EOP. These restrictions figure more into what should be increased among the
underendowed.
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threats to the United States'
in point. Few seem to regard them as serious
92
polity.
ownership-protective
status as an
One long-standing form of restriction upon asset-alienability in the
United States dovetails with the other principal form of ownership
delimitation, taxation: the taxation of one form of wealth-alienation itself.
Like other forms of limited and incremental expropriation, for example,
property-, income-, and sales taxation, estate and gift taxation has not
tended to be seen as threatening the United States' status as an agency- and
ownership-protecting polity, although there are, of course, some fringe
elements who continue to argue that the income tax, since its 1913
inception, 93 has been "unconstitutional". Indeed, estate taxation and
progressive income taxation have widely been viewed and justified
precisely as means of vindicating real EEOR responsible agency itself.94 In
CL terms, they have been viewed as means of partly rectifying perceived
inequities in the distribution of ethically exogenous endowments. In CR
terms, they have been viewed as means of preserving the long-term health
of the republic by preventing republic-threatening, unearned plutocratic
aggregations of financial and political power. Such arguments are still
regarded as mainstream. Taxation also has, of course, long enjoyed a
special degree of deference by courts. 95 So long as recently proposed and
partly adopted radical aberrations in the venerable American tradition of
inheritance taxation and externality-recouping regulation are quickly
reversed, then, American legal tradition96 will actually serve to facilitate
concerted ownership promotion policies.
Milton Friedman noted long ago that the ability to sell "shares" in one's self or one's future
92.
earnings would facilitate borrowing for education, as a sort of human capital expansion project. See
FRIEDMAN, supra note 90, at 85-107. But fewer people appear to have taken that suggestion to heart
even than have supported the proposal of Landes and Posner, supra note 60.
Michael J. Graetz, THE U.S. INCOME TAX: WHAT IT Is, How IT GOT THAT WAY, AND
93.
WHERE WE GO FROM HERE 3 (1999).

94.

See, e.g., Frank . Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting

the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969); Charles A. Reich, Individual
Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965); Charles A. Reich,
The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); William H. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the
Welfare System, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1431 (1986).
95.
The classic decision holding that the Legislature's taxing authority is plenary is A. Magnano
Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934).
See Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 3, at Part TV (discussing recent aberrations). See
96.
also EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 20, at 99-104, 263-305 (advocating for one of the aberrations). But
see WILLIAM H. GATES, SR. & CHUCK COLLINS, WEALTH AND OUR COMMONWEALTH: WHY AMERICA
SHOULD TAX ACCUMULATED FORTUNES (2002) (arguing for conclusions contrary to Epstien's);
MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER TAXING
INHERITED WEALTH (2005) (same); STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS:
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C. FROM CONSTRAINTS TO STRATEGIES: PROGRAMMATIC ENTAILMENTS
The constraints just elaborated do not block or prevent our realizing
the core EEOR values discussed in Part II. They simply counsel that some
means of operationalizing our EEOR are likely both more fully to
operationalize it, and to occasion less friction, than others. They
recommend, then, some broad classes of implementation strategy over
others. They tell us that to realize the EEOR fully we should indeed act to
make of ourselves an OS-a polity in which core material opportunity
endowments of the kind elaborated in Part II are both widely spread and
vindicated by property rules. And in order to effect that spread, the
constraints tell us to work, so far as possible and in exchange for
perceivedly "deserving" behavior, to channel perceivedly "new" resources
to, while refraining from perceived "taking" from, our underendowed,
"rather than" perceivedly "taking," already accumulated resources from our
already fulsomely endowed.
When we have we publicly held vast accumulated material resources,
such as land, the aforementioned strategy has been easily employed. We
simply have offered up the vast public tracts, in smaller but adequately
independence-conferring-sized tracts, to such underendowed citizens as
have been prepared to work hard to render the tracts productive. Such, of
course, was the method of the nineteenth and early twentieth century
Homestead Acts, which we shall discuss in Part V. Alternatively or
additionally, we have dedicated land in larger tracts to endow institutions
that spread other core endowments over the citizenry. Such was the method
of the nineteenth and early twentieth century Land Grant Acts,
contemporaneous and programmatically associated with the Homestead
Acts, which funded open-access higher education institutions nationwide;
we shall discuss these too in Part V. Where, on the other hand, we are
lacking in such an already accumulated asset as land, the method of
nineteenth and early twentieth century style "homesteading" and
"schoolsteading" is not available to us. The "new" resource which we must
channel then is not already accumulated, left over from the past, but is to be
accumulated, reasonably expected to come to fruition in future in
significant part through the diligent efforts of our beneficiaries themselves.
In such case the method of past homesteading and "schoolsteading" gives
way to the method of future financial engineering; for finance is the act of
WHY LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXES (1999) (same); LIAM MURPHY
OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE (2002) (same).

& THOMAS

HeinOnline -- 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 85 2005-2006

NAGEL, THE MYTH OF

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:45

facilitating future accumulation. Our constraints, then, recommend for the
foreseeable future a strategy of financially engineering our OS into being.
IV. FINANCE REDIRECTED: CREDIT INSURANCE, DEBT
SECURITIZATION, AND TAX POLICY AS THE PREFERRED
MEANS OF OWNERSHIP SPREADING
The core American values elaborated in Part II suggest a broad spread
of ethically exogenous material opportunity and risk over the boundedly
responsible agents who constitute our citizenry. They also counsel that
ethically endogenous resource holdings be left to fall where they may so
long as complete and neutral markets constitute the mechanism by which
they are allocated. For such markets appropriately commensurate agentvalued goods and services, and thus appropriately honor the responsible
efforts whose fruits are valued by other agents.
The constraints elaborated in Part 11, for their part, counsel that some
strategies we might employ in seeking to realize the core values of Part II
are likely to prove more effective than others. For endowment psychology,
along with our "legal endowment," is such that the core values-in
particular, that of agent autonomy-are more fully realized by some forms
of legal entitlement than by others, while some means of vindicating core
rights, in turn, are experienced as more legitimate or less unobjectionable
than others.
In this part we begin the process of translating values and constraints
into programs. For reasons that will be clear by the end of this part, the
preferred such process, which I shall call generically "the Method," makes
use of financial engineering techniques that would not have been necessary,
and probably would not have been feasible, prior to the early to midtwentieth century.
It is helpful in this context to remind ourselves that the constraints
only constrain us; they do not block our path. For it happens that in
spreading ethically exogenous resources widely we can conform to those
aspects of endowment psychology and the legal endowment that define the
treadable path of least resistance. And we can do so without fundamentally
compromising our core constitutive ideals. The key is in finance, the means
by which macroeconomies always have grown. By rethinking the aims and
methods of finance in a way that treats our infinitely valued individual
citizens as microcosms, in a sense, of macroeconomies, we can spread
ethically exogenous material opportunity widely through financial
engineering techniques that make optimal accommodation with-indeed,
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even employment of-our psychological and legal endowments
themselves. Financial engineering of a particular sort can give
programmatic expression both to our constitutive EEOR ideals and to our
laws and pretheoretic proprietary sensibilities.
A. FROM STRATEGY TO FINANCE: THE METHOD OF FINANCIAL
ENGINEERING

"Finance," both in popular usage and for our present purposes,
broadly denotes the class of means by which something presently desired,
but not yet obtained, may be paid for, even when it cannot be purchased
outright.97 It therefore often can connote, more particularly, the act of
borrowing as one such means. 98 In this respect, the word also connotes,
from a more theoretical point of view, an intertemporal shifting of asset
use: 99 one, in effect, trades future assets (call them Af) for present ones
(Ap)-"borrows against the future"-typically on the understanding that
100
use of the borrowed asset (Ab) at present will yield more, in the long run,
than will deferment of use or acquisition of the to-be-acquired, presently
desired asset Ap. Often the future yield is what affords the means of paying
for the present use of the borrowed asset Ab itself. When that is the case,
the project (or "investment") which yields the future return, and which is
rendered possible by borrowing itself, is sometimes popularly, though
potentially misleadingly, said to be "self-amortizing," "self-financing," or
"self-liquidating." ' 0 ' The investment in such case has, at a minimum,
"broken even," hence is financially rational to have undertaken; one has not
lost in the temporal aggregate through the intertemporal shift.
97. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 630 (6th ed. 1990) ("As a verb, to supply with funds through the
payment of cash or issuance of stocks, bonds, notes, or mortgages; to provide with capital or loan
money as needed to carry on business.").
98. See id.
99. See, e.g., Zvi BODtE & ROBERT C. MERTON, FINANCE 2 (2000) ("Finance is the study of how
people allocate scarce resources over time."). This is, of course, the way in which finance is treated in
most theoretical finance texts, as well as in most standard microeconomics texts that devote attention to
the subject. See, e.g., ANDREU MAS-COLELL, MICHAEL D. WHINSTON & JERRY R. GREEN,
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 732-81 (1995).
100. Typically, the "long run" is defined, in orthodox theory, as the individual agent's full life
span, and that which is "yielded" and maximized by the intertemporal shift of assets is "utility." This is
the operating template of the "permanent income" or "life-cycle" hypothesis that figures into most
financial theory. See, e.g., BODIE & MERTON, supra note 99, at 146; Truman Bewley, The Permanent
Income Hypothesis: A Theoretical Formulation, 16 J. ECON. THEORY 252 (1977); F.P. Ramsey, A
Mathematical Theory of Saving, 38 ECON. J. 543 (1928).
101.
See JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND
INVESTMENT TERMS 628 (6th ed. 2003) (defining "self-amortizing mortgage").
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The best investments are, of course, those that yield the highest
returrs-those that do more than break even or simply "pay for
themselves." They yield more than what has been sunken into them, even
after costing interest and discounting returns by the prevailing market rate
over the course of the project's completion. Their net present values are not
merely positive; they also are positively high. 10 2 From this point of view,
postsecondary education, housing, and even many possible securities
portfolios that one might finance by borrowing are good investments. If, for
example, the U.S. Census Bureau is correct in estimating that a college
degree now adds an average of about $1 million to one's lifetime income,
and if the average amount paid out of future income for such a degree,
including interest charges but excluding room and board (which would
have to be paid anyway), is $50,000,103 then, assuming an employment life
of forty-five years, the discount rate would have to be about 7%-rather
higher than the 4%-5% that has prevailed for many years now-for the
"project" to fall short of breaking even. 104 And that is, of course, entirely to
ignore the incalculable nonpecuniary benefits of a postsecondary education.
Parallel observations hold true for homeownership and, indeed, for the
holding of a substantial, appreciating, and dividend- and interest-yielding
portfolio of securities-ownership shares in firms and in firm debt. Homes
typically appreciate in value over the long run at a significantly higher rate
than the discount rate. 10 5 So, of course, does the value of a broad marketindexed stock portfolio.10 6 Homes and stock portfolios accordingly would
constitute good pecuniary investments in the long run, even if one had to
borrow to finance their acquisition, provided that the borrowing rate were
102. "Discounting" is the process of converting future values to present values in view of the rate
at which investing a present amount that yields interest grows toward that future value. The barebones
formalization is: FV = PV (1 + r)y, where r is the interest rate and n is the number of periods over which
interest is calculated. See BODIE & MERTON, supra note 99, at 102-18.
103.
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE BIG PAYOFF: EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND SYNTHETIC
ESTIMATES OF WORK-LtFE EARNINGS (2002), http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p23-210.pdf;

Federal Student Loan Programs, Loan Facts, http://www.studentloanfacts.org/loanfactsbenefits/
students/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2005).
104. The seven percent discount rate was found by using the discounting formula: $lM _ $.05M
(1 + .07)45. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. I have, of course, left out income that would
have been forgone over the course of the education, and have abstracted from the compounding rate by
assuming interest to accrue only once per year, but the essential result is not thereby significantly
changed.
105. That, of course, is one reason for the popularity of real estate investment trusts ("REITs") as
investment vehicles. See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 283-84, 306

(rev. & updated 8th ed. 2004).
106. See id. at 124. The now classic source is JEREMY J. SIEGEL, STOCKS FOR THE LONG RUN 4952 (2d ed. 1998).
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not inordinately high. And the security and independence-or at the very
least the "cushion" thereby conferred, both in actual fact and as a matter of
"wealth effect"-inflected perception-probably are priceless for most
people. It would, then, constitute a great advantage were those lacking in
such assets able to finance their acquisition, by borrowing to purchase
them. Their ownership would yield sufficient long-run income as to
amortize the debt well before the death of the typical purchaser or before
the asset's depreciation to the vanishing point. And that ownership would
yield incalculably more to the holders and to the society of which they were
members.
Why, then, does the United States not constitute an "ownership
society" already, with everybody owning a home, a substantial stock
portfolio, and at least a four-year postsecondary degree? The answer is
tripartite: First, significant portions of the adult population do hold the first
and last of these three basic, responsible, agency-enhancing assets, while
far fewer owned homes before the 1940s and far fewer had completed
higher education before the 1970s.10 7 Second, we have not yet worked
publicly to spread substantial owning of the second asset type, securities,
and it shows: hard capital is the last remaining of the three chief assetshomes, business capital, and human capital-that confer the kind of
productive, life-building autonomy prized both by and in the agent-citizens
who jointly constitute the EEOR that is not yet widely held directly.' 0 8 And
third, absent public action of this sort, things are more than likely to remain
this way, just as would have been the case with homes and higher
education absent our concerted efforts from the 1940s and the 1970s
forward.
But why is that? What is the "concerted effort" to which I refer, and
why would it be necessary to the facilitation of the spread of ownership of
those three "fundamental assets"? The answer is, again, finance. In order
for investments such as those in homes, educations, or stocks to make
pecuniary sense, again, their discounted long-run yields must exceed the
costs, including opportunity costs, of their financing. The rate that one pays
for the use of money one invests in them-the interest rate-must
accordingly be low enough. But in order for the rate to be low enough, and
indeed, even for it to be less than "infinitely" high-for lendable funds to
be forthcoming at all-those who have the funds to lend must not perceive
the loans to be too risky. The lender's calculus, that is, largely mirrors the
107. See infra Parts V.A, V.C.
108. See infra Part V.B. A partial, though rather limited, exception here is the ESOP, on which
more is presented in Part V.B.
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borrower's, though it is even more severe. The lender will discount the
returns on the loans-the interest that they yield-by the returns the lender
could earn on alternative investments of the funds that bear similar risk
features to those attaching to the contemplated loan. 10 9 And unlike the
borrower, the lender will not allow the nonpecuniary benefits derived (by
the borrower) from the credit-purchased asset to compensate for added
increments of cost. The lower the risk attaching to the would-be assetpurchaser's loan, then, of course, the more attractive that investment to the
lender.
Typically, a lender will mitigate or lessen risk by taking a security
interest in some asset already owned by the borrower, or by requiring a
guaranty from some well-resourced associate of the borrower. Here then is
one source of the venerable adage that "it takes money to make money."
Financing is typically available to those who, in a sense, have least need of
it-those with direct or indirect access to already-accumulated,
collateralizable assets.110 In effect, finance performs as little more than a
temporary liquidation service in such cases-a means by which temporarily
to transform hard, accumulated assets into immediately usable cash. The
financier acts as a large-scale, noncustodial pawnbroker.
But here lies also a key to the means of breaking what some have
called this "tyranny of collateral and connection" or "closed circuit of
finance.""' For collateral is not the only means of mitigating lender risk.
Indeed, it is an exceedingly crude such means. It can be likened to a one
hundred percent reserve requirement imposed upon a depository
institution-little economic growth would ever occur under such
109. This is simply a trivial entailment of the risk-reward trade-off familiar to portfolio theory.
Portfolio efficiency consists in maximizing returns given a specific risk profile or minimizing risk given
a specific returns profile. See Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952). See also
HARRY M.

MARKOWITZ,

PORTFOLIO

SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION

OF INVESTMENTS

(1959).
110. Of course those with accumulated assets have need of financing too. The point here is simply
that those without already accumulated assets often have even more need of financing-in order to
accumulate in the first place.
111. See, e.g., Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, FinancialDependence and Growth, 88 AM.
ECON. REV. 559 (1998); Raghuram G. Rajan, Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice Between Informed
and Arm's Length Debt, 47 J. FIN. 1367 (1992); Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great
Reversals: The Politics of FinancialDevelopment in the Twentieth Century, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (2003);
Luigi Zingales, Survival of the Fittest or the Fattest?Exit and Financing in the Trucking Industry, 53 J.
FIN. 905 (1998). See also RAGHURAM G. RAJAN & LUIGI ZINGALES, SAVING CAPITALISM FROM THE
CAPITALISTS: UNLEASHING THE POWER OF FINANCIAL MARKETS TO CREATE WEALTH AND SPREAD

OPPORTUNITY 30-33 (2003).
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circumstances. 11 2 If measures can be taken to weed out projects that are
unlikely to succeed, and at the same time likely failure rates over a broad
swathe of investments can be statistically determined, then we can both
minimize and pool default risk, and provide against the latter with less than
one hundred percent collateralization. We can require borrowers simply to
cover pro rata shares of aggregated, pooled default risk-that is, we can
move from collateralization to default insurance.
We can then enhance the boost thereby given the pool of loanable
funds by taking another step. Closely associated with perceptions of and
aversions to risk are the desire and demand for liquidity1 13 -the capacity to
withdraw from an investment as readily as one enters into it. If, then, not
only default risk, but also debt obligations themselves (that is, rights to
repayment) can be pooled, and shares in the pool then sold as resaleable
securities, we shall in effect have "completed" the market for OS-valued
capital financing debt by "securitizing" it and allowing such risk as attaches
to the securities to flow toward its most willing and efficient bearers; we
114
shall thereby have optimized the volume of such financing available.
Such measures constitute precisely the means by which we have, as a
society, spread the ownership of homes and postsecondary degrees so much
112.

Regulatory authorities impose fractional reserve requirements upon depository institutions in

order to ensure the availability of sufficient cash to cover depositor withdrawal needs and avoid

destructive "bank runs." It happens that very low rates are required to effect that task, thereby freeing
up the remaining deposits to lend and thus fueling economic growth. The development of "reserve
systems" that facilitate interbank lending and pooling the risk of inadequate reserves at any one
institution has of course freed up even more deposited funds for credit extension.
The Federal Reserve's reserve requirements are promulgated as Regulation D, 12 C.F.R. pt. 204
(2005), issued under the authority of 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(l)-(4) (2000). For more on the mechanics of
reserve requirements, see Ross CRANSTON, PRINCIPLES OF BANKING LAW 127-29 (1997). For an
overview of the troubled history of fractional reserves until the modem era-specifically, the difficulty

of finding the golden mean between growth-stiflingly excessive reserves and systemic risk-incurring
inadequate reserves, prior to the advent of sophisticated statistical predictive methods as means of
calculating fractional reserve needs-see MONEY: A HISTORY 162-92 (Jonathan Williams ed., 1997);
SHUBIK,

supranote 75, at 259-79.

113.
See James Tobin, Liquidity Preference as Behavior Towards Risk, 25 REV. ECON. STUD. 65
(1958). The insight is derived from JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT
INTEREST AND MONEY (1936).

114.

"Securitization" has grown rapidly in the last decade and has given rise to some of the largest
FRANK J. FABOZZI ET AL., FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCIAL
MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS 435-97 (3d ed. 2002). It is often overlooked that all of this began with,

and fastest growing securities markets. See

and continues to be largely driven by, the activities of erstwhile "government sponsored enterprises"
("GSEs") like Fannie Mae. See infra Part V. See also Leland C. Brendsel, Securitization's Role in
Housing Finance: The Special Contributionsof the Government-SponsoredEnterprises, in A PRIMER
ON SECURITIZATION 17, 17-29 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., 1996); Lewis S. Ranieri,
The Origins of Securitization, Sources of Its Growth, and Its Future Potential, in A PRIMER ON
SECURITIZATION, supra, at 31, 31-43.
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more broadly than they were spread prior to the late twentieth century. And
they are means that we have yet, thus far, to attempt in the spreading of that
one form of asset rivaling homes and human capital in importance to agentcitizens of an efficient EEOR-business capital. Call this set of means "the
Method."
Here, then, is the Method's basic schema, which we shall find
recurring in the most significant, albeit fragmentary, modern American OS
programs and proposals thus far pursued or advocated. First, society, acting
collectively through its elected government, acts to optimize the amount of
capital available for lending to those lacking in assets by those possessed of
assets, by itself directly affording the security typically afforded by security
interests in collateral. We, in effect, insure lenders against borrower
default, either directly, by actually administering the insurance program, or
indirectly, by serving as guarantor, reinsurer, or guarantor-insurer for
nonpublic or quasi-public agencies that serve as first lines of lender
assurance. (The initial lenders themselves are, of course, financial
intermediaries-primarily depository institutions which have offered
federal deposit insurance since the 1930s and have pooled liquidity- and
consequent solvency-risk via the Federal Reserve System since 1913.)l 15
In order to ensure the financial solvency of our efforts, we impose
basic quality standards upon both our borrower-beneficiaries and the
projects that they wish to finance through their debt. We require that
borrowers earn reliable incomes in the case of housing, or that they make
satisfactory academic progress in the case of education, and we require that
all receive financial counseling. We also insist that the homes and
educational institutions meet basic quality standards tending to maximize
the likelihood that the investments will indeed bear positive net present
values. We also, of course, might exact a small premium of our borrowers
in order to cover the (now minimized) costs of administration and
maintenance of the insurance fund. Or we can cover the cost collectively in
the case of the least advantaged among us.
Where we have employed these strategies thus far, we shall see in the
next part, we actually have begun by affording the insurance directly, then
gradually have receded into the background as secondary guarantor or
115.

For a discussion of the creation of the Federal Reserve System as a congressional response to

the financial downturn of 1907 and the birth of federal deposit insurance as a response to the bank panic
of the early 1930s, see ALLAN H. MELTZER, A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE, VOLUME 1: 19131951 (2003). See also HOWELL E. JACKSON & EDWARD L. SYMONS, REGULATION OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS 27-45 (1999); JONATHAN R. MACEY, GEOFFREY P. MILLER & RICHARD SCOTIT
CARNELL, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 11-27 (3d ed. 2001).
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reinsurer while private insurers or quasi-public guarantors, upon observing
the successes of the government-run insurance programs, have stepped into
the newly created market that previously had been unimagined or thought
infeasible. 1 6 The ultimate full faith and credit of our society's organ of
collective action-our reliable and enduring bond-issuing and bondhonoring government-proves to be enough; the administering can devolve
to others.
Second, we "jump start" the development of a secondary market in the
consequently burgeoning number of low-risk debt obligations that follow
on the success of the first set of initiatives. That is, once many lenders step
in to assist in financing the acquisition of basic EEOR-valued assets in
response to our public initiative to eliminate their risk, we commence the
pooling and securitizing of the consequently proliferating debt obligations.
We are aided in so doing by success in the first initiative itself. For one
thing, the growth in debt obligations following on the provision of
insurance or guaranty results in enough debt to pool efficiently. For
another, the fact that so large a portion of the total pool of debt is
associated with the insurance or guaranty program itself, coupled with our
imposition of quality standards as a condition on enjoyment of the benefit
of the program, results in the development of a standard debt contract or
promissory note form, and that homogeneity of form itself facilitates
efficient bundling and securitizing.
Third, we might-though we need not-publicly subsidize, directly or
indirectly, the interest payments made by program beneficiaries on the
debt. We can do so either by paying the interest directly, or by rendering
such payments tax deductible. That latter, we will see, has proved to be the
preferred means in our American OS-in-the-making, particularly for the
middle class, while direct subsidy often has figured into such programs as
these that operate for the poor. And this, we shall see further, probably
owes to the same endowment heuristics that render this "financial
engineering" mode of asset-spreading the tried and true contemporary
method in our society thus far.
Before turning to the specific ways in which this method meshes with
those endowment heuristics and other constraints, it might be well to
schematize the Method pictorially.l17 Figure 1 does so:
116. This Article later demonstrates that this was precisely the case with respect to mortgage
insurance. See infra Part V.A. This Article will also show that the huge trend toward securitization that
is currently underway began with the federally created secondary mortgage market-maker, or
securitizer, Fannie Mae. See Brendsel, supra note 114; Ranieri, supra note 114.
117. See infra Part V (adding more to this abstract schema when we focus on specific programs).
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FIGURE 1. General form of credit insurance- and debt securitization-based
ownership-spreading programs "18

Providers.'
Sellers

As we soon shall see, minor variations on precisely this picture figure
into the most successful-though thus far only fragmentary (that is, single
asset-spreading)--contemporary American OS programs thus far
implemented. They also figure into the most interesting looking such
programs that have not yet been tried. It is worth asking why this might be
so.
B. THE METHOD, OUR VALUES, AND OUR CONSTRAINTS

The fundamental reason for the Method's success, I suggest, is that it
gives elegant and comprehensive programmatic expression to the values
118. In the figure, Guarantor and Securitizer begin as public or quasi-public entities, then
subsequently privatize.
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and constraints elaborated in Parts II and III. Recall, first, those values and
constraints: They are that an enduring American OS should, first, work to
foster the broadly equitable spread of ethically exogenous assets-material
opportunities-while allowing ethically endogenous assets to remain with
their producers. Second, the American OS should seek so far as possible to
favor the spread of assets that are maximally vindicable by property rulesrules that afford maximal space to agent autonomy, as consistent with the
equal ethically exogenous autonomy of others. Third, the American OS
acts most prudently by (insofar as equalizing ethically exogenous assetowning involves special solicitude for the exogenously underendowed): (a)
channeling perceivedly "new" resources to the underendowed rather than
overtly "taking" already existing resources from the already fully endowed;
(b) conditioning that channeling of perceivedly new resources to the
underendowed upon the latter's exercise of responsible, productively
virtuous effort-in effect ethically endogenizing the "new" resources; and
(c) so far as possible, refraining from perceived "taking" rather than
engaging in outright "giving."
Now note how the Method meets precisely these criteria. First, decent
homes and educations-those assets which have been spread thus far by
means of the Method-are perceived by American EEOR sensibilities as
basic minima. They are "core endowments," per Part II, to which all young
Americans just starting out in life are believed to deserve access-at least
provided that such persons as lack such assets lack them owing to luck
rather than through any fault of their own." l 9 The same, as noted in Part
II.B.3, can be said of access to productive nonhuman capital, but as yet we
20
have not worked to foster its spread, save in piecemeal fashion.1
Second, homes are as property-like as assets get in American law;
they are fully protected by property rules.' 2 Education, for its part, is in
effect property-rule-protected. For not only can it not be taken, once had,
from its possessor at a price below what the rightful possessor demands, it
cannot be taken from the possessor at all; but can only be rented, at a
119. This "no fault" proviso presumably accounts for our willingness, for example, to disqualify
convicted drug offenders from access to federally assisted higher education finance. See 20 U.S.C. §
1091(r) (2000). This Article does not purport to endorse or condemn that policy, only to root it
ultimately in the view that people can become ethically responsible for their lack of education as they
grow older.
120.

See infra Parts V.B, V.D.

121.
Which is not to say that property rule protection here does not sometimes give way to the
state's power of eminent domain. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). The
great controversy and bipartisan outrage occasioned by the latest decision, however, suggest that it is
indeed more exceptional than "the rule."
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reservation price set by the possessor. 1 22 Securities portfolios, too, are
property-rule-protected, even if for most of us a security, being fungible, is

123
just its market value.

Third, the financial engineering schema-the Method---channels
perceivedly "new" resources to the underendowed. To begin with, housing
and education are not taken from some and given to others. But more to the
point, the credit extended for purchase of homes and higher education is
not, pursuant to endowment psychology, perceived as taking and
redistributing, even if in orthodox finance-theoretic terms all credit that
flows in one direction does so at the opportunity cost of other directions. It
just is not perceived in the same way that outright taxing and redistributing
would be.
Moreover, the channeling of the credit is conditioned upon the
recipients' responsibly diligent behavior; recipients must work to amortize
their debts, in addition to working to maintain the value of the home or
complete the education. In the case of the one successful business capitalspreading program to make (partial) use of the Method-the Employee
Stock Ownership Plan ("ESOP")-the same is true of the employee
beneficiaries, who must labor for the firm that sponsors the plan.
Finally, insofar as interest on the loans facilitated by the Method is
subsidized, it typically is subsidized by tax deduction rather than direct
122. David Ellerman argues in effect that education, or at any rate human capital, can actually be
taken-that it is in effect partial slavery when one works for hire, alienating a portion of one's self and
one's education. See DAVID P. ELLERMAN, PROPERTY AND CONTRACT IN ECONOMICS: THE CASE FOR
ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY (1992). See also DAVID P. ELLERMAN, THE DEMOCRATIC WORKER-OWNED
FIRM (1990) [hereinafter ELLERMAN, WORKER-OWNED FIRM]; JAROSLAV VANEK, THE GENERAL
THEORY OF LABOR-MANAGED MARKET ECONOMIES (1970). This Article does not address that

argument here, but notes that, at least in theory, in the absence of chattel slavery, the hirer must still pay
the reservation price of the laborer; hence the human capital is property-rule-protected. That is not to
deny that the reservation price will be EEOR-objectionably low in a substantially nonneutral market, for
example, a market in which some participants lack equal access to ethically exogenous endowments,
including business capital and productive networks. But that problem of entry nonneutrality afflicts the
reservation price charged for parting with any property held by the desperately underendowed, not just
labor. If Essau had as much right to eat from the family porridge pot as Jacob, and paid Jacob his
birthright for lunch because he was desperately hungry after laboring for the family while Jacob
illegitimately controlled access to the family larder, then the price he charged for parting with the
birthright was EEOR-illegitimately low. The contract between him and his brother would not be
enforceable in our courts.
123. If an individual chooses, a security can always remain property-rule-protected. For example,
before United Parcel Service ("UPS") went public, if an individual had been attached to UPS stock for
sentimental or familial reasons-say, because generations of that individual's family had worked for
UPS and received stock therein pursuant to the company's egalitarian ESOP plan-the individual no
doubt could have insisted upon replacement of the stock itself by one who had tortiously converted it,
rather than settling for estimated market value.
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payment. It is a refraining from "taking," "rather than" a "giving." The one
exception here only confirms the rule. Direct subsidy of interest payments
often figures into use of the Method in financing asset-acquisition by the
(means-tested) least advantaged members of society, those who are
1 24
perceived under EEOR values as warranting special solicitude.
C. WHY THE METHOD IS MODERN: OUR VALUES, OUR CONSTRAINTS,

AND OUR RESOURCES-PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

Before we move on to our programmatic history, it is worth briefly
considering why what I am calling "the Method" characterizes only
modern American OS programs and proposals. After all, haven't there been
ownership-spreading programs in the past as well? Why would they not
have employed the same methods, if those methods purport to give the
fullest financial expression to the Part III constraints? There appear to be
two answers, one having to do with feasibility, the other with necessity.
The feasibility answer is that it is much easier to make use of the
financial system now, and to securitize and create secondary markets now,
than it would have been until comparatively recently. Indeed, there was no
centrally managed or regulated system of depository institutions until 1913,
nor was there deposit insurance until 1932.125 The deepening of the
securities markets to the point of rendering large-scale securitization of
retail debt obligations feasible, in turn, has been critically facilitated by the
development of advanced computing and communications technologies
since the 1970s.
The necessity answer probably is the more important one: until the
early twentieth century there already was a "new," quite material resource,
abundant and both legally and perceivedly publicly owned, that could be
channeled especially toward the underendowed without running afoul of
endowment heuristics. That resource was federal land. It was precisely this
land that was distributed by the federal government to the benefit of
underendowed Americans up through the first twenty years of the twentieth
century. Such distributions were both direct, in the case of the Homestead
Acts, which afforded a broad distribution of the principal material resource
out of which many Americans of the time built prosperous lives; and
indirect, pursuant to the Land-Grant Acts, which endowed institutions of
124. See infra Part V (corroborating this claim). Federal ownership facilitation programs
employing the Method allow the better-off to deduct interest payments for tax calculation purposes,
while directly supplying interest payments on behalf of the apparently faultless working poor.
125. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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higher education with land. 126 These "land grant" colleges and universities
were open to all in order to supply the human capital that could optimally
be conjoined to land capital in the building of productive lives.
It was, significantly, after the land ran out that the Method, the
financial engineering method, was hit upon by fits and starts. And it was,
happily, precisely over this period that national markets grew sufficiently
integrated, and technologies sufficiently sophisticated, as to render the
Method fully feasible. A critical purpose of the present Article accordingly,
is to show the generalizability of the Method-particularly now as our
markets grow yet more integrated and our technologies yet more
sophisticated-in order to complete the modem American OS anticipated
by the land grant programs of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
and begun in earnest by our now well-established and continuing federal
home and higher education finance programs. The point, that is, is to show
how we might finally become that Jeffersonian republic that we were on
our way to becoming before the land ran out.
V. PARTIAL INTIMATIONS OF THE COMING WHOLE:
FRAGMENTS OF AN AMERICAN "OWNERSHIP SOCIETY" PAST
AND PRESENT
We are now equipped to interpret our own programmatic history as an
OS-in-the-making. This part accordingly surveys, under the aspects of the
core value and constraint understandings summarized in Parts II and III, as
well as the finance-schema laid out in Part IV, past and recent OS programfragments and proposals. The benefits of doing so are two-fold: First, our
survey corroborates the political, psychological, legal, and financial
syntheses of Parts II through IV, by demonstrating how past OS programfragments and proposals resonate with or instantiate its counsels and ideals.
And second, it equips us to meld the fragments together so as to draw
additional implementary lessons for the OS to come.
Because the ultimate aim is to bring programmatic coherence and
endurability to our future ownership-facilitative policies, we will do well to
be more brief in the treatment of policies that do not seem replicable than
in treatment of policies that do. We will consider the former principally
with a view to how they show both that we have long been attempting to
become an OS, and that our efforts to that end have in all cases given
expression to Part II values and Part III constraints. It will also be useful to
126.

See id.
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group our surveyed programs and proposals under three broad headings,
which I will call "homesteading," "capital homesteading," and "humancapital homesteading." We will see that these three families of programs
jointly constitute what might be called the "three-legged stool" of a
complete, comprehensive, and contemporary American OS.
A. "HOMESTEADING"

The first form of asset with whose ownership the American polity
came to be pervasively concerned was real estate. Real property continues
to constitute a substantial strand in latter-day American ownership policy
as well, but for reasons that we shall highlight, it no longer can reasonably
be expected to enjoy the pride of place that it once held. Its principal
significance now is as one leg of the aforementioned "three-legged stool,"
and as that asset in the spread of which "the Method" of Part IV was first
pioneered.
1. Early Land Law
There has not been a more durable or property-rule-protected asset in
the American tradition than real property. And no asset has resonated more
powerfully with the CR strand of American political self-understanding.
Land was thought to be the very source of political power by early
republican thinkers, 127 its wide dispersal accordingly a requisite to
preventing power's unhealthy concentration. As a highly generative asset,
moreover, land was thought to be the basis of a household's selfsufficiency and, thus, republic-reinforcing

independence, too. 128 Free

government required freeholders. CL and PC advocates, as well, could
view real property as one of the more crucial assets during the early days of
the American republic. For land was still central to economic development
and to that autonomy and self-determination that sprang of economic
independence.
As discussed in this Article's prequel, British closure of the West to
colonial migration was indeed one point of contention ultimately leading to
the American Revolutionary War itself. And English primogeniture and fee
tail had both prompted much of the migration to North America in the first
127. Of course, not only republicans thought this. It is no accident that the first act of William I
upon conquering England was to distribute large parcels of land to his loyal nobles. It is also no
accident that those parcels which he carved out were not contiguous-this in order to prevent the
concentration of power among any dukes who might later have opposed him. See, e.g., Edward L.
Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins (Feb. 22, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
128. See supra Part HIA.
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instance and inspired, by negative example, early changes to the common
law of real property by North Americans.1 29 After the Revolution, the
Northwest Ordinance1 30 quickly opened up the new nation's western lands
to settlement and cultivation by the growing masses of "shiftless," towndwelling unemployed-long thought a source of decadence and civil
instability by CR thinkers. 13 ' Sale to the public of federal lands, themselves
ceded to the national government by the newly independent states, was
agreed to constitute a suitable means of paying down the new republic's
war debt. 132 There was disagreement, however, over what tract-sizes and
prices the government should impose, as well as over who should be
permitted to purchase and whether credit should be permitted in the
purchasing. Policy oscillated between victories by those early economic
growth-concerned PC advocates who sought to keep a sizeable laboring
population back east to man the workhouses of infant U.S. manufacturing
industries, and the CR advocates who sought to foster a more widespread
yeoman citizenry. 133
The Land Act of 1796,134 which both doubled the minimum price that
the government could accept per hectare, and restricted purchases on credit,
represented a victory for the manufactures-favoring, "Hamiltonian"
camp.1 35 The Harrison Land Act of 1800,136 which (a) provided for smaller
unit sales and liberalized credit, and (b) afforded preemptive rights to
purchase at minimum price to squatters who already had begun to develop
parcels before 1800, was a victory for "Jeffersonians." 137 Agricultural
depression, which ended a period of rapid expansion following the War of
129.
See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 228-58 (1973); MORTON J.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1788-1860, at 31-62 (1977); JAMES WILLARD
HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY

UNITED STATES

(1956); Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 3, at Part I.A.
130. Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1787, 1 Stat. 51.
131.
See McCoY, supra note 1, at 185-208. See generally BENJAMIN HORACE HIBBARD, A
HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC LAND POLICIES (Univ. of Wisconsin Press 1965) (1924).

132.

See

ALAN F. ZUNDEL, DECLARATIONS OF DEPENDENCY: THE CIVIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION

IN U.S. POVERTY POLICY 30 (2000).

133. Id. at 30-32. Hence, incidentallv, Hamilton's favoring of restrictions upon westward
migration, though his concern also was with consolidating federal unity and avoiding the perceived
threat of national entropy. See ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 4, at 257-300.

134.

Land Act of 1796, ch. 29, 1 Stat. 464.

135.

ZUNDEL, supra note 132, at 30-32.

136.
137.

Id. at32.
Id.
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1812, brought yet another Land Act in 1820,138 this one restoring cash-only
39
sales of government land. 1
In debates surrounding all of these enactments, CR advocates of low
prices, small parcels, and easy credit spoke directly to the individual virtues
and political stability-enhancing lifeways of the hardworking small
farmer-"backbone of the nation"-contrasting these to the greed,
corruption, and republic-threatening habits of the "speculators" and
"aristocrats" who sought and advocated sales, in cash only, of larger tracts
that humbler citizens could not afford. 140 Opponents, as had Hamilton
before them, spoke to the CL and PC virtues that concentrated urban
14
populations would bring. 1
It is hardly surprising that land policy should have represented so
central, frequent, and contentious a matter for debate in the early days of
the American colonies and republic. Land was, in those early days, as
"asset-like" as assets could get. It afforded the greatest material
opportunity, and accordingly conferred the greatest degree of autonomy,
available in the socio-economy of the time. The state of markets, tastes, and
technological development until the mid- to late nineteenth century was
such that virtually any needs, wants, or life plans that the typical American
could conceive were well furnished through land-ownership. One could
either grow upon or extract from land what was required, or trade what was
extracted for something else required, or sell interests of various kinds in
the land itself.142 Moreover, land was plentiful, and could be optimally
productive only if widely allocated, for the technologies of agricultural
extraction at the time were such that holders of very large tracts, unless
they were slave-holders growing cotton, could not produce as much in
aggregate as could smaller holders. CR, CL, and PC interests alike,
accordingly, could be argued to be at least partly vindicated through
promotion of a broad dispersal of land-ownership. 43 Positions among the
three traditions on the land-dispersal question diverged only at the margins
(how much should farming be encouraged relative to industrialization) until
those conditions changed. The change occurred first, when the nation's
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 33.
Id.
See id. at 32-33.
See id. at 30-32.

142.

See generally CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION: JACKSONIAN AMERICA 1815-

1846(1994).
143. See id. For a recent account of the continuing importance of broadly dispersed landownership
to economic development in preindustrialized agrarian economies, see DIANE E. DAVIS, DISCIPLINE
AND DEVELOPMENT: MIDDLE CLASSES AND PROSPERITY IN EAST ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA (2004).
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initial western border began to be reached; second, when territory was
filled in all the way to its final western border; and finally, when
technological change rendered large tracts, of the sort that have come to be
associated with so-called corporate farms and agricultural conglomerates,
more productive than smaller "family farms."
2. The Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century Homestead Acts
The financial panics and ensuing economic downturns of 1837 and
1857 fell particularly hard on the suddenly developing manufacturing
industries located in eastern American cities as the mid-nineteenth century
unfolded. 144 Pundits and labor leaders began to advocate the parceling of
public lands into small plots, to be made available to settlers at nominal
prices. By the early 1850s, the U.S. House of Representatives had passed
several "homestead" bills, each of which had subsequently stalled in the
Senate. As in the case of the earlier land policy debates, a mix of
arguments-including the needs to depopulate crowded cities, to better the
conditions of laborers, and to develop fallow federal lands-was made on
behalf of homesteading. But also as with those earlier debates, the themes
and vision of a stable republic of virtuous yeoman freeholders and
autonomous citizens figured prominently. 145
Despite Jefferson's, Jackson's, and other southerners' opposition to
Hamiltonian industrialism and their advocacy of cheap land policies, the
principal obstacle to the homestead bills of the 1850s was, ironically,
southern resistance. The movement to populate the west with "free
laborers" was seen both as an ideological challenge to the by then welldeveloped plantation system in the South and as an effort to block the
expansion of slavery. 14 6 Abraham Lincoln's victory in the presidential
144. See JOHN STEELE GORDON: AN EMPIRE OF WEALTH: THE EPIC HISTORY OF AMERICAN
ECONOMIC POWER 142-86 (2004). See generally SELLERS, supra note 142.
145.
"Then, who is it that should not support this measure of Homes for All? Look at its wooing
incentives to industry, frugality, temperance, independence, love of country, virtue, and adoration of the
beneficent donor-the Father of all." CONG. GLOBE, 32nd Cong., 1 st Sess. App. 298 (1852) (statement
of Rep. Cable). "Let each man have a home, and when your elections come around he is a freeman, he
is an independent man; he goes to the ballot-box and votes his own vote, and not the vote of his
landlord or his master." CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1653 (1860) (statement of Sen. Johnson).
That peroration is typical.
146.
See PAUL K. CONKIN, PROPHETS OF PROSPERITY: AMERICA'S FIRST POLITICAL ECONOMISTS
136-255 (1980); ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (1970) [hereinafter FONER, FREE SOIL]; ERIC FONER,
POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN THE AGE OF THE CIVIL WAR (1980) [hereinafter FONER, POLITICS AND
IDEOLOGY].
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election of 1860, quickly followed by southern secession, at last brought
full enactment and presidential signature to the Homestead Act of 1862.147
The original Homestead Act and its progeny 148 constitute one of but a
few federal programs-apart, perhaps, from some of those associated with
the New Deal-which have attained a near mythic status as virtually
unqualified successes. 149 In exchange for a nominal fee and a promise to
work the land for a minimum of five years in order to render it productive,
ordinary citizens aged twenty-one or older were promised 160 acres of land
each to call their own. The original legislation sparked the celebrated
"Oklahoma Land Rush," an enduring symbol of American westward
expansion. 150 Altogether, the federal government transferred over 270
million acres of public lands, or about ten percent of the land area of the
United States, to private ownership pursuant to the Homestead Act and
associated legislation.151
The self-contained, self-financing nature of the Homestead program
was particularly elegant, and quite in keeping both with the EEOR ideals
sketched in Part II and the law- and psychology-grounded constraints and
strategies recommended in Part III. (It also, thanks to its use of an already
accumulated "new" resource, had no need of resort to "the Method" of Part
IV, which functions as a Part II ideals- and Part III constraints-respecting
surrogate for "new" accumulated asset-spreading.) Government effectively
distributed an autonomy-facilitative, productivity-enhancing, property-ruleprotected asset broadly and equitably to a large population of persons not
already endowed with substantial material assets beyond their (unskilled)
human capital. It did so without directly confiscating holdings already held
by others who were members of the same society.1 5 2 And it rendered the
distribution contingent upon the exercise of responsible effort. In return,
147. Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (repealed 1976).
148. The Act of 1862 remained in effect until it was repealed in 1976, with a provision for
continued homesteading in Alaska until 1986. The last of the major grants under the homesteading
legislation came with the Homestead Act of 1916. The Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 effectively drew the
homesteading era (outside of Alaska) to a close. See Taylor Grazing Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 315, 315(a)-(o)
(2000). It is intriguing, in this connection, that "the Method" of financially engineered home-spreading
began at precisely this time as we shall see in the next subpart.
149. But see Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, Cowboys and Contracts, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 489,
506-13 (2002) (polemically decrying the Act's rent-dissipating effects in a generalized antigovernment
lamentation).
150. It also gave Oklahomans the nickname, "Sooners." The term refers to those who managed to
slip into the Oklahoma territory to stake claims ahead of, or "sooner" than, the rush.
151.
National Park Service, The Homestead Act, http://www.nps.gov/home/homestead-act.html
(last visited Nov. 19, 2005).
152. See ZUNDEL supra note 132, at 37-38. I perhaps ignore here, of course, the land's original
inhabitants.
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Americans would see not only a reduction in the number of dependent,
"shiftless" city-dwelling unemployed and a growth in the number of
"virtuous citizens," but also would see the transformation of idle resources,
both human and geographical, to productive employment-a development
which could be justified on grounds of developing national wealth as well
as responsibly independent citizenship.
There were, of course, some shortcomings of the Homestead program.
Not all homesteaders were prepared or ultimately able to render 160 acres
of land productive, and not all parcels were as promising or ultimately as
productive as others. Hucksters and speculators endeavored to assemble
larger tracts at bargain-basement prices by purchasing on the cheap the
tracts of those who failed. 15 3 Had the government or private sector been
prepared to counsel or assist would-be homesteaders in connection with the
difficulties of beginning farms from scratch, and had fulsome regulation
and the policing of fraud been feasible to the same extent it is today, the
program doubtless would have been even more successful.
It also bears noting that land was becoming less paradigmatic as a
CR-, CL-, or PC-conceived asset as the twentieth century commenced.
More wants were coming to be conceived, and satisfied, that could not be
directly satisfied by land or by what farmed land could generate. As
railroads, manufacturing, and eventually the modern industrial corporation
developed and proliferated, new forms of asset began to rival, then surpass
land in their value, variety, and apparent fecundity. Consequent
urbanization gradually accelerated that process of movement away from
land-based agrarian agency. The American economy, society, and
population were decisively leaving their earlier land-rooted natures and for
this reason, CR and especially CL and aggregative PC ideals increasingly
would come to be best advanced through the development and dispersal of
new kinds of assets, including new kinds of real estate, urban and suburban
homes. The dispersal of real estate would remain a significant, if less
congruous, means of advancing portions of the three agendas.
3. Contemporary Home Finance
It was in the twentieth century that more or less comprehensive federal
facilitation of real estate acquisition for nearly all citizens began153. The law actually restricted such eventualities, but it was inadequately enforced. See id. A
similar fate, though more extreme, recently befell the privatization of Soviet state-owned industries. See
MAXIM BoYcKo, ANDREI SHLEIFER & ROBERT VISHNY, PRIVATIZING RUSSIA (1995); Bernard Black,
Reinier Kraakman & Anna Tarassova, Russian Privatizationand Corporate Governance: What Went
Wrong?, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1731 (2000).
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ironically, shortly after real estate had precipitously diminished in
importance as a CR-, CL-, and PC-advancing asset. And as with so much
else in twentieth century American public policy, the Great Depression of
the 1930s catalyzed real innovation in this realm.
Among the many markets that "crashed" and entered into protracted
slump during the Depression was the housing market. Early in the
twentieth century, as now, most who purchased housing did so partly on
credit.' 54 What was different was that fewer, for that reason, purchased
housing at all. Until the early 1930s, housing credit markets were
fragmented-by state and even by substate region within states-and
mortgages in consequence were comparatively illiquid, highly risk-prone
investments for would-be lenders. Individual savers still constituted the
largest single group of mortgage holders in the 1920s. And in significant
part for this very reason home loans were extended for brief terms in
comparison to today-generally for two to three years-at the end of which
they "ballooned" to coming due in full. Loan-to-value ratios, for their part,
were quite low by modem standards.' 55 As little as fifty percent was
considered very high, and was altogether rare. The short-term nature of
mortgages reflected lenders' needs for liquidity, while low loan-to-value
ratios reflected both their risk-aversions and indeed their actual risks.
Financing on such terms fell far short of typical would-be home buyers'
capacities and needs; and so second mortgages, junior liens, and rollover
refinancings-all at the higher interest rates required to compensate lenders
for incurring additional risk-were common. The real estate boom of the
1920s facilitated and indeed was indispensable to this "layered" mortgage
system's functioning.
When real estate prices leveled off, then began to fall in 1928, shortterm mortgages no longer could be refinanced in full. Resultant forced
sales and foreclosures, which reached the rate of over one thousand per day
once some fifty percent of all home mortgages in the country had gone into
default, brought prices even lower, pulling the real estate market into a
classic "downward spiral." 156 Lending institutions were faced with the
Hobson's choice of carrying mortgages in amounts greater than one
154.

See D. BARLOW BURKE, JR., LAW OF FEDERAL MORTGAGE DOCUMENTS 2-25 (1989);

T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 20318(1985).
155. BURKE, supranote 154, at 3-4.
156. Milton P. Semer et al., Evolution of FederalLegislative Policy in Housing: Housing Credits,

KENNETH

in FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY AND PROGRAMS: PAST AND PRESENT 69, 73 (J. Paul Mitchell ed., 1985).
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hundred percent of then-current home market price or taking less than full
repayments on their loans. Depositors' funds were threatened either way.
As depression in other sectors of the economy disemployed more and
more laborers, small deposits in such institutions dwindled while the
unemployed dissaved. A liquidity crisis among lending institutions-including the mutual savings banks ("MSBs," or "thrifts") that financed
most home loans-ensued, forcing all such intermediaries to cease lending
to home buyers. Once home-financing dried up, so did the construction
industry. And because construction was a labor-intensive industry, its
slump naturally augmented the national unemployment problem
significantly. Prospective facilitation of resumed growth in homeownership
rates, and prospective boosting of the national employment rate, then,
became both urgent and complementary goals in the early 1930s.
The legislation that ultimately passed to realize these aimscommencing with the last year of the Hoover administration, then
ballooning in its extent over the early Roosevelt years---can hardly fail to
impress the newcomer to this field with its financial elegance and
comprehensiveness. In essence, federal policy did what Part III noted
national government arguably to do best: mediate and ultimately lessen risk
by using its full faith and credit to facilitate and insure a market truly
national in scope, and using its police power to regulate that market to
avoid having to operate the market-making and market-insuring
apparatuses on other than "market" principles.
The process began with the Federal Home Loan Bank Act ("FHLBA")
of 1932,157 which authorized establishment of a system of regional federal
home loan banks roughly parallel to that of the Federal Reserve's system of
regional Federal Reserve banks.1 58 A Federal Home Loan Bank Board
("FHLBB") was established to act in a capacity analogous to that of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. Member institutions were
capitalized by invested federal funds-first appropriated, later converted
into capital subscriptions of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation-the
federal capital to be retired ultimately by investments made by member
institutions, MSBs, that joined the system. The regional banks, again, like
regional Federal Reserve banks, provided standards and supervision to
member institutions, and in return supplied them an added line of credit by
advancing funds on the security of mortgage loans they held. The
advanceable funds derived, not only from member institutions'
157.
158.

Federal Home Loan Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1449 (2000).
Semer et al., supra note 156, at 70.
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subscriptions, but also through issuance of debentures in the private capital
market, each of these the joint and several obligations of all banks in the
system.
Member institutions in the federal home loan bank system were
sharply distinguished from ordinary commercial banks in several
fundamental ways. First, individuals' funds invested in the institutions were
not designated or treated as deposits in the custodial sense, but as "shares."
Depositors accordingly were "shareholders," and their earnings were
characterized not as "interest" but as "dividends." There was, accordingly,
no right of immediate withdrawal or redemption. Rather, one had to seek a
"repurchase" of one's shares, and the institutions had the power to impose
waiting periods before granting such requests. Likewise, checking
privileges and other general banking services were not permitted to the
159
institutions, which were limited, rather, to making first mortgage loans.
In essence, then, the system was quite limited but elegantly self-contained:
the federal government facilitated the pooling of risk on a national scale for
a system of specialized financial intermediaries in which small investors
could save for purposes of accumulating sufficient funds to make down
payments on new homes, and from which they could borrow once prepared
to assume mortgage debts of their own.
The new Congress that took office in 1933 built substantially upon
Hoover's humble but well designed initiative. Realizing that the FHLBA
did nothing for the thousands of mortgagors whose loans already had
defaulted, Congress passed a Home Owners' Loan Act ("HOLA") in
1933,160 establishing a Home Owners' Loan Corporation ("HOLC")headed by a board of directors comprising members of Hoover's FHLBBto refinance mortgages in default or in process of foreclosure, and to enable
owners whose homes already had been lost through foreclosure or forced
sale to recover those homes. 16 1 Using funds borrowed in the private capital
market through issuance of federally guaranteed bonds, HOLC made loans
of more than $3 billion by 1936 for the refinance of mortgages, payment of
delinquent taxes, and making of essential home repairs and
improvements.' 62 When the program was later liquidated pursuant to the
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at71-72.
Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1468 (2000).
Semer et al., supra note 156, at 73.
Id.
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terms of the temporary legislation, the investment was fully recovered both
63
for the Treasury and for all private borrowers. 1
While this success in ending panic and restoring confidence in
mortgage lending is certainly noteworthy in its own right, what is yet more
significant is the number of innovations, persistent to this day, that HOLC
introduced to the private mortgage industry in carrying out what was at the
time an emergency mission. Chief among these was today's familiar, yet
then quite novel, long-term, amortized mortgage, which both made possible
and demonstrated the possibility of extending homeownership, at no
confiscatory public cost, to people of moderate means when that ownership
was financed through reasonably low monthly charges related to income
and credit rating. The long-term result, buttressed by further legislation
would be a complete restructuring of the practices of American home
mortgage financing.
In enacting the HOLA, Congress also acted affirmatively to
supplement the system of regional home loan banks established in 1932
with additional, fully private institutions. In effect, there would now be
nationally chartered MSBs, in addition to state-chartered MSBs, just as
there had been both nationally and state-chartered commercial banks since
passage of the National Bank Act of 1863.164 The FHLBB itself would
charter the new institutions in order directly to "provide local mutual thrift
institutions in which people [could] invest their funds ... for the financing
of homes." 165 In granting charters, the board of directors was to give
"primary consideration to the best practices of [already existent] mutual
thrift and home-financing institutions in the United States. 166 Each newly
created institution would, upon incorporation, become a member of the
appropriate regional home loan bank. Preexisting state-chartered member
institutions were authorized under the 1863 Act to convert to federal status
upon request (again as with the commercial banking industry). Through the
1933 Act, then, the board of directors, created by the 1932 Act originally to
oversee a new reserve banking system for existing (state-chartered) home
lending institutions, now became the overseeing entity for the new,
emergency-managing HOLC. It also became the implementing agency for
163.
striking.
164.
165.
166.

Id. The contrast with the aftermath of the "S&L" debacle of the 1980s to early 1990s is
National Bank Act of 1863, 12 Stat. 665-82.
Id.
Id. at 73-74.
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the creation of a more complete national system of local mortgage lending
67
institutions acting pursuant to best practices.
Having in effect moved toward more fully "completing" the national
primary mortgage market,1 68 the next step for Congress was to insure
directly investor deposits in these institutions. Whether such insurance
would have been necessary atop the risk-modulation offered by the Federal
Reserve-reminiscent federal home loan bank system itself absent
competing institutions, 169 such insurance was surely necessary in view of
the new system of federal deposit insurance that had proved to be necessary
to restore confidence in commercial banks. 170 Besides the obvious analogy
to the national commercial banking system, the new national MSB system
faced the prospect of being unable to compete with the newly insured
commercial banking system for savers' funds absent a similar insurance
scheme.
Accordingly, Congress in the National Housing Act ("NHA") of
193417 established an analogue to the commercial banking system's
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC")-a Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC"). The board of directors of the
FSLIC would comprise members of the FHLBB. Initial capitalization was
provided by the HOLC. The Act required that national thrifts be insured by
FSLIC (just as Federal Reserve member banks were insured by FDIC). It
also permitted state-chartered system-member institutions to acquire such
insurance provided that their operating, lending, and reserve practices met
standards established by the FSLIC (again, rather as state-chartered
commercial banks could seek FDIC insurance). 172 The premium charged
was .25% of accounts of insured members, plus creditor obligations. 173 if
an insured institution ever were to be liquidated, the FSLIC would be
appointed conservator or receiver for federally chartered thrifts, and was
167. Id. at 74. In short order the new federally chartered institutions, though constituting but a
third of all system-member institutions, held well over half of system assets.
168. See supra Part I.C (discussing market-completeness).
169. But note that the Federal Reserve System itself, notwithstanding its pooling and lender of last
resort functions, had not proved able to prevent the post-October 1929 bank runs that prompted
President Roosevelt to call a "Bank Holiday" upon taking office. See MELTZER, supra note 115, at 271414.
170. The deposit insurance system was inaugurated with the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of
1933, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1831 (2000).
171.
National Housing Act of 1934, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.).
172. Semer et al., supranote 156, at 74-75.
173. Id. at 75.
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authorized to serve in the same capacity for state-chartered insured
74
institutions. 1
Up until the "S&L (Savings and Loan) Crisis" of the late 1980s and
early 1990s, the deposit insurance system proved sound enough to be
extended, with liberalized terms, over time. Coverage increased in
176
successive increments1 75 and premiums concurrently were reduced.
Restrictions on the investment powers of thrifts gradually receded,
including as to maximum mortgage amounts, loan-to-value ratios,
geographical coverage, and types of investment permitted. New
investments, other than first mortgages, were permitted, and by the mid1980s, thrifts could act as trustees for some kinds of investment trust, a
banking service clearly not among the original, nonbank functions to which
177
the thrifts were conceived originally to be necessarily limited.
Having insured depositors directly against the liquidation of mortgage
lending institutions, Congress next insured the institutions themselves
against defaulting mortgagors. Section 203 of the Act provided for a
nationwide mutual mortgage insurance system through which the newly
created Federal Housing Administration ("FHA") could insure first
mortgage loans. These loans could be made for the construction, purchase,
or refinancing of one- to-four bedroom family homes which would not
exceed twenty years' duration, or either $16,000 or eighty percent of the
appraised value of real property. 178 In order to be FHA-insured, mortgage
loans were required to be made by responsible lenders who were able to
service the debts. 179 Interest rates could not exceed five percent per annum,
or up to six percent under certain exceptional circumstances, and the
required periodic payments could not be "in excess of [borrowers']
reasonable abilit[ies] to pay."'180 FHA also was required to formulate and
impose requirements as to insurance, repairs, reserves, foreclosure, and
other matters upon federally insurable mortgages. 81 FHA insurance
174. Id.
175.
Id. at 75-76.
176. Id. at 76.
177.
Id. It is widely believed to be for this very reason-the growth of the S&L system beyond its
original purposeful bounds-that the "crisis" of the late 1980s and early 1990s, precipitated by
speculation in the nonresidential real estate bubble of the 1980s and other opportunistic behavior, was
able to reach the depths that it did. Intriguingly, the institutions that fared best in the crisis were those
that remained closest in their functions and practices to the original, "unliberated" S&Ls. See, e.g.,
HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 265-86 (1996).

178.

Semer et al., supra note 156, at 78.

179.

Id.

180.

Id. at 78.

181.

Id.
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provided lenders, in the event of foreclosure-and conveyance of the
relevant property and associated claims to FHA-the right to (a) U.S.guaranteed debentures which (i) were equal in value to the unpaid principal
of the loan and certain additional allowances, and (ii) matured within three
years of the maturity of the original mortgage; and (b) a certificate of claim
equal to the unpaid interest on the loan plus foreclosure costs, payable82to
the extent that FHA realized proceeds from its handling of the property. 1
FHA's financing was particularly elegant in its conception and design.
The Act required the Administration to charge premiums of not less than
.5% and not more than 1% per annum of the outstanding balance of each
insured mortgage loan, that charge being passable to the borrower atop the
interest on her loan. 183 FHA was required to classify insured mortgages into
separate risk pools "in accordance with sound actuarial practices and risk
characteristics," then to maintain separate accounts for each pool. 184 When
all mortgages in a particular pool account had been paid, FHA was required
to distribute the remaining balance in that account to its relevant
homeowners.' 85 This, of course, gave real content to the term "mutual
' 186
mortgage insurance."
The FHA insurance scheme appears to be one of the most
comprehensively and financially innovative federal programs ever to have
been implemented. It effectively altered, in fundamental ways, the entire
regime of home-financing in the United States. For this reason, as well as
for the insight that it will yield into the prospects of analogous federal
initiatives in other, nonhousing industries, it will be well here briefly to
catalogue in detail the basic changes in home-financing that FHA wrought.
First, FHA effectively extended HOLC's innovations in long-term
mortgage financing and amortization to virtually all first time mortgages. It
effectively replaced traditional collateralization requirements with national
default-risk-pooling and thereby extended homeownership to a much larger
portion of the rapidly growing U.S. population than ever before.187 Second,
the essential uniformity of FHA mortgage requirements effectively brought
182.

Id.at 79.

183.

Id.

184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. See also HANSMANN, supra note 177, at 246-64. It should be noted in passing that
Section 207 of the Act extended FHA insurance structured as described above to certain regulated rental
projects, while Section 2 did the same for substantial repair loans. Semer etal., supra note 156, at 7980.
187. Id. at 101. See also supra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing the stultifying effects
of collateralization requirements).
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into being a standardized home mortgage instrument that was recognized
and thus marketable throughout the country on a grand scale. 188 It
effectively opened the door to securitization-with all of its attendant
liquidity and risk-spreading benefits-of home loans. 189 Previously, owing
to real property's status as a creature of state law, credit had not flowed
freely or efficiently across state lines from where it was most available to
where it was most needed: the market was fragmented. 190 Insurance itself
had the same integrative effect as lenders nationwide could rely upon this
single form of security, rather than having to investigate the vagaries of
differing state jurisdictions' laws of secured real property transactions.
Third, the requirements of (a) actuarial soundness, (b) risk classifying
and separate pooling, and (c) mutuality-return of surpluses to fully
amortized pools-ensured that the system simulated the efficiency of a
private market. The requirements prevented losses to the Treasury and
19 1
assured borrowers that their premiums were no higher than necessary.
Finally, various housing quality preconditions that FHA was statutorily
required to place upon the availability of its insurance, along with the
warranties, appraisals, and inspections utilized to enforce those conditions,
not only protected the finances of the system and the living standards of its
1 92
beneficiaries, but also raised the quality of new housing countrywide.
In view of its innovations, it is perhaps not surprising that the FHA
system proved both a programmatic and a fiscal success.' 93 Perhaps the
greatest measure of success in FHA's case is the degree to which Congress
found it fiscally feasible both to extend the system and progressively
liberalize its attendant conditions. Over time, for example, Congress raised
the maximum loan-to-value ratio of eligible mortgages, which permitted
progressively lower down payments to be made by purchasers or
sponsors. 194 In time, Congress also lengthened the maximum loan period
for eligible mortgages, effectively permitting smaller monthly amortization
188. See BURKE, supra note 154, at 6 (noting "the need for standardized mortgage and note
documents"). See id. at 10-25 (discussing the subsequent evolution of standardized mortgage
documents and the secondary market therein).
189. See supra Part IV (discussing securitization and its benefits).
190. Semer et al., supra note 156, at 100-03.
191.
Id. at 81-82.
192. Id. at 83-84.
193. According to one authoritative commentator, "[T]he FHA mortgage insurance system was a
viable program from the beginning.... The program got underway with surprising swiftness,
considering the novelty of the system and the enormous number of institutions and agencies throughout
the United States which were involved." Id. at 91-92.
194. Id. at 94-97.
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payments. 19 5 Finally, Congress gradually increased the maximum dollar
ceilings of individual mortgages. 196 Naturally, all of these developments
not only vastly increased rates of homeownership throughout the United
States, but also stimulated productive savings rates, the construction and
1 97
associated industries, and, therefore, employment rates.
Although the NHA represented a manner of "quantum leap" beyond
the innovative immediate predecessors upon which it quickly built, it did
not represent the last of the New Deal era's great innovations in the
facilitation of homeownership. A fundamental feature both of the FHLBA
of 1932, the HOLA of 1933, and the NHA of 1934 was to facilitate
national integration of diffuse local home credit markets. The FHLBA did
so by providing a national financial infrastructure of regional clearing
institutions for the mobilization and channeling of cash reserves. The
HOLA did so by adding "flesh" to the skeletal FHLB structure through the
direct charter of additional, federally supervised local thrift institutions.
And the NHA, via FHA, did so by effectively creating a standardized
mortgage instrument backed by a federal form of security not subject to the
vagaries of differing state laws of real property and lending.
Although those developments were critical to the development of a
truly national primary mortgage market, what remained absent was a
secondary market that would render savers' investments in home
mortgages optimally liquid, thus attracting yet more capital for mortgage
lending by savers with greater risk-aversions and consequent liquidity
preferences. Congress supplied this secondary market in 1938 in the form
of "Fannie Mae," the Federal National Mortgage Association, which
provided a national market for the trading of FHA-insured mortgages
themselves, that is, full securitization. 198 While originally aimed at
supporting a secondary market in mortgages for publicly subsidized
housing, in time, Fannie Mae's scope broadened to the purchasing of
mortgage loans in the unsubsidized mortgage market. Fannie Mae was later
supplemented by the Government National Mortgage Association ("Ginnie
Mae") and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac")
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 100-03.
198. See Richard W. Bartke, FannieMae and the Secondary Mortgage Market, 66 Nw. U. L. REV.
1, 16-29 (1971); Patrick H. Hendershott & Kevin E. Villani, Direct Intervention in the Mortgage
Market, in FEDERAL HouSING POLICY AND PROGRAMS: PAST AND PRESENT, supra note 156, at 123,
123-41. See also MARTIN MAYER, THE BUILDERS 66-382 (1978).
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in other, more specialized mortgage markets.' 99 In effect, Fannie Mae and
its progeny closed the proverbial circle, fully completing the market for
housing credit and housing credit-risk-bearing, thereby maximizing the
availability of such credit and in turn minimizing that credit's cost to home
buyers in the manner described in Part IV.
Following is a diagrammed summary of the full set of (public and
private) institutions and inter-relations that now jointly constitute the
current structure of home finance in the United States.
199. See generally Brant K. Mailer, The CollateralizedMortgage Obligation: The Latest Phase in
the Evolution of Mortgage-Backed Securities, 13 REAL EST. L.J. 299 (1985).
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FIGURE 2.

Home-financing structure
20 0
legislation of the 1930s

since

federal

homeownership

Bdr/Ses

It should be pointed out that Congress has supplemented this system
of housing credit with tax policy, again as foreshadowed in Part IV above.
Given that the mechanics of "incentivizing" through tax policy are by and
large familiar, I will simply note that Congress facilitated the growth of the
thrift institutions envisaged by the 1933 Act through exempting thrift
200. Note that HOLC, whose board comprised FHLBB board members, was by terms of its
implementing legislation a temporary measure, phased-out in 1936. FHLBB, FHA, and FSLIC have
since been merged into or brought under the aegis of the Federal Housing Finance Board, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, and FDIC, respectively; but the home finance
structure mapped here itself remains intact.
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depositor interest earnings from taxation, 20 1 and allowing tax deductions
for mortgage interest payments up to specified ceilings and local property
tax payments. 20 2 Although prompted by a depressed housing industry, the
encouragement of homeownership alone is the principal policy reason for
the system's continuance today.
In all events, a few numbers and statistics are quite telling as to the
system's overall effectiveness: Production of homes by 1933 had dropped
to 93,000 units, less than one-tenth the number built in 1925.203 Onsite
construction employment had dropped to 150,000 persons from more than
twice that number by the same point.204 Employment in the associated
materials and equipment industries had dropped by the same amount. 20 5 By
the early 1970s, in contrast, over two million housing starts were being
reported annually, excluding mobile home shipments, and of these onefourth were assisted by FHA insurance. 20 6 FHA-insured repair and
rehabilitation loans were near $1 billion annually. 20 7 By 1980, over thirty
million such loans, totaling over $20 billion, had been insured. 20 8 By the
same point, FHA had helped generate credit for mortgages and other loans
totaling $164 billion-including over $119 billion in home mortgagescompared to a total national investment in home mortgages of $18 billion
in 1934.209 About twenty percent of all nonfarm starts in housing
210 Eleven million families had
construction had been FHA-insured.
2 11
benefited from FHA operations.
In the immediate post-Second World War years, FHA is thought to
have stimulated 375,000-500,000 housing units per year, about $4-$5.5
billion worth. 2 12 In 1930, only forty-six percent of American families
owned their own homes. 2 13 By 1970-notwithstanding a much larger
national population-the figure had risen to sixty-three percent. 2 14 Prior to
201.
HOUSING
202.
203.
204.

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

See Richard E. Slitor, Rationale of the Present Tax Benefits for Homeowners, in FEDERAL
POLICY AND PROGRAMS: PAST AND PRESENT, supra note 156, at 163, 163-84.
See id. at 163-84.
Semer et al., supra note 156, at 77.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 99.
Id.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 101.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 102.
Id.
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1934, mortgage banks handled
business. Mortgage banks now
$50 billion, according to the
scale home builders came into
national housing market made
2 16
industry and credit market.

only a minuscule portion of the mortgage
service FHA mortgages amounting to over
Mortgage Bankers' Association. 2 15 Large
existence only with the growth of a truly
possible by a national mortgage banking

In view of the considerable importance of federal housing policy as a
coherent set of asset-building, market-completing, and industry-stimulating
programs, it is well worth locating it among any cluster of ownershipfacilitative EEOR policies. All that remains is to draw out the ways in
which homeownership programs for the middle class realize the values of
the Amezrican OS laid out in Part II in a manner consistent with the
constraints, laid out in Part III, placed upon ownership facilitation by
American legal precedent and ownership psychology.
Housing is readily mapped onto the American OS's understanding of
an ownable asset. For those with relatively stable incomes and
employment, housing in today's market-a remarkably "thick" and
"complete" market owing to federal home finance policy itselfsignificantly enhances responsible agency and civic attachment while
diminishing dependency. It is physically and financially durable (valueretentive), and rendered yet more so by FHA-buttressed quality standards.
It is legally perhaps the most secure of goods protected by property rules
and due process. Because the typical home buyer has recovered initial
transaction costs and begun to accumulate durable equity, relative to what
the person would have done in paying similar rental costs within two to
three years of closing on the person's house, 217 and because of the
increasing availability of second mortgages, housing also is a much more
2 18
liquid asset than it used to be.
Though it is not clear whether there have been extensive populationwide studies correlating homeownership with actual psychological attitudes
and practices of agency, responsibility, and civic attachment in the manner
discussed in Part III, there have been interesting studies carried out among
215. Id.
216. Id. at 102-03.
217. See MALKIEL, supranote 105, at 57.
218. Indeed, perhaps too liquid. Robert Shiller notes that the current housing market bubble might
account, in part, for the low national savings rate, which is dangerous in view of the facts that (a) the
housing market is indeed a bubble, and thus is more than likely to burst; and (b) homes function as
more than savings vehicles, such that the loss of a home in the event of a crash after over-mortgaging
will be more than the loss of finances. See Amy Feldman, Interview with Robert Shiller: Nobody Knows
when a Bubble Will End, MONEY, Feb. 25, 2005, at 74.
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particular segments of the United States and other populations-wage
laborers and African-Americans in the United States and rural women in
China, for example 2 19 -which confirm the predictions suggested in Part III.
There is substantial evidence that homeowners take better care of and
preserve and enhance the values of their properties, 220 and that they
22 1
participate more and exercise more leadership in their communities.
Although, in view of the foregoing observations, housing looks to be
as paradigmatically asset-like, in the terms of Part I, as real estate has
always been in the American tradition-and indeed even more so in light
of its greater liquidity now than in the past-there are some respects in
which much of today's real property is less asset-like than that of times
past. First, housing is not polymorphically "generative" in the way that
homestead land was in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth
centuries. One cannot extract a host of ever-growing, indefinitely available
further assets from it. At best, housing will be generative only in the sense
that it tends to appreciate in value over time in normal markets; it yields
"returns" in Tobin's sense. 222 More valuable than housing in this respect is
the land itself, which, if Malthus or Ricardo are to be believed, will tend to
grow in value indefinitely over the long run; one need only live for long
enough.223 But it is nonetheless less likely that one's "homestead" today
will confer upon a homeowner the manner of autarky or autonomy that it
would have done in the past. One can live in it, but not on it or off of it, so
to speak. It is surely necessary for many or most, but only sufficient for a
few, for the purpose of building a life.
Housing also is, of course, less liquid than a simple bank account or
mutual fund portfolio. While the growth of "second mortgaging," as well as
appreciating housing markets' enhancement of salability enhance the scope
of uses to which one may put both paid-down and "sweat" equity in a
219. See Deborah Page-Adams & Michael Sherraden, Asset Building as a Community
Revitalization Strategy, 42 SOC. WORK 423, 423-34 (1997); Edward Scanlon, Low-income
Homeownership Policy as a Community Development Strategy, 5 J. COMMUNITY PRAC. 137, 137-54

(1998); Deborah Page-Adams & Nancy Vosler, Homeownership and Well-being Among Blue-collar
Workers (Ctr. for Soc. Dev., Working Paper No. 97-5, 1997); Edward Scanlon, The Impact of
Homeownership on the Life Satisfaction of African-Americans (Ctr. for Soc. Dev., Working Paper No.
99-4, 1999); Min Zhan & Michael Sherraden, Landholding and Household Development: What Do We
Know? (Ctr. for Soc. Dev., Working Paper No. 98-2, 1998).
220. See supra note 219.
221. See supra Part lI.A.
222. See TOBIN, supra note 75, at 21.
223.
See T.R. MALTHUS, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION (Donald Winch ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1992) (1803); DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND

TAXATION (Everyman's Library 1962) (1817).
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home, transaction costs and initial investment recovery-lags inevitably
reduce the velocity at which this can be done. Moreover, while such
mortgaging practices might render real property more liquid now than it
typically was in the past, the fact is that yet more liquid alternatives are
available now than in the past. 224 Again, then, one's "homestead" is
relatively less autonomy-conferring today than it was in the past, meaning
that a contemporary American OS must seek to facilitate ownership of
more assets than homes even if it wishes to do no more than keep up with
the American OS of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
If housing is a less fully agency-supportive asset today than were
homesteads in earlier centuries, federal housing policy, at least, appears to
be as savvy about American legal tradition and ownership psychology as
were early American land policy and the Homestead Acts. Indeed, the
home finance programs manifest all of the optimal law- and psychologyrespecting strategies reviewed in Part III. Recall first, pursuant to Part
III.A, that the American OS does well to (a) foster ownership of the
greatest variety of choice-enhancing assets as possible, (b) use and
facilitate the spread of markets in such assets, and (c) foster the ownership
of "durable," "accumulated," and maximally legally secure, property-ruleprotected assets. Recall next, pursuant to Part III.B, that such "facilitation"
is likely to fare best, as a political matter, where it (d) channels perceivedly
"new" ownership opportunities to, or refrains from "taking from," the less
endowed, and (e) conditions such channeled benefits upon the exercise of
responsible diligence by those beneficiaries. Federal home finance policy
for the middle class scores satisfactorily or better in respect of all five of
these general criteria.
With respect to (a), the home finance programs at least fostered the
spread of one incontestably choice-enhancing asset, even if, as noted just
above, a comprehensive OS today must foster the spread of more assets
than homes. As to (b), the home finance programs made extensive use of
existing markets in homes, thrift deposits and securities, and governmentissued bonds. More importantly, home finance policy actually "jumpstarted" the creation of new markets-in particular, markets in an
altogether new form of financial security: the FHA-insured mortgagebacked security. That, in conjunction with federal mortgage insurance, had
the salutary effect of broadening, integrating, rationalizing, and more
efficiently distributing risk across the home credit market, which in turn
224. One exception includes "land banks" and thus a kind of securitization of land in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; except few people then were able to participate. See generally
FRIEDMAN, supra note 129, at 243-97.
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extended the pool of credit available for home finance. The degree to
which these government activities all were in keeping with market
principles is perhaps best evidenced by the fact that Ginnie Mae and its ilk,
and even FHA itself since 1997, have converted entirely over to private
entity status even after having begun as public or mixed public-private
entities. As to (c), we have observed that real estate is as durable,
accumulated, and legally protected as an asset can be in the American
tradition.
With respect to (d), the federal home finance programs did not, on the
surface, "take" assets from some for "redistribution" to others, but rather
simply channeled a perceivedly "new resource"-the credit-availability
gains to be gleaned by integrating and completing the default-risk marketto those (and only those) who up to that point had not been sufficiently well
resourced with available collateral to purchase their first homes on credit.
Insofar as tax policy played a role in the programs, it took the form of
"refraining" rather than "taking"; mortgage payments made by home
buyers could be deducted from taxable income. Finally, as to (e), the
programs essentially benefited only those who purchased or repaired homes
meeting stipulated quality standards, while laboring diligently over the
years in the economy earning the moneys used to pay down their
mortgages. The programs were of no assistance to "idlers" or to those who
already owned homes. We will see below that other successful ownershipfacilitating programs have manifested these five characteristics and we will
project additional programs on this basis.
B. "CAPITAL HOMESTEADING"
While housing might seem the natural latterday successor to the
eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth century yeoman "homestead" in
its durability, value-retentivity, legal security, and "stake"-like nature-the
home both as one's "castle" and as one's nexus to the community-in other
respects something quite other than residential real property would seem
more modernly to fill the bill. The traditional farm was a generative source
of sustenance and income-of productive and remunerative autonomy-as
well as of shelter, domicile, and nexus to the community. It amounted to a
form of capital as well as to a form of residence. It would be only natural,
then, to expect CR thinking, if not indeed the thinking of all three
constitutive American political traditions, in modern times to have fixed
attention not only upon homeownership, but also upon business or
productive capital-ownership as contemporary successor to the pre-twentyfirst-century "homestead." Nineteenth century agricultural homesteading,
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that is, might have been expected to give rise not only to twentieth century
"house-steading," but also to what we might call "capital homesteading."
Remarkably, however, widespread attention has not flowed in the
predictable direction. It is as though federal housing policy along with
federal aid to the dwindling number of American "family farmers" came to
occupy all of the policy space once occupied by federal land policy. But
there have been some limited exceptions, and these are worth exhuming
and examining here pursuant to the prospect of designing and realizing a
comprehensive American OS. As with "homesteading," we will first
provide a bit of context with a brief look at "capital homesteading" policy
in its earlier and more modest formulations, then turn to more
comprehensive proposals making extensive use, like twentieth century
federal homeownership policy, of the Part IV "Method" of financial
engineering.
1. Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century Labor and Its Tools
Chords similar to those sounded by nineteenth century land policy
continued to resonate, until early in the twentieth century, in labor and
industrial policy debate. While it is by now a commonplace to associate
labor with wage income in near Pavlovian fashion, that association was
hotly contested through most of the nineteenth and much of the early
twentieth centuries. 225 The dominant agenda of the labor movement up
until the 1890s did not concern itself directly with raising wages,
shortening the work week, or improving the health and safety features of
working environments. Rather, that agenda aimed at attaining those
perceivedly secondary ends by means of attaining the more intrinsically
important end of abolishing the wage system altogether and replacing it
with a system of worker ownership and consumer-producer cooperativesearly prototypes of today's ESOPs. 226 This was the articulated platform, for
example, of the Knights of Labor, by far the largest and most influential of
American labor organizations until the 1890s; and it remained the goal of
continuingly influential labor movements up until the dawning of the
1920s.22 7 The displacement of artisanal and craft production by highly
centralized, bureaucratically organized modes was seen, and constantly
225.

See

MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC

PHILOSOPHY 168-249 (1996).

226. See id. For more on how the ideology of the cooperative movement finds expression in
enterprise-organizational form, see HANSMANN, supra note 177, at 66-226. For contemporary defenses
and further economic analyses of cooperative and worker-owned firms, see ELLERMAN, WORKEROWNED FIRM, supra note 122; VANEK, supra note 122.
227. See FONER, FREE SOIL, supra note 146; FONER, POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY, supra note 146.
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described, as a threat to the dignity of work and the independence of the
citizenry-hence, to the enduring of republican self-government itself.22 8
The hope, accordingly, was to carry some analogue of the Jeffersonian
yeoman ideal over to the realm of nonagrarian industry. In view of the tight
conceptual link between labor's economic dependency upon hirers and the
lack of individual laborers' autonomy, this would have constituted a classic
CL concern as well.
Though it seems to be forgotten now, today's Republican Party during
its early years in the late 1850s-as well as, again, its first successful U.S.
presidential candidate, Abraham Lincoln-were as opposed to "wage
slavery" in the North as they were to chattel slavery in the South.229
Lincoln and his party envisaged an America populated by independent,
self-reliant artisans and laborers as well as farmers, a land where all faced
equal opportunity to build, by diligent effort applied to individually or
cooperatively owned land, business and human capital, productive,
230
worthwhile lives.
The early history of American antitrust policy featured arguments
along the same lines, even to the point of permitting or encouraging some
forms of business integration-resale price maintenance arrangements, for
example-which resulted in higher consumer prices. The reason was that
such arrangements, notwithstanding their effects on prices, facilitated
republican freedom by ensuring a larger number of independently owned
and operated retail establishments. 23 1 That broad independence was thought
worth the price of higher prices. Consumer interests, including lower
prices, of course ultimately became the sole touchstone of antitrust
policy. 232 But "producer" interests-or at any rate, shop-owner interests228. See FONER, FREE SOIL, supra note 146; FONER, POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY, supra note 146.
229. See ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Address at Cooper Institute, New York City (Feb. 27, 1860), in
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-1865, at 111 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989). Some southern political
economists, in an irony attributable to the strange bedfellow-making wrought by political disputation,
found common cause with northern advocates of free labor in their defenses of the life conditions of
southern chattel slaves as compared to those of northern wage laborers. It is perhaps partly for this very
reason that more purist northern abolitionists, anxious to broaden northern opposition to chattel slavery,
sought to decouple chattel slavery from "wage slavery" as a national issue. See ERIC L. McKITRICK,
SLAVERY DEFENDED: THE VIEWS OF THE OLD SOUTH 12-19 (1963).
230.
See LINCOLN, supra note 229.

231.

See id.

232.

See, e.g., PHILLIP AREEDA & LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 3-38, 42 (5th ed. 1997)

(placing the policy emphasis on control of "market power" in the interest of consumer welfare, which is
now typical in leading textbooks).
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for decades figured prominently, both in legislative argument and in court
233
decisions, again for explicitly articulated, CR- and CL-grounded reasons.
One might wonder why consumer interests ultimately came to prevail
over the interest in widespread productive autonomy. The answer seems to
involve three related reasons, all traceable ultimately to a failure up until
now, to have thought through what a comprehensive effort at spreading
productive ownership would require. First, the progress of the modern
industrial corporation in realizing productive and distributive economies of
scale rendered the artisanal and small shopkeeper ideals obsolete as
appropriate pictures of the broad spreading of business capital ownership.
Wide ownership of business capital required wide ownership of business
shares, not just individual businesses.
Second, the failure to pursue wide ownership of the latter sort-of
business shares-arguably facilitated the failure of effective consumer
demand to keep pace, without lag, with the growth of business productivity
during the aforementioned corporate revolution in American industry, a
revolution that brought about the rapid rationalization and automation of
productive activity. That failure in turn appears to have played a key role in
the protracted economic depression of the 1930s, which in turn led to the
third factor explaining the triumph of consumer interest over the interest of
productive autonomy in economic policymaking: a fixation, in theoretical
economic, government, and policy circles, on centralized "Keynesian"
demand-maintenance as the means of avoiding recessionary slump. From a
"producer republic," the United States became a "consumer democracy,"
more concerned with the now (post-1940s) tried and true method of
233. As one Senator remarked:
Do we want an America where ... all we have is catalog houses? ... Or do we want an
America where there are thousands upon thousands of small entrepreneurs, independent
businessmen, and landholders who can stand on their own feet and talk back to their
Government or to anyone else, in case they feel that they are being unjustly treated.... [The
small enterprise] produces good citizens, and good citizens are the only hope of freedom and
democracy. So we pay a price for it. I am willing to pay that price.
98 CONG. REC. 7, 8741, 8823 (1952) (statement of Sen. Humphrey). Furthermore, as Justice Douglas
noted in United States v. FalstaffBrewing Corp.,
Control of American business is being transferred from local communities to distant cities
where men on the 54th floor with only balance sheets and profit and loss statements before
them decide the fate of communities with which they have little or no relationship.... A
nation of clerks is anathema to the American antitrust dream.
United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 541-43 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). See
also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) ("[W]e cannot fail to recognize
Congress'[s] desire to promote competition through the protection of viable, small, locally owned
businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might result from the
maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It resolved these competing considerations in favor
of decentralization.").
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centralized demand management, via macro-oriented fiscal, tax, and
monetary policy, than with other more micro- and ownership-oriented
means of calibrating demand-growth to productivity-growth, which
arguably would have been more aligned with our EEOR ideals.
Such other means did lie to hand, however. Indeed, they were being
pioneered by the federal homeownership-spreading programs themselves.
Could those means be generalized to spreading business-share-ownership?
2. Contemporary Citizens and Stock?
As noted above, the artisanal ideal that animated the first phase of
"capital homesteading" advocacy ultimately died out, in all likelihood,
because large-scale mass production seemed to render that ideal obsolete.
Economies of scale and scope rendered capital-intensive enterprise-and
"therefore," it was thought, wage-earning labor power as the principal
income-realizing asset held by most Americans-too opportunity-costly to
forgo. 234 But if that trajectory alone explains the ultimate abandonment of
attention paid value-productive-as distinguished from merely valueretentive-capital as successor to the pre-twenty-first-century "homestead,"
then we seem to have fallen prey to a particularly harmful form of aphasia.
For one can own productive capital in more forms than that of a tool belt,
pharmacy, or laptop. One might own the larger forms of business enterprise
themselves, even if they are very large, jointly with others. That is what the
ownership of shares in heavily capitalized business enterprises is, after all.
And it takes little imagination to appreciate that one might come to own
such shares by financial engineering means analogous to those that we
employ collectively through government levers, in cooperation with private
entities and markets, to facilitate homeownership. Why, then, has this
prospect not been carefully explored? The best explanation appears to be an
object lesson in imprudent packaging and politicking.
The suggested FHA-like "capital-diffusion" prospect was in fact once
advocated, with some vigor, by a man now alternately described as genius,
saint, visionary, and benevolent crank, a man who managed at various
234.
See, e.g., RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AMERICAN
INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1877-1900 (2000); ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE
DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM (1990); ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., STRATEGY AND
STRUCTURE: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE (1962); WILLIAM
G. Roy, SOCIALIZING CAPITAL: THE RISE OF THE LARGE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION IN AMERICA

(1997). There nonetheless continue to be calls from some quarters for something like the nineteenth
century republican-artisanal, or at any rate an "industrial-democratic," ideal. See ELLERMAN, WORKEROWNED FIRM, supra note 122; VANEK, supra note 122.
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points to capture the attentions of power-brokers and agenda-setters as
diverse as Presidents Nixon, Carter, and Reagan, Senator Russell Long,
Representative Gerald R. Ford, and CBS television's "60 Minutes" news
program. The man is Louis Kelso, inventor of the now-familiar ESOP. But
while the latter innovation is commonplace today, few seem aware that it
was originally envisaged as the spearhead of a much more ambitious,
economy- and society-transformative program of publicly facilitated
235
capital-ownership-spreading.
Lore has it that Kelso, a law student at the time of the Great
Depression, was genuinely mystified and distressed by the specter of a
highly productive and technologically advanced economy seemingly
brought to a standstill by the untrammeled workings of its own
characteristic processes. 236 While serving in the army during the 1940s and
stationed at a quiet base in Panama, therefore, Kelso accordingly set about
studying and teaching himself economics with a view to solving this great
riddle. The upshot of his effort was a manuscript, modestly titled
"Capitalism," in which he attempted to address his own questions. In
essence, the "theoretical" answer at which Kelso arrived was rooted in
what he took for the basic truth embedded in the much-storied "Say's
Law"-that in long-run equilibrium, the incomes accruing to the factors of
production in an economy were necessarily sufficient to enable that which
was produced to clear the market. 237 Kelso believed that "Say's Law" had
238
in a peculiar sense been "violated" in modem capitalist economies.
235. This Article discusses Kelso's proposals at length, because he was the leading designer and
advocate of publicly facilitated capital ownership spreading programs. Authors who made proposals
along Kelsonian lines before Kelso include the founders of the distributivist movement associated with
Catholic social thought of the 1920s. See HILAIRE BELLOC, THE SERVILE STATE (Henry Holt & Co.
1946) (1912); G.K. CHESTERTON, THE OUTLINE OF SANITY (1926). For works by latterday Kelsonians,
see CURING WORLD POVERTY: THE NEW ROLE OF PROPERTY (John H. Miller ed., 1994); EQUITABLE
CAPITALISM: PROMOTING ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY THROUGH BROADER CAPITAL OWNERSHIP (Stuart
M. Speiser ed., 1991); JEFF GATES, DEMOCRACY AT RISK: RESCUING MAIN STREET FROM WALL
STREET (2000); JEFFREY R. GATES, THE OWNERSHIP SOLUTION (1998); WILLIAM GREIDER, ONE
WORLD, READY OR NOT: THE MANIC LOGIC OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM (1997); WILLIAM GREIDER, THE
SOUL OF CAPITALISM (2003); MAINSTREET CAPITALISM: ESSAYS ON BROADENING SHARE OWNERSHIP
IN AMERICA AND BRITAIN (Stuart M. Speiser ed., 1988); Robert Ashford, Louis Kelso's Binary

Economy, 25 J. SOCIO-ECON. 1 (1996); Robert H.A. Ashford, The Binary Economics of Louis Kelso:
The Promise of Universal Capitalism, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 3 (1990); Jerry N. Gauche, Binary Economic
Modes for the Privatizationof PublicAssets, 27 J. SOCIO-ECON. 445 (1998).
236. See STUART M. SPEISER, A PIECE OF THE ACTION: A PLAN TO PROVIDE EVERY FAMILY WITH
A $100,000 STAKE IN THE ECONOMY 127-274 (1977).

237. Say's Law has suffered many alternative formulations---even by Say himself. In its most
familiar articulation, the "law" states that "supply creates its own demand." Keynes famously observed
that Say's Law actually bears at least two interpretations: The first is a "mechanistic" one captured by
the "demand-creation" maxim. The other interpretation, better labeled "Say's Identity," has it that
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The violative mechanism, as Kelso saw it, was what we might
describe as the modem capitalist economy's failure to calibrate the
composition of most consumers' income-sources proportionally to the
gradually growing nonhuman capital intensity of the productive process
itself.23 9 While nonhuman ("hard," or "machine") capital had come over
time to play an ever-greater productive role in the manufacture of goods
and the provision of services, prospective consumers of these goods and
services continued by and large to derive their incomes from their human
capital alone. 240 In an economy whose constitutive legal system and
substantive law permitted or even facilitated the development and
exacerbation of this growing "imbalance," the inevitable consequence was
that consumer purchasing power often would tend to grow at a lower rateor at any rate in more "fits and starts" fashion-than did the
macroeconomy's level of productivity. 24 1 The result was that goods
because all productive inputs are factor payments, supply-side investment by definition gives rise to
equivalent potential demand. See KEYNES, supra note 113, at 18, 26, 313-64.
238. Keynes, of course, argued that the proper question was not whether Say's Law had been
"violated," but how it was that supply-payment's conceptually entailed potential demand could fail to
materialize as effectual or actual demand. See KEYNES, supra note 113, passim. The real question has to
do with the transmission mechanism-and potential lags embedded therein-from factor-payment to
product-demand.
239. See also JOSEPH RAPHAEL BLASI, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP: REVOLUTION OR RIPOFF? 27-28
(1988). Here and in what follows I use a good bit of my own descriptive vocabulary in an effort
charitably to interpret what oftentimes can read as a highly Baroque and eccentric Kelsonian rhetoric. (I
hope, of course, that my own idiom is less so.) I interpret Kelso as a sort of "automatic Keynesian." If
Keynesianism saw the source of crisis in the fact that the means of mass production could in the short
term grow more rapidly than those of mass consumption, given that the latter was composed not only of
factor-payments, but also of differing distributions of such payments over persons with differing
marginal propensities to spend, and thus justified government spending as a means of nudging
aggregate demand more quickly into line with aggregate supply-capacity, then Kelso saw the same
source of crisis, but recommended a more "direct" link between improvements in productive capacity
and absorptive capacity-by putting the returns to productive capacity (that is, to "hard," nonhuman
capital) immediately into the hands of would-be consumers themselves, hence by putting ownership,
and the consequent legal right to such returns, directly into their hands.
240. Kelso appears implicitly to have believed that tying the two compositions directly together
would automatically calibrate the macroeconomy's aggregate supply of goods and effective demand
therefor.
241. Consumption may "lag" behind for periods, and then catch up later. This would constitute a
"Keynesian" reading of Kelso, whereby "sticky" prices slowed the market's passing-on of productivity
gains to consumer-laborers. Kelso appears not to have countenanced periodic "violations" of "Say's
Law" corrected in the long run, but his writings do not rule out reconciliation with the standard
Keynesian explanation of liquidity traps. Indeed, one is tempted to conjecture that had Kelso taken the
time to understand Keynesian theory rather than simply the American versions of Keynesian policyprescription, he might have come to see his own writings as essentially Keynesian in terms of basic
diagnosis and "improved-Keynesian" in terms of chosen supply-demand calibration mechanism.
Kelsoism is ham-fisted Keynesian theorizing plus subtler-than-American "Keynesian" cure-prescribing,
proposing in place of regularly adjusted income-confiscations and redistributions a manner of

HeinOnline -- 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 126 2005-2006

2005]

A JEFFERSONIAN REPUBLIC

periodically failed to clear markets, inventories grew, frightened employers
disemployed laborers and held back from investing (which contracted
effective demand yet further) and the familiar "downward spiral" to
persistent macroeconomic contraction ensued.
As Kelso saw things, there were but two ways to prevent or reverse
these periodic spirals to protracted slump. The first was for government to
confiscate income from the wealthier, marginally less disposed to consume
into whose hands it tended to flow, then to spend the takings itself or
channel them to potentially more consumer-demanding but underconsuming laborers with a view to "leap-frogging" or "jumpstarting"
consumption back into balance with increased productivity. This familiar
"Keynesian" solution, Kelso noted, was that (a) upon which the U.S.
government had lit in the 1930s, early to mid-way into the New Deal; (b) to
which the United States subsequently committed itself explicitly into the
indefinite future with the Employment Act of 1946;242 and (c) which it had
continued to employ ever after. 243 Government sanction and support of (a)
collectively bargaining employee cartels-labor unions, which according to
Kelso were able to strongarm employer concessions that a "fair" and "free"
market would never have afforded; (b) tax-financed and ultimately only
minimally productive military expenditure during the Second World War
and thereafter; and (c) similarly financed welfare transfers from the
Roosevelt era onwards. In Kelso's view, all were instances of
government's attempt forcibly to restore Say's balance rapidly back to the
macroeconomy by coercive means through the exercise of police and
taxation powers.
Although Kelso willingly acknowledged the apparent necessity of
such measures, he also appeared to be troubled by what he viewed as
balance-through-confiscation-and-redistribution,
which he described
variously as "socialistic," "unjust," and ultimately corrosive of respect for
property, of "productiveness," and even of liberty itself. 244 Apparently as a
"automatic" demand-supply calibration put into place by government-facilitated spreading of the
ownership of later-manufactured productive capacity.
242. Employment Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1024 (2000).
243. Incidentally, it was precisely during this period that antitrust policy swung decisively in the
direction of demand-side concern from supply-side (ownership-broadening) concern. See supra Part
V.B.1.
244. See, e.g., KELSO & ADLER, supra note 51, at 121-29. Note that Kelso's views lead us back to
that ambivalence in the CR, CL, and PC traditions over the relation between political liberty and rough
material equality. The conception of "justice" to which Kelso implicitly appealed appears to have been
to be one under which all prices and incomes were determined by freely competitive, factor- and goodsvaluing markets and channeled to the owners of value-adding productive factors in proportion to those
factors' contributions to value. Id. at 77-82. While at times his statements to this effect appear to render
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result, Kelso came to advocate the second possible solution he saw to the
modem capitalist economy's macroeconomic imbalance which "violated"
Say's Law. Rather than continuously confiscating and redistributing
existing or already flowing income in order to stimulate effective aggregate
demand sufficient to clear markets
la Keynes, why not facilitate the
outright acquisition by capitally disenfranchised wage-laborers and others
of new generative sources of income, that is, of hard capital assets
themselves?
If incomes in the absence of government intervention would tend to
flow in greater proportion to the owners of nonhuman than to those of
merely human capital assets-because freely operating markets simply
valued that increment which the latter such sources added to goods more
highly than they valued that which the former did-and if capital, in
Kelso's misleading idiom, "paid for itself' as seemed to him to be accepted
by the very logic of corporate finance itself,245 might society not somehow
finance broadened capital ownership out of the forthcoming income-flows
to new, future capital rather than from the flows of already-owned, existent
capital? And if so, would this not present a seemingly nonconfiscatory,
nonredistributive-in
a word, more (Kelsonianly) "just," or
"nonsocialist"-means of capital (and hence opportunity) diffusion?246
And if so, once again, would this not then constitute a less objectionable
means of bringing the demand side of the economy's relative proportions
of human and nonhuman capital in production, as sources of income for
consumption, to the supply side's relative proportions of the same? That is,
to put the matter in decidedly non-Kelsonian terms, would it not constitute
him indifferent to the distributive justice of original factor-endowments, the fact is that in other places
Kelso argues quite forcefully for a fundamental "right of participation" or "right to be productive." Id.
See also LOuis 0. KELSO & PATRICIA HETrER, HOW TO TURN EIGHTY MILLION WORKERS INTO
CAPITALISTS ON BORROWED MONEY 9-11 (1967) (suggesting that his conception of justice as
distribution according to value-added is actually contingent upon, or meant to be taken always in
tandem with, a just distribution of ex ante opportunity to add value).
245. It is of course misleading to claim, in Kelsonian fashion, that capital "pays for itself." In the
language of contemporary finance, we do better to describe Kelso's observation simply as the
commonplace that only projects with positive discounted net present values are rationally undertaken.
Capital "pays for itself' only in the sense that investment in some capital acquisitions yields
(discounted) income streams that exceed, in aggregate, their (discounted, if paid over time) acquisition
costs. See supra Part 1.B.
246. The answer from an orthodox, abstract theoretical finance point of view is, of course, "no."
Certainly not if we think in terms of possible opportunity costs (incurred by those who do not benefit)
and the dilution of the value of present holdings (effectively a rental value) wrought by preferentially
subsidizing certain persons' future holdings. But Kelso, as we shall see, was more financial engineer
than financial theorist. And of course there are, as we saw in Part II, good EEOR values-grounded
reasons for exploiting the very Part III blind-spot-that is, endowment heuristic-to which Kelso
himself, as a matter of financial theory, fell prey.
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a better calibrated sort of "automatic Keynesianism" operating much more
gracefully than then-current federal policy's more fitful, coarse-grained, ad
hoc form?
It is here that both the currents of legal scholarship prominent at the
time of Kelso's legal education, and Kelso's practical experience as an
investment banker and corporate finance lawyer appear to have come into
play. Like many legal and economic progressives of the early twentieth
century-Veblen, Ely, Commons, Hale, and other early "institutionalists"
and "legal realists" among them 24 7-Kelso recognized that an economy
comprises more than roads, bridges, banks, and factories; workers,
managers, and investors-what we might call its "hardware." As Kelso saw
it, every economy operated according to what we might now call a
"software" as well-that is, what Kelso termed an "invisible infrastructure"
constituted not only by antecedently assigned rights and obligations, but
also by usages, practices, and customs. 248 Some of these were rational and
efficient, while others were mere holdovers and habits that had long
outlived their usefulness or rationality. Among the latter, in Kelso's view,
was the "crude," "primitive," relic of insistence upon preexisting,
preaccumulated collateral as a means of securing debt. 249 This Kelso saw as
the principal source of inertia responsible for capital's persistent
concentration in the hands of relatively few participants in modem
capitalist economies. 250 While the maxim that "it takes money to make
money" might be true as a customary or a present-day legal matter, Kelso
247.

On these thinkers and the period generally, see, for example, BARBARA H. FRIED, THE

PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISsEz FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS
MOVEMENT (1998).
248.
See KELSO & HETTER, supra note 244, at 48-52; LOUIS 0. KELSO & PATRICIA HETTER
KELSO, DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC POWER: EXTENDING THE ESOP REVOLUTION 45-47 (1986).

249. Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales have recently renewed this charge, connecting
"collateral and connections" to an inherent conservatism embedded in the institutional structure of the
present economy. See RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note I11.
250. See id. Rajan and Zingales have also renewed this charge. They also cite, in this connection,
the growing proportion of new project finance represented by retained earnings. See id. at 95-107. This,
too, concerned Kelso, who advocated legally requiring that all surplus be paid out to shareholders in the
form of dividends, which he viewed as critical to a more property-respecting form of corporate
governance regime. See, e.g., KELSO & ADLER, supra note 51, at 191, 207-13. In this respect, we might
view Kelso as a Berle-Meansian. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 97-99 (1933). It is of course a cornerstone of modem financial

theory that, given tax neutrality, symmetric information, strong market efficiency, and zero agency and
transaction costs, investors should be indifferent between divided payouts and capital gains attributable
to retained earnings finance. See Merton H. Miller & Franco Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth, and
the Valuation of Shares, 34 J. BUS. 411 (1961); Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of
Capital,CorporationFinance, and the Theory ofInvestment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958). But Rajan
and Zingales, presumably like Kelso, would deny that those "givens" are present.
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argued, it was flatly false as a matter of productive logic, financial logic,
risk logic or, therefore, economic necessity.
Kelso argued that debt could more efficiently, productively, and
ultimately more "democratically" be secured by a combination of informed
project-evaluative sobriety and insurance. 25 1 In order to borrow from
lending institutions so as to finance plant-expansion plans, for example,
Kelso noted that firms typically had to submit detailed plans and plausible
resultant income projections to the scrutiny of careful would-be lenders.
While some such plans did nonetheless fail in the end to produce what they
projected, thus failing to "liquidate themselves," the fact was that in
aggregate only a relatively small percentage actually did so fail. Security
needs for debt of this sort in the aggregate therefore were far less than the
universal requirement of collateral appeared to imply. 252 As Kelso saw
things, therefore, even parties lacking in collateral should be able to acquire
ownership of new productive capital, so long as risks of project failure
could be quantified in aggregate, minimized, and pooled insurance funds,
which would then be channeled to those comparatively few lenders who
did lose on their investments.
In this light, Kelso sketched a basic "capital credit" and "insurance"
schema operating for the benefit of nonwealthy, capitally disenfranchised
persons-rather as had the federal housing legislation of the 1930s for
nonwealthy, nonhomeowning persons. Variations on the basic pattern were
envisaged according to persons' relations to the firms whose financed
capital expansion plans were contemplated. The first prototype appears to
have been the ESOP, which Kelso conceived in the late 1950s as a means
of assisting the employees of a then soon-to-be-sold Palo Alto newspaper
publisher to purchase their own firm.253 The prior owners of the firm,
apparently solicitous of their employees' futures but financially unable any
longer to retain the business, requested that a consortium of investment
bankers, lawyers, and other financiers design a plan by which the
employees could purchase the firm. Using conventional financing methods,
the group was unable to design a transaction whereby the employees could
purchase even a substantial part of the business without drastically cutting
251.
Kelso's proposal is similar to the Method discussed in Part IV, and FHA mortgage-finance
methods, as discussed in Part V.A.3. The analogies, which do not appear to be accidental, are further
explored and elaborated infra.
252. In effect, there was a collective-action problem, owing to a missing market-a market that
pooled default risk-with the result that everybody was left having to put up "temporary" insurance
premiums of one hundred percent.
253.

KELSO & KELSO, supra note 248, at 52-53.
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their wages and committing their earlier-accumulated personal savings.
At
25 4
this point, the story goes, Kelso stepped in and conceived the ESOP.
The structure of Kelso's plan was as follows: "Kelso & Co."
established a trust whose beneficiaries were the newspaper's employees.
The trust obtained a loan from a lending institution to purchase the
newspaper, and the newspaper pledged to the lender to issue regular
dividend-yielding stock to the trust.255 The trust, then, per the terms of the
note that it provided the lender in exchange for the loan, pledged the stock
itself as security, and undertook to pay down the loan with the dividends
earned on the stock. As the loan was paid down, stock gradually was
released by the trust to the separate accounts of the employees.
FIGURE

3.

Institutional/financial structure of an ESOP arrangement
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255. For Kelso, the dividend-yield is critical as the means of amortizing the "capital mortgage."
But see supra note 250.
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According to Kelso, within several years the debt had been paid, and
the employees went on to become well-to-do shareholders, many retiring in
256
their fifties for lack of need to continue laboring.
It is not clear (a) why the lender in Kelso's first ESOP transaction was
willing to bear the risk of default by the capital-purchasing employee trust;
(b) why, if the risk was low, the institution would not simply have
purchased the stock for itself; 257 or (c) whether in fact the loan was secured
by some "traditional" means additional to the use of the firm's stock itself
as collateral. Perhaps the newspaper was well enough established and
regarded that its going concern value was substantial. Or perhaps the wellintentioned original employer sold the business at below value, cosigned
the loan, or was friendly with the lender. In the absence of such
circumstances-or of similar circumstance such as government loan
guarantees, insistence upon dividend-yielding stock and prohibition of the
already capitally enfranchised (including lending institutions) from
purchasing the stock themselves-it would seem doubtful that ESOP
transactions, let alone similar such transactions made for the benefit of
nonemployees, would ever have proliferated unaided. For Kelso's defaultrisk-mitigating "capital credit insurance," never got off of the ground.
Before explaining how and why ESOPs, unlike Kelso's other
proposals, did come to proliferate throughout the American economy, we
will do well briefly to describe some of Kelso's variations on the original
ESOP scheme. For these constitute a rich catalog from which to draw in
envisaging future "capital homesteading" programs as a sort of "third leg"
of what we might think of as the "three-legged stool"-embracing homes,
human capital, and productive nonhuman capital-that any American OS,
in order to be meaningfully complete, will surely have to strive to
construct.
About the same time that the newspaper transaction was taking place,
Kelso worked up a similarly structured financing arrangement whereby the
consumer patrons of a failing utility, Valley Nitrogen Producers, Inc., of
Fresno, were enabled to purchase that firm. 258 The arrangement differed
from that of the newspaper ESOP only in that the constituents of the
purchasing trust now were consumers rather than producers of the firm's
256.

KELSO & KELSO, supra note 248, at 53.

257. If the institution were a commercial bank or thrift then the answer is obvious. Familiar
portfolio-shaping rules would have restricted the portion of depository institutions' capital able to be
invested in equity securities. But Kelso does not name or characterize the institution other than as a
"lender."
258.
KELSO & KELSO, supra note 248, at 67-73.
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product. Thus was born the "CSOP," or "consumer stock ownership
plan." 259 According to Kelso, Valley Nitrogen Producers, Inc., like the
newspaper publisher, was a financial success, but in the end was done-in by
resentful, less efficient competitors who procured legislation from
260
Congress banning the CSOP.
In addition to ESOPs and CSOPs, Kelso envisaged a full menu of
further "SOPs" (stock ownership plans) and "COPs" (cooperative
ownership plans), including GSOPs (government employee stock
ownership plans), RECOPS (real estate cooperative ownership plans), and
ultimately the most simplified of all-ISOPs (individual stock ownership
plans) and USOPs (universal stock ownership plans)-for those not
fortunate enough to bear salient and continuous patronage relations with
firms. All of these bore by and large the same financial structure as that of
the ESOP. Indeed, given his later hope that something which we might call
"second-order SOPs" be formed to enable the constituents of first-order
SOPs to diversify their ownership portfolios, and given the growth of the
mutual fund industry over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, one might
imagine that had Kelso lived to the present he would by now have come
principally to advocate but one, fully generalized form of all of his
proposed SOPs.

261

Pursuant to such a full-bodied Kelsonian vision, we might picture a
scheme whereby (1) firms or firm-consortia and allied investment
companies provide lenders with business-expansion plans when firms wish
to acquire investment funding for further growth, (2) lenders in turn
evaluate and assess the soundness of those plans and extend loans to
investment companies allied with the firms whose plans are approved, (3)
the investment companies then purchase dividend-yielding stock from their
allied firms with the proceeds of the loans and hold the stock in trust for
their member-investors, and ultimately (4) the investment companies
release the stock to their member-investors' accounts as the loans are paid
down. 262 Public, private, or mixed public-private insurers might render
259. It is an instructive exercise to map the variety of Kelsonian stock ownership plans onto the
sundry ownership forms assayed by Henry Hansmann. See HANSMANN, supra note 177. If the
governance difficulties so well explored by Hansmann are mitigated-say, by the delegation of broad
discretion to management or a board-Kelso's choices of owner for various firm types largely track the
logic of efficient ownership by primary patron laid out by Hansmann.
260. KELSO & KELSO, supra note 248, at 67.
261.
Id. at 70.
262. This would presumably require changes in the laws bounding corporate finance and
governance, for example, perhaps limiting the financing of expansion with retained earnings, a practice
which many have come to regard as socially inefficient in any event and which certainly tends to
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collateral unnecessary in these transactions by (5) insuring qualifying
loans--evaluated according to sound actuarial practice and sober business
expansion plan evaluation-against default, like FHA mortgage insurance
policies. We might also (6) monetize the "capital mortgages" through the
Federal Reserve Act's section 13 "Discount Window"; 263 (7) securitize
them for sale on a secondary market; and perhaps (8) reinsure the "capital
mortgage" insurers themselves, all in the manner of Fannie Mae, Ginnie
Mae, and Freddie Mac.
perpetuate and indeed aggravate concentrated ownership. See RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 111, at
77-82. But see supra note 250. It would also, presumably, require prohibiting the already heavily
capitalized from participating, or conferring special advantages on the undercapitalized, as the
Homestead Acts of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did.
263. See infra note 265.
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It will not have gone unnoticed how strikingly the basic Kelsonian
schema, along with the above-proposed further elaborated variation upon it,
mirrors the financial structure of the federal homeownership-facilitative
programs discussed in Part V.A and diagrammed at Figure 2. Kelso
admittedly did not advocate the creation of a new system of "capital
diffusion" banks paralleling the nationally chartered MSBs established for
home-financing-presumably he considered the existing investment and
commercial banking industries, along with the Federal Reserve System,
adequate to his projected tasks. And he did not project any Fannie Mae-like
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public or private firms to securitize "capital mortgages" for a secondary
market. But Kelso's "capital mortgage" and "capital mortgage insurance"
schema nevertheless appears a near structural replica of standardized
HOLC mortgages and FHA mortgage insurance. For in Kelso's scheme,
eligible business expansion plans would have to meet sound investment
criteria just as do mortgage loans and home building plans in the federal
home-finance programs, and insurers would then pool residual risk on
generally "self-amortizing" loans just as does FHA. 264 Kelso even
suggested, at later points in his career, bringing the Federal Reserve into
the capital diffusion act, conferring upon it a role functionally reminiscent
of that of home mortgage securitizers in facilitating a national secondary
mortgage market, by advocating that the Federal Reserve allow lending
institutions to monetize their lender-held capital credit promissory notes
through the Federal Reserve Act's section 13 "discount window. 2 65
264. Of course, a business will tend to lack the virtually guaranteed appreciative, Ricardian
"rental" tendency that real estate in a polity with a growing population and that occupies a bounded
territory tends to have. A good evaluation, however, will most likely minimize the risk of depreciation
or non-value-productivity and there is more upside potential in a productive enterprise than in a merely
retentive piece of real property.
265. Federal Reserve Act of 1913, ch. 6, § 13, 38 Stat. 251, 263-64 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). Section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act provides for the "discount
window" through which the Federal Reserve may "monetize" payables (primarily commercial paper,
referred to as "eligible" paper in the Act) of participating depository institutions (technically, the latter
serve as collateral for Federal Reserve lending to participating institutions), in effect trading liquidity
for assets in a manner analogous to secondary markets' "securitizing" payment obligations. Although
the section 13 discount window was originally envisaged for that purpose-in effect, to facilitate and
incentivize small business lending by local banks by offering the latter quick means of monetizing the
resultant debts owed them-it has seldom been so used. Instead, it is primarily government (generally
U.S. government, though in some cases other government) debt that is monetized by discounting. The
principal nongovernmental debt-monetizing uses have been pursuant to large "bailout" packages
assembled or proposed for institutions-generally banking institutions, but occasionally nonbank
institutions-thought to be "too big to [allow] to fail." See, e.g., Frederick S. Cams, A Two-window
System for Banking Reform, FDIC BANKING REV., June 1995, at n.37, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/
analytical/banking/1995sprg/rbrlalft.html#2; David Fettig, Lender of More than Last Resort, REGION,
Dec.
2002,
http://woodrow.mpls.frb.fed.us/pubs/region/02-12/lender.cfm;
A&M-Commerce
Department of Economics and Finance, Course 572 Dale Funderburk, http://www.tamucommerce.edu/
ecofin/courses/funderburk/572/yesf.txt (last visited Dec. 26, 2005). The explanation seems to be that the
First World War and consequent rapid national debt growth and national industrialization quickly
preempted what was originally envisaged as the window's more localized business debt-monetizing
purpose. See, e.g., STAFF OF H. SUBCOMM. ON DOMESTIC FINANCE OF THE COMM. ON BANKING AND
CURRENCY, 88TH CONG., A PRIMER ON MONEY 42-43, 69-71 (Subcomm. Print 1964); G. EDWARD
GRIFFIN, THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND: A SECOND LOOK AT THE FEDERAL RESERVE (3d ed.

1998); Norman G. Kurland, The Federal Reserve Discount Window, Center for Economic and Social
Justice, http://www.cesj.org/homestead/reforms/moneycredit/discountwindow.html (last visited Nov.
21, 2005).
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The principal difference between the two cases was that, whereas
FHA insurance facilitated the purchase and thereby the supply of a
relatively nongenerative, merely appreciating asset-housing-and
therefore might also have been expected to place inflationary pressures
upon these assets' prices, 266 "capital credit insurance" would facilitate the
purchase and thereby the supply of an asset directly tied to
counterinflationary, productivity-enhancing business investment in plant
and equipment.26 7 We might add for our own part that capital credit
insurance might have been expected to introduce other advantages that
FHA did-for example, a standardized instrument tradable nationally
(thereby facilitating the development of secondary markets in privately
securitized capital mortgage debt and perhaps in turn thereby obviating or
diminishing the need of Federal Reserve discounting), a qualitystandardized form of business investment in productivity-improvements,
and a broadly recognized, familiar method of capitally enfranchising
citizens previously blocked from the market for want of prior-accumulated
substantial savings or personal connections to wealth.2 68
As noted, however, Kelso's principal innovation, "capital credit
insurance" patterned after originally federal mortgage insurance, never
quite got off the ground as the latter did. 269 The great majority of Kelso's
"SOPs" apart from ESOPs fared no better. 270 One reason, I think, is that
Kelso did not emphasize the financial linkages between his proposals and
266. This Article demonstrates that this is the case in education finance, as well. See infra Part
V.C.
267. Kelso also suggested that, if necessary to combat inflation, the Federal Reserve could always
raise the discount rate with respect to credit not extended to broaden capital ownership. Current
followers of Kelso now openly advocate a "two-tiered interest rate." See, e.g., Kurland, supra note 265.
Kelso also argued that the Federal Reserve could curtail its open market operations and monetize less
government debt, in effect substituting "productive credit" (that advanced ultimately to firms) for
"unproductive credit" (that advanced for the sake of government transfer payments and "sterile"
military spending). See, e.g., KELSO & KELSO, supra note 248, at 85-103. Indeed, were the law to limit
firms' rights to retain earnings for purposes of financing business expansion or improvement, thus
encouraging firms to resort to "capital-mortgaged" investment by current nonowners,
counterinflationary productivity-enhancement and productive ownership-spreading would be mutually
reinforcing. While Kelso did not play up this distinction between "capital mortgages" and home
mortgages, later followers did. See, e.g., Center for Economic and Social Justice, The Capital
Homestead Act Summary, http://www.cesj.org/homestead/summary-cha.html (last visited Nov. 20,
2005).
268. This assumes that, like the Homestead Act, any "Capital Homestead Act" would be carefully
designed and overseen to favor those not already possessed of huge capital holdings or other political
advantage.
269. It seems, however, that it nearly did-in Puerto Rico in the mid-1970s, and in Alaska in the
early 1980s, as we shall see. See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 248, at 76-83.
270. SPEISER, supra note 236, at 132-34.
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the federal home finance programs. Even less, then, did he attempt to
justify them by reference to the values described in Part II, the constraints
described in Part III, and the financial "Method" described in Part IV.
Instead, he purported to have "discovered" a "new economics," which
latter was so idiosyncratic in its articulation that it discredited him in the
eyes of orthodox economists and the policy makers whom they influence.
Kelso's "new theory," in effect, simply elevated to the status of financial
theory itself what we noted in Part III to be puzzling features of endowment
psychology. The proper treatment of those features, I think, is to take them
as constraints-that is, to choose methods of ownership spreading that
accommodate them. This is the virtue of the Method, of the federal home
finance programs that employ it, and thus of the Kelsonian "capital
homesteading" programs that would have employed it. Had Kelso
advocated those programs in this way, I think, he would have come across
more as politically savvy than as economically cranky. Because he did not,
his political successes, such as they were, were both very limited and late in
coming.
Kelso's principal political success came with ESOP legislation in
1974. At a social gathering in 1973, Kelso caught the ear of Senator Russell
Long of Louisiana, Chairman of the powerful Senate Finance
Committee. 27 1 Long, son of the celebrated populist governor whose
unapologetically confiscatory and redistributive "Share Our Wealth"
campaign 272 and growing popularity had so worried President Roosevelt in
the run-up to the 1936 national elections, 273 found himself fascinated by
the Kelsonian vision's promise of broadly distributed productive ownership
and consequent economic growth achieved seemingly without physically
confiscating or directly taxing existing holdings. 274 When comprehensive
federal pension legislation-itself precipitated by the Studebaker debacle
of the decade before 275 -neared completion in 1974, Long saw an
271.
272.

Id. at 193-95.
Governor Huey P. Long advocated a $5000 "homestead" for every American family, to be

financed by a wealth tax. See HUEY P. LONG, EVERY MAN A KING: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF HUEY P.

LONG (Da Capo Press 1996) (1933); T. HARRY WILLIAMS, HUEY LONG (First Vintage Books 1981)
(1969).
273. See CONRAD BLACK, FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT: CHAMPION OF FREEDOM 326, 344-45
(2003); FRANK FREIDEL, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: A RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY 146 (1990);
WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL: 1932-1940, at 96-100
(1963); WILLIAMS, supra note 272, at 201-25.
274. We must, of course, distinguish here between "physically confiscating" and diluting. See
supra notes 245-46.
275. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 68-84
(3d ed. 2000). Those familiar with recent bankruptcies in the airline industry will be tempted to say plus
ga change.
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opportunity to spearhead Kelso's program by securing the ESOP's formal
recognition as a federally favored employee benefit plan. Thus the ESOP
entered federal law with ERISA, the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act.2 76
Under ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code, ESOPs came
simultaneously to enjoy the favorable taxation advantages conferred upon
employee retirement pensions, 277 and exemption from a number of the
strict fiduciary requirements-notably those respecting portfolio278
diversification and leveraged transactions in employer securities.
Subsequent years saw further favors progressively bestowed upon the
ESOP, until at length the form in several variations proliferated across the
economy, embracing over twelve million laborers in over ten thousand
companies, among them at one time or another such well-known firms as
Avis, the Chicago Tribune, Delta, Federal Express, General Motors,
Maytag, Polaroid, Proctor & Gamble, Quaker Oats, United Airlines and
Xerox.27 9 While Kelso and his followers celebrated these developments as
proof of the ESOP's-and, more broadly, the basic Kelsonian schema'ssuperiority over traditional corporate financing and ownership regimes,
others point to the distortions of the ESOP-favoring tax code and to
antitakeover device as
ERISA's rendering the ESOP a particularly effective
280
the real explanation for the form's proliferation.
The fact is that we likely will not know the whole truth here until
experiment is tried with capital credit risk-pooling. For what seems to have
been Kelso's real innovation-the promise of "capital credit insurance" as
a substitute for traditional collateral and plutocratic connection, by analogy
to FHA mortgage insurance employed to the same end-simply never has
been tried. The closest we have thus far come is in the form of (a) calls by
two commissions, one appointed by President Ford and the other by
President Carter, for serious econometric modeling and testing of
276. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
277. See 26 U.S.C. § 409 (2000).
278. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a)(2), 1108(b)(3), 1108(e) (2000).
279. See, e.g., HANSMANN, supra note 177, passim. See generally THE EXPANDING ROLE OF
ESOPs IN PUBLIC COMPANIES (Karen M. Young ed., 1990); UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP

(Corey Rosen & Karen M. Young eds., 1991). ESOP-like structures have made significant headway in
non-U.S. jurisdictions, as well. See THE EXPANDING ROLE OF ESOPS IN PUBLIC COMPANIES, supra;
UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, supra.

280.

See, e.g.,

HANSMANN,

supra note 177; Richard L. Doemberg & Jonathan R. Macey, ESOPs

and Economic Distortion, 23 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 103 (1986); Michael W. Melton, Demythologizing

ESOPs, 45 TAX L. REV. 363 (1990).
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Kelsonian hypotheses; 28 1 and (b) a plan authorized by Congress, but only
seconded by the designated state legislature in substantially modified form,
to implement a USOP benefiting all Alaskans in connection with the TransAlaska Oil Pipeline in the early 1980s. 282 Would it be worthwhile to
experiment in serious, if nonetheless preliminarily piecemeal, fashion with
"capital homesteading"? Given that this form of "homesteading," like
Homesteading proper, would be aimed at fostering the spread of assets
bearing Part II.A attributes, by means consistent with Part III.B
constraints, it would seem so.
To begin with the obvious, business capital in today's economy is
surely the autonomy-conferring asset par excellence. In many ways it is
more "asset-like" today even than land itself was in the past. Industrial
capital is highly generative, it being well established that historic average
annual returns on equity cluster around 6.6%-7.2%.283 It is highly liquid,
particularly in "Anglo-Saxon" countries like the United States, with their
"deep" and "efficient" securities markets.28 4 Industrial capital also is quite
legally secure, arguably more secure than even land, in that it is not
generally subject to specific use or alienability restrictions, or to eminent
domain.
Corporate capital also, owing to its greater disposability and flexibility
than real estate, could induce greater attitudes and practices of autonomy
than housing. And the holder of such assets, if thereby enabled to consume
more of the products turned out by productively financed manufacturers,
might also be expected to stimulate economic growth to a degree quite
dwarfing that provided by mere tax-financed redistribution. It thus might
appear that the CR-sounding Kelso, ironically, is simultaneously more CL
than many modern "liberals" and more GDP-maximizing in his promises
than are many PC advocates. Perhaps here, however, lies also another key
to Kelso's failure thus far to catch on.
One potential pitfall that afflicts the more general form of Kelsonian
SOP-finance is its seeming violation of one of the ownership-psychology281. The closest we have come thus far is in the form of (a) calls by two commissions, one
appointed by President Ford and the other by President Carter, for serious econometric modeling and
testing of Kelsonian hypotheses; and (b) a plan authorized by Congress, but only seconded by the
designated state legislature in substantially modified form, to implement a "USOP" benefiting all
Alaskans in connection with the Trans-Alaska Oil Pipeline in the early 1980s. See KELSO & KELSO,
supra note 248, at 76-83; SPEISER, supra note 236, at 153-56, 230-31.
282. KELSO & KELSO, supra note 248, at 76-83.
283. SIEGEL, supra note 106, at 11.
284.

See, e.g., FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, COMPARING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 1-45

(2000).
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grounded constraints discussed in Part III.B. On the one hand, "capital
homesteading" fares well on four of the five scales on which we observed
homesteading to fare well: much like homesteading, it (a) fosters the spread
of a great variety of choice-enhancing assets, including contingent claims;
(b) makes liberal use of and fosters the fuller development of markets in
such assets; (c) fosters joint ownership of durable, accumulated, and legally
secure assets in particular; and (d) channels perceivedly "new" ownership
opportunities to the less-endowed rather than confiscating "already
accumulated" assets from the well-to-do. Capital homesteading also partly
conditions benefits channeled to the underendowed upon the provision of
viable business plans to lenders by the firms that would be capitalized
through "capital mortgaging."
The problem, however, is that the general ISOP form does not
condition the benefits offered the ultimate individual capital-holders upon
any particular manner of diligent, productively virtuous, "socially useful"
behavior. It, as surely as an $80,000 outright grant, 285 can look much like a
"giving," a "mere government handout." Kelso works to get around the
problem by varying SOP arrangements according to the patronage
relationships that beneficiaries bear to the firms that they would own-as
employees, as customers, etc. And no doubt the intuitive attraction that
laboring for a firm bears as a basis for acquiring ownership shares in the
firm is one reason that the ESOP has been the only politically successful
form of SOP. But the ultimate futility of tying SOP forms to patronage
forms stems from the fact that there appear to be antecedent "political"
reasons internal to firms for the prevalence of ownership among particular
kinds of patrons in particular industries. 286 The Kelsonian SOP forms bear
no relation to those. Indeed, where it is-in keeping with the costs and
benefits of ownership versus contracting-efficient for one kind of patron
to own the firm, such patrons are typically already the owners. 287 The only
way in which Kelsonian finance can bring ownership where it is not
already found, then, is by in effect channeling wealth to persons lacking in
wealth.2 88 It is, that is to say, notwithstanding Kelsonians' protestations to
the contrary, financially a form of redistribution.28 9
285. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (1999) (proposing
such an outright grant).
286. See HANSMANN, supra note 177. This is one general thrust of Hansmann's remarkable
studies.
287. See id. This too is a critical lesson emerging from Hansmann.
288. This is not to say that we could not channel wealth to, say, current or potential customers
lacking in wealth in the form of ownership of customer-owned firms, cooperatives, etc. There mightindeed, presumably will-be good reason to conform SOP arrangements to patronage-based ownership
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What has to be done, then, in order to lessen objection to what will be
the inevitable appreciation by some that Kelsonian finance does make
choices as between potentially competing claimants upon "newly created"
wealth, is somehow to condition the channeling of "new" wealth to the
ethically exogenously underendowed upon some manner of perceivedly
deserving action on the part of beneficiaries. 290 We require some analogue
to the literal homesteader's hard work at the plow, or the ESOP-beneficiary
laborer's work at the printing press, so to speak. I will propose possible
such analogues in Part VI, pursuant to a plan of experimental testing of
Kelsonian programs.
Key here will be, first, to tie the benefits of such experimental
programs to the perceived desert-specific need and/or productively
virtuous behavior-in keeping with the constraints discussed in Part 11,
and, second, to abandon Kelso's oddball economic theorizing and jargon,
which, pace Kelso's own convictions to the contrary, do not add anything
worthwhile to the discipline or pinpoint any fundamental errors in the
29 1
same.
forms from industry to industry. The point here is simply that many, perhaps most, of those to whom we
will wish to channel ownership are people who do not antecedently bear such patronage relations to the
firms that Kelso would have us bring them to own. In addition, it is not immediately apparent how we
are antecedently to condition their acquiring such ownership on such patronage relations to the firms
that we shall facilitate their coming to own.
289. It is possible to pretend that it is not only in thanks to the endowment heuristic discussed at
Part lIl-the perception that future income is somehow "less real" than accumulated income, and that
"new" wealth accordingly cannot be redistributed, only distributed. This is not, of course, to condemn
it. It is only to say that it can run afoul to some of the heuristics considered in Part III or respectable
theory in general when described in a manner apparently meant to conceal the redistribution rather than
to put endowment psychology to good use. See supra Part III.
290. It must be emphasized that this is simply a political concession. By virtue of the EEOR ideals
sketched in Part 11,the ethically exogenously underendowed already, by definition, are deserving of
more favorable treatment calculated to bring their ethically exogenous endowments up to par, so to
speak. But as noted in Part I, in view of owner-psychology, as well as in view of the "tracing
problem" and "boundary dispute" concerning the endogeneity/exogeneity divide discussed in Part H,
some endowment-enhancement strategies will fare better politically than others. See supra Parts H, I11.
291. As noted earlier, Kelso's proposals only suggest a more directly implementing form of
linkage between productive capacity growth and effective consumptive capacity growth-a more
"automatic" sort of Keynesianism. Not only are Kelso's eccentric jargon and fly-by-night theorizing
counterproductive, but they are also altogether unnecessary, as, after all, the federal home finance
legislation of the 1930s did not require a comprehensive new theory of "home finance economics" in
order either to be viewed as worth trying or indeed to work. Indeed, the economic rationales offered
here were distinctly Keynesian in flavor. For example, as Secretary of Labor Perkins commented:
[T]his bill seems to me top be of very great importance at this time because of the results
which it will have in providing employment for building-trade mechanics who have long been
out of work and who are themselves a basic part of our market, our purchasing power in this
country.
CONG. GLOBE, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 10,289 (1934) (statement of Sec. of Labor Perkins).
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C. "HUMAN CAPITAL HOMESTEADING"

While the innovative federal home finance structure developed over
the 1930s and 1940s has not as yet been adapted, a la Kelso, to "hard
capital" ownership-spreading (apart from the minimal case of the ESOP), it
has been substantially replicated, with success rivaling that of the home
finance programs themselves, in the case of "soft" or "human" capital
spreading. The basic historical and financial patterns, along with the cluster
of CR, CL, and PC ringing justifications proffered by the programs'
advocates, will by now ring familiar. We can therefore be brief in our
treatment.
1. Publicly Provided Primary and Secondary Education
The direct public provision of childhood education is a triumphant, if
thus far still incomplete, realization of American EEOR values. 292 It
spreads a critically important, ethically exogenous material opportunity
broadly over citizen-agents-in-the-making who will ultimately be
(boundedly) responsible, for building their own lives through productive
effort. 29 3 The steps that have led to this triumph have from the very start
been justified in familiar CR, CL, and PC terms. 294 Current fallings short of
these actuating ideals-in particular, in respect of the gross disparities in
295
funding wrought by the system of local financing of K-12 education accordingly must be regarded both as intolerable failures in the fair
allocation of a critical core endowment, as discussed in Part II, and,
therefore, as failures thus far to live up fully to our own core EEOR values.
292. One aspect of brevity here will be a relative neglect, however regrettable, of childhood; that
is K-12, education. Considerations of (a) the limited amount of space available for a single article; (b)
the sheer amount of additional space that would have to go into a comprehensive survey of public
education; (c) the fact that K-12 education is regarded, for better or worse, more as a state and local
than as a federal concern in the United States; and (d) the relative familiarity, to most Americans, of
publicly afforded K-12 education, its successes and present challenges, afford some solace in
connection with this lacuna. Nonetheless, what we know about public K-12 education should be, in
effect, incorporated by reference into this Article; for it is a critical piece of that complete and coherent
American OS in whose service this Article is written.
293. And the steps that led to this triumph began surprisingly early in our history-much earlier,
in fact, than did comparable steps taken in the histories of other economically developed societies. See
JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD & NATHAN SCOVRONICK, THE AMERICAN DREAM AND THE PUBLIC

SCHOOLS 9-21 (2003); SCHOOL: THE STORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC EDUCATION 15-37 (Sarah Mondale
& Sarah B. Patton eds., 2001).
294. It is not insignificant, in this connection, that the first well-known advocate of public
education in America was none other than Thomas Jefferson himself. See HOCHSCHILD &
SCOVRONICK, supra note 293, at 17.
295. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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When we begin actually blueprinting a comprehensive American OS, we
shall have to address and correct those failures.
For the present, I confine myself to the principal means by which the
American OS-in-the-making has worked to compensate for the imperfect
spread of human capital by state and local public education provision. As in
the case of real estate, those means began with the direct provision of, and
have since evolved into critical assistance with the self-amortizing finance
of postsecondary education.
2. Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century Higher Education Provision
It is in respect of postsecondary education, that national policy has
been most innovative in spreading ownership of human capital over a
broader and broader swathe of the American population. The foundations
of human capital spreading, however, intriguingly were laid earlier, in
federal land and homeownership policy. Indeed, the first federal forays into
higher education promotion followed the model of, and in fact were
programmatically conjoined with, the Homestead Acts of the nineteenth
century. And the financial foundations of the more innovative federal
student loan programs begun in the later twentieth century were laid by,
and to a degree also programmatically connected to, the federal home
finance programs begun in the 1930s and 1940s. We begin with the earlier
programs, then proceed to the present.
The first large scale federal involvement with higher education came,
appropriately enough, immediately on the heels of the first Homestead Act.
And like the latter, it took the form of outright land donation. The Morrill
Land Act of 1862, popularly known as the "Land Grant Act," afforded to
each state thirty thousand acres of federal public land for each senator and
representative of that state under congressional apportionment based on the
1860 U.S. Census. 296 The land was to be used-typically, sold-by the
states to fund perpetual endowments for colleges or universities of
"agricultural and mechanical arts"-that is, for higher education in
agriculture and engineering. Those schools, in turn, were to be open to all
citizens domiciled in the respective states.297 Other acts, which followed,
296. Morrill Land Act, ch. 130, 12 Stat. 503 (1862).
297. Id. See also Ezra Cornell: The Cornell University, http://rmc.library.cornell.edu/Ezraexhitit/EC-life/EC-life-11.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2005). Ezra Cornell articulated his guiding ideal in
founding Cornell University in 1865, New York's "land grant university": "Finally, I trust we have laid
the foundation of an [sic] University-an institution where any person can find instruction in any
study." Id.
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brought further federal
institutions.29 8

assistance to

the

land grant

educational

The actuating ideals behind the Land Grant Acts and their progeny
were, not surprisingly by this point, cognate with those that animated the
Homestead Acts and their progeny. The land grant colleges and universities
and related programs were designed to spread over the population skills
bearing directly upon the production of material goods-products of
agricultural and industrial engineering. The point, then, was to widen the
form of human capital that could usefully be conjoined with a thendominant form of nonhuman productive input-land-by diligent agentcitizens acting industriously to better their lives, agents who in so doing
would render land more productive and society more wealthy.
While the United States remained largely an agrarian economy up to
the Second World War, the tremendous industrialization and urbanization
accelerated first by the First World War effort and then by the Second
World War effort rendered clear that things would not long remain so.
Accordingly, as the First and Second Wars wound down, Congress and
Presidents Wilson, then Roosevelt, took fundamental new steps in the
realm of federal assistance for higher education and cognate resource
spreading, culminating in 1944 with the Serviceman's Readjustment Act,
better known as the "GI Bill."2 99
The GI Bill is widely viewed, particularly in respect of its higher
education provisions, as a great American achievement-visionary and
298.
A "Second Morrill Land Act" ("Morrill II"), passed and signed into law in 1890, brought
additional moneys, generated by the sale of federal lands, to the so-called land grant colleges and
universities founded as a result of the first Morrill Act. Morrill Land Act II, ch. 841, 26 Stat. 417
(1890). Morrill II also vested the then-named Office of Education-predecessor to today's cabinet-level
Department of Education, established in 1867 to assist the states in collecting information on best
educational practices nationwide-with responsibility for administering federal support for the land
grant colleges and universities. Subsequent legislation built upon the Morrill foundations. Such
legislation included the Hatch Act of 1887, ch. 314, 24 Stat. 440 (enacting agricultural extension
programs); the Smith-Lever Act, ch. 79, 38 Stat. 372 (1914); the Bankhead-Jones Act, ch. 338, 49 Stat.
436 (1935) (enacting the same, for territories); and the National Sea Grant College and Program Act of
1966, Pub. L. No. 89-454, 80 Stat. 998 (enacting a land-grant analogue for education that would aid in
development of "coastal resources" in states with oceanic or Great Lakes coastlines).
299.
Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, ch. 268, 58 Stat. 284. Veterans had, of course,
enjoyed a long history of federal assistance prior to the GI Bill, including some with education.
Pensions and disability benefits for veterans had dated back to the Massachusetts Bay colony itself, and
have been available in one form or another to American veterans ever since. The Homestead Acts for
their part had been anticipated by federal land grant programs for U.S. veterans begun in the 1850s. But
it was the Rehabilitation Act of 1919 that, for the first time, specifically conferred education allowances
upon disabled veterans-in this case, of the First World War. See History of GI Bill,
http://www.gibill.va.gov/education/GIBill.htm (last visited Dec. 26, 2005) [hereinafter GI Bill].
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forward-looking while prudent, individually and socially transformative,
and ultimately prosperity-promoting. 30 0 It notably, for the first time,
recognized and brought together in one program both loan guaranty as a
strategy and education as an asset. Many believe that in fostering these
developments, the GI Bill not only modulated the move back into the
workforce by demobilized service members-thus preventing a renewal of
the massive unemployment that had preceded the Second World War-but
also that developing and spreading high-end human capital over a large
swathe of the working population laid
critical foundations for the economic
30 1
1950s.
and
1940s
later
the
of
boom
3. Contemporary Higher Education Finance
Direct provision of higher education resources is, of course, analogous
to direct provision of land and other productive resources. In a world of
scarcity-for example, a world in which there are no longer millions of
acres of newly conquered land to allocate-such direct provision requires
outright redistribution from the heavily endowed to the underendowed.
This must be done in a manner that might, absent some salient and
dramatic public obligation such as that owed veterans, run afoul of one or
more of the endowment heuristics discussed in Part III. Accordingly, once
scarcity is encountered, prudent asset-spreading makes use of financial
innovations that either are or appear to be less redistributive or less
"unearned," innovations such as those schematized in Part IV as "the
Method," and seen in action in Parts V.A.3 and V.B.2 above. It is therefore
not surprising that real innovation in the spreading of higher education
opportunity appears on the American scene shortly after the GI Bill had run
its course-that is, after the obvious debt owed to World War II veterans
had been discharged.
Once again, nonetheless, a perceived crisis acts as impetus. In the case
of the federal home finance programs, we saw, crisis took the form of a
crash in the housing market at the end of the 1920s. In the case of "capital
homesteading," we also saw, crisis took the form of a protracted labor
market contraction. In the case of higher education finance, crisis took the
form of a satellite launch in the late 1950s-specifically, the successful
Soviet launch of Sputnik in 1957.302 Nearly fifty years later it is easy to
300.

See GI Bill, supra note 299.

301.

See id.

302. See PAUL DICKSON, SPUTNIK: THE SHOCK OF THE CENTURY (2001). See also The New York
Times Looks Back: Sputnik, http://www.nytimes.com/partners/aollspecialsputnik/ (last visited Nov.
20, 2005).
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forget, or simply never to have known, how traumatic the successful launch
of Sputnik, the perceived "winning" of the first stage of the "space race,"
by America's principal global competitor, was to American public
consciousness. But the fact is that public perceptions of national security
and public confidence that "we [were] number one" were badly shaken;
and the national conversation, in response, turned immediately to the
30 3
question of who or what was to blame.
One principal culprit, as determined by Congress and President
Eisenhower, turned out to be substandard science and technical
education.30 4 Congress accordingly acted swiftly in passing the National
Defense Education Act ("NDEA") of 1958.305 At the heart of NDEA was
the National Defense Student Loan ("NDSL") program, which for the first
time offered federally provided long-term, low-interest loans to
Americans-now
including
nonveterans-seeking
postsecondary
education. The NDSL program continues to the present day, having been
renamed the National Direct Student Loan (still "NDSL") program in 1972
and the now-familiar Perkins Loan program in 1987. It has, however, been
superseded, in terms of dollars lent and numbers of participants, by
additional federally sponsored education finance programs to which we
turn presently.
As the 1950s gave way to the early 1960s, federal involvement with
higher education assistance began to be described not simply in national
defense, but in "great society" terms. The first noteworthy step taken after
1958 came with the Economic Opportunity Act ("EOA") of 1964,306
whereby Congress among other things established the Federal Work-Study
Program ("FWSP"). FWSP provided federal funds to institutions of higher
learning in order to assist them in providing employment to needy students
working toward postsecondary degrees. The linking of education aid to
work appears significant in light of the endowment heuristics discussed in
Part III. In the absence of a perceived external exigency such as the one
that the launching of Sputnik had appeared to raise in 1957, or of a large
social debt such as that owed World War II veterans in the late 1940s, the
first tentative step in the direction of education aid advocated simply in
social welfare terms came with strings attached-recipients had to work for
the aid.
303.
304.
305.
306.

See supra note 302.
See DICKSON, supra note 302.
National Defense Education Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-864, 72 Stat. 1580.
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (repealed 1981).
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The EOA was but a beginning, however. The first real milestone,
which stands to contemporary higher education finance rather as the 1934
NHA stands to contemporary home finance, came one year later with the
Higher Education Act ("HEA") of 1965.307 The HEA forms the basis of all
current federal financial assistance programs for seekers of higher
education. Pursuant to the Act's Title IV, all such programs now are
administered by the Department of Education. And in addition to bringing
all then-existent federal higher education assistance programs-including
the NDSL, now Perkins program, and the FWSP-under the Title IV
umbrella, the HEA established two new such programs that persist to the
present and reach far more students than do Perkins or Work Study.
The first of these, the Educational Opportunity Grant Program, which
over time evolved into the "Basic Opportunity Grant Program," then the
now-familiar Pell Grant Program, ushered in two norms that have
characterized federal higher education assistance policy ever since. The
first norm is that of a basic education-financial minimum to which all are
held to be entitled. Whether they fall short of that minimum in their
personal resources is determined by means-testing; but if they do, they are
entitled to federal grant support. The second norm is that of portability,
meaning those who qualify for grant aid may use it, on the same terms, to
finance an education at any qualified institution of higher learning that they
choose.
The second new program established by the HEA was of much
broader significance, having come now to overshadow all others in terms
of dollar amounts afforded and number of recipients served. It also,
significantly, from the start partly replicated, and has since come fully to
replicate in its structure and functions the home finance programs discussed
in Part V.A.3 and "capital homesteading" as discussed in Part V.B.2. It also
instantiates the financial engineering strategy, the Method, schematized in
Part IV. That program is the federal Guaranteed Student Loan ("GSL")
Program, now known as the familiar Stafford Loan Program.
As originally designed, the GSL Program offered two principal
benefits. The first was simply a federal guaranty of the debts incurred by
those financing their postsecondary educations by borrowing. The
guaranty, of course, operated much as did federal mortgage insurance after
the passage of the NHA in 1934 as discussed above in Part V.A.3. It
removed lender risk, hence made loanable funds more readily available on
307. Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
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cheaper terms. While the guaranty system has since evolved into a twotiered structure, whereby state-established nonprofit firms act as first-line
guarantors while the federal government acts as secondary or "back-up"
guarantor, the operating principles and ultimate loan availability-enhancing
effects remain the same.
The second GSL benefit was a direct federal subsidy afforded to
borrowers for the interest that accrued on their debt. (The indirect subsidy
of tax-deductibility has been present from the start.) 30 8 The same basic
distinction, as between guaranteed loans with indirect subsidy-interestbased tax-deductibility--on the one hand, guaranteed loans with direct
interest-subsidization on the other, persists to the present day in the
distinction between so-called subsidized and unsubsidized Federal Stafford
Loans. That distinction, of course, mirrors the one described in Part V
between home finance assistance for the poor and home finance assistance
for the nonpoor.
Another noteworthy aspect of the HEA was its built-in regime of
regular revisitation, under the rubric of reauthorization, by Congress.
Pursuant to section 12 of the Act, Congress was to reconsider
appropriations for purposes of furthering the Act's aims at least every five
years. The periodic reappropriations have brought continued innovation to
and augmentation of HEA programs, rather as the 1930s and 1940s brought
continual augmentation of the federal home finance programs.
A particularly important innovation came with the 1972 Higher
Education Amendments. 30 9 That year Congress established the Student
Loan Marketing Corporation, better known as "Sallie Mae," as a
government-sponsored enterprise ("GSE") bearing distinct family
resemblances to the earlier-established GSEs that we encountered earlier in
Part V.A.3-Fannie Mae of 1938 and its progeny, Ginnie Mae and Freddie
Mac. As Sallie Mae's full name suggests, the corporation was formed with
the express purpose of pooling outstanding student loan obligations and
marketing shares in the pool. That is, Sallie Mae was formed to securitize
student debt and foster the creation of secondary markets, just as Fannie
Mae, Ginnie Mae, and Freddie Mac had been formed before it to securitize
308. The direct subsidy was originally a means-tested benefit, limited to lower-income
Americans. A Middle Income Student Assistance Act, passed in 1978, extended the subsidy to middleincome Americans, which was subsequently scaled back by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1981. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.); Middle Income Student Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 95-566,
92 Stat. 2402 (1978).
309. Higher Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235.
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and jump start the creation of secondary markets in mortgage obligations.
In addition, Sallie Mae was authorized to extend consolidation loans
pursuant to a new Federal Consolidation Loan Program to graduates who
had borrowed from multiple lenders and wished to refinance and simplify
their repayment obligations after graduation. The loan refinancing program
can, of course, be likened in part to the home mortgage refinancing
program instituted with HOLC in 1933.
Sallie Mae bore another important resemblance to Fannie Mae and the
other mortgage-securitizing GSEs: it only began as a GSE. As with the
secondary mortgage market-makers, once the federal government had
established the existence and shown the long-term independent viability of
the requisite secondary student loan market, it gradually withdrew: Sallie
Mae began the process of privatization in 1997 and completed it last year,
310
in December of 2004, upon termination of its GSE charter.
Federal mortgage program-reminiscent innovation in the realm of
higher education finance did not end with the establishment of Sallie Mae.
Additional critical steps came about twenty years later, with the Higher
Education Amendments of 1992.311 The 1992 Amendments, among other
things, brought all federal higher education loan programs under the now
familiar rubric of the Federal Family Education Loan Program, or
"FFELP." They also, intriguingly, mandated that home equity be excluded
as a factor in needs-testing of students for education finance assistance-in
effect recognizing human capital as an asset to be spread in addition to, not
as a substitute for, homes. But perhaps the most important innovations
wrought by the 1992 Amendments were those that resulted in various
forms of standardization.
First, the Amendments mandated sole use, by institutions indirectly
benefiting from federal higher education finance assistance, of a single,
freely available application form for students seeking Title IV assistance.
That form is the now familiar Free Application for Federal Student Aid, or
"FAFSA" form. Second, the 1992 Amendments mandated use of a single,
uniform need analysis methodology-the so-called "Federal Need
Analysis"-by higher education institutions indirectly benefiting from
federal higher education finance assistance. This form of standardization
can be seen as a further step in the direction established by the earlier-noted
instituting of portability by the Education Opportunity Act of 1964.
310. Sallie Mae, About Us, http://www2.salliemae.com/about (last visited Nov. 20, 2005).
311. Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, 106 Stat. 448 (codified in
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
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Finally, the 1992 Amendments mandated development of a common
loan application and promissory note form for use by the private lenders
whose funds were to be lent to the students who were the beneficiaries of
federal loan guarantees. It also mandated other standardized lender and
guarantor forms and procedures for use by those private lenders, and by the
private guarantors whom the government had encouraged from the late
1970s onward to interpose themselves between borrowers and the
government itself, which had come to function more and more as a
secondary (or "back-up") guarantor or reinsurer. For our purposes, this
third form of standardization is perhaps most significant of all: it is, of
course, an analogue to the standard mortgage instrument that developed out
of the FHA mortgage insurance programs of the 1930s, which
standardization was crucial in the development of the secondary mortgage
market by Fannie Mae and its progeny. 312 The establishment of a standard
loan agreement and promissory note form, not surprisingly, yielded parallel
benefits to Sallie Mae in its making of a deep secondary student loan
market.
Yet this does not exhaust the FHA-replicating measures taken by the
1992 Amendments. A further such measure was those Amendments'
instituting of the Title IV Institutional Quality Assurance Program,
("IQAP"),3 13 designed to ensure that postsecondary schools whose
enrollees received federal assistance in borrowing were indeed helping the
beneficiaries to develop human capital-the kind of capital which
borrowers would be able to use to amortize their debts over time after
graduation. In this respect, the IQAP is an analogue to the housing quality
standards required as a condition of receiving federal mortgage insurance,
as well as the Kelsonian business plan evaluation as a condition of
receiving "capital mortgage" financing. 3 14 Low quality homes-homes that
did not retain or indeed appreciate in value-of course would not generally
have constituted investments rationally worth financing; the same,
presumably, might be thought to hold in the case of an education not
conducing to the development of productive, responsible agency by the
citizen-beneficiary of federal education-financing assistance.
In view of the many structural similarities catalogued above between
federal higher education financing assistance on the one hand, and federal
home financing assistance (as well as Kelsonian capital mortgage financing
312.

313.
2005).
314.

See supra Part V.A.3.

Information for Financial Aid Professionals, http://www.ifap.ed.gov (last visited Sept. 2,
See supra Part V.A.3.
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assistance) on the other, it is perhaps worth diagramming the current
FFELP programs in order to demonstrate how strikingly similar these
programs are in their financial structures.
FIGURE 5.

Higher education financing structure since federal higher
education finance legislation of the 1960s, '70s, and '90s35

The federal higher education finance programs are probably the only
American ownership-spreading programs that rival federal home financing
assistance in their success. As in the case of the latter in Part V.A.3, a few
statistics on these education finance programs are particularly telling.
315.
Note that Sallie Mae, originally a GSE, privatized in 2004. "Loan Consolidators" can be
primary lenders or other education finance companies like Sallie Mae. They can even be state guaranty
agencies, which bear mixed public-private status and vary from state to state. There is, then,
considerable functional and, indeed, public/private status overlap among asterisked entities.
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In the 2003-04 academic year, about half of all American
undergraduates financed their educations with loan assistance through
FFELPs 3 16 and approximately $39 billion in FFELP loans were awarded to
over 5.4 million students or their parents. 3 17 Yet in fiscal year 2004, less
than $900 million in tax revenue went to support the $245 billion in bythen accumulated outstanding FFELP loans-a subsidization rate of less
than 0.4%.318 And in fiscal year 2003 there was no net cost to the public
3 19
fisc in support of the $213 billion then outstanding in FFELP loans.
Turning from costs to benefits, interest rates on student loans have dropped
steadily since the 1970s, owing in part to the low risk that attaches to those
in part to the success of
loans with the backdrop of federal guaranty, and
320
Sallie Mae in making a deep secondary market.
The federal higher education finance assistance programs can be
counted as a classic American OS success story on the same order of
magnitude as the federal home finance assistance programs. They represent
virtually costless forms of collective action, taking the forms of collateralsubstitution and market-making in the interest of broadly spreading a core
EEOR endowment-human capital. That spread, through its breadth,
vindicates Part II's "EOP," or equal opportunity principle. And it supplies
the holders of the right to equal material opportunity with an essential
resource that they can diligently employ to better their own lives, realize
and enhance their autonomy and independence, and enhance the wealth of
the nation considered as a whole.
316. See Federal Student Loan Programs, The Federal Family Education Loan Program Overview,
http://www.studentloanfacts.org/Ioanfacts/overview/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2005) [hereinafter FFELP
Overview]; U.S. Department of Education, Financial Aid, http://www.ed.gov/finaid/landing.jhtml?
src=rt (last visited Nov. 20, 2005).
317. FFELP Overview, supranote 316.
318. Id.
319. Federal Student Loan Programs, Loan Facts, http://www.studentloanfacts.org/loanfacts/
fastfacts/nonetcost.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2005).
320. FFELP Overview, supra note 316. The Department of Education estimates that a typical
1982 college graduate with $8000 in debt would have looked forward to paying a total of $4200 in
interest over the course of loan-repayment. Today's college graduate, by contrast, would have to accrue
$18,000 in debt, over twice as much, before facing the same accumulated interest costs. Students using
FFELP loans graduate at a substantially higher rate than do students not using such loans--over fifty
percent as compared to about thirty-two percent-and on average a college degree is estimated to add
over $1 million to the graduate's lifetime earnings; so FFELP can be credited with greatly enhancing
the life prospects of its beneficiaries. Id. See also supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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VI. COMPLETING THE PICTURE: THE AMERICAN OWNERSHIP
SOCIETY AS "THREE-LEGGED STOOL"
We are now positioned to revisit the question with which we began
our inquiry-the question as to what an "ownership society" might beand answer it in some preliminary detail. The answer in broad outline is,
first, per Parts II and III, that a recognizably American OS will be a society
that (a) works to facilitate the spread of ethically exogenous material
opportunities while (b) honoring complete and neutral markets' allocations
of ethically endogenous goods and services per our core American EEOR
values, (c) which goods and services and opportunities are vindicated so far
as possible by property rules per the traditions of American law, all in a
manner (d) comporting with American endowment psychology.
Absent new material resources such as public lands, the American OS
effects its constraint-consistent ownership spreading by the Method of
financial engineering which pools and spreads ethically exogenous default
risk in order to facilitate credit's flowing to the underendowed, as
explicated in Part IV. Not only is that the preferred course for the future,
but it has also effectively, though inchoately and incompletely, been our
course in two of three critical endowment domains-home ownership and
human capital ownership---since approximately midway through the
twentieth century. Such was the lesson of Part V.
What remains, then, to complete the OS that we have been
unconsciously becoming, is consciously and fully to draw out that rough
blueprint which has been latent in our programmatic history up to now,
with a view specifically to filling such gaps as that blueprint reveals to be
yet remaining in our OS-in-the-making. As most such gaps, I think, are
attributable principally to a single "macrogap," and as this is a "big picture"
article rather than a detailed outline, it will be best for now first to single
out that principal lacuna, then to sketch broad means of filling it, then to
anticipate the principal challenges that will face that filling effort, and
finally to sketch the means by which to face those challenges. Further
sequels then can handle further microdetails.
A. FROM HOMES AND SKILLS TO SECURITY AND SECURITIES

Part V shows us that the Part IV "Method" has worked very well in
spreading the ownership of homes and human capital broadly over
boundedly responsible, hardworking agent-citizens. Those homes and basic
educations, in turn, are core opportunity endowments per Part 11-basic
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resources that can fairly be regarded as ethically exogenous in the holding,
at least early in one's life.
But Part II also told us that access to nonhuman capital, to productive
networks, is a core opportunity endowment, as is access to means by which
to pool or trade off ethically exogenous risk-the "negative" counterpart to
opportunity. And these are two core endowments that we have not, thus far,
systematically endeavored to spread widely. I have argued in a predecessor
article for means of spreading risk in a manner consistent with our
fundamental, EEOR values. 32 1 Here, accordingly, I will emphasize the need
to think more seriously about the opportunity-spreading picture.
Human capital- and home finance, it bears emphasizing, often are of
little use absent access to productive networks that enable one to capitalize
upon one's own diligence-that is, access to employment or ownership
stakes in firms. For as we saw throughout Part V, the Part IV "Method" of
publicly facilitated home and higher education finance typically works only
in conjunction with the beneficiary's earning income so as to pay down the
individual's publicly facilitated mortgage debt. Yet in a world where
productivity growth wrought by rapid technological advance and
"globalization" often occurs more rapidly than does (lagging) demand for
high-skilled labor, and in which ownership of, as full or partial substitute
for employment by, firms itself requires nonhuman capital, such access is
322
apt regularly to fall into short supply.
The only solution to that problem, consistent with American OS
values and constraints, appears to be to facilitate the spread of such
nonhuman capital itself by the Method. A completed American OS,
accordingly, in effect will bring home skill and implement (nonhuman
capital) together as they were in the nineteenth and early twentieth century
"homestead," where one's diligent effort and painstakingly acquired skills
themselves, as applied through the (rudimentary) equipment that one had to
the agrarian resource to which one was afforded property-rule-vindicated
access, were sufficient to confer economic independence. The cluster of
321.
See Robert Hockett, From "Mission Creep" to Gestalt-switch: Justice, Finance,
the IFIs, and Globalization's Intended Beneficiaries, 37 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 167, 192-201

(2005); Hockett, supranote 55, at 203-57.
322.

See Hockett, supra note 55, at 107-12, 174-82. See also EDMUND S. PHELPS, STRUCTURAL

SLUMPS: THE MODERN EQUILIBRIUM THEORY OF UNEMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND ASSETS (1994);

supra Part V.B.2. Note, incidentally, that the very productivity improvements that render periodic
underemployment by the well-skilled likely-technological development and "outsourcing" to poorer
regions where even highly skilled labor is desperate enough to work for bargain basement wageswould redound immediately to the benefit of American workers to the degree that they were business
share owners.
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assets whose acquisition our contemporary OS will facilitate will
constitute, as did that nineteenth and early twentieth century homestead
itself, a manner of "three-legged stool" upon which free and independent
agent-citizens can stand securely while responsibly building productive and
worthwhile lives. We must seriously model and test, then, the real
prospects for completing our OS by applying the Part IV "Method" to the
realm of nonhuman capital spreading as we have done so successfully to
now, since midway through the last century, in the realms of home
ownership and human capital spreading.
B. FROM SECURITIES TO CREDITS, SURETIES, AND SECURITIZATION

Employing the "Method" in the realm of nonhuman capital will, of
course, mean fostering and facilitating the extension of credit for the
purchase of ownership shares in firms. In effect, credit and credit-riskpooling-hence, reasonably expected future capital-will stand in for
already accumulated capital, such that those faultlessly lacking in
nonhuman capital will be enabled, by exercising reasonable diligence, to
acquire it. That is the means of spreading this core EEOR endowment
consistently with the Part III constraints-as, again, we have seen through
Part V, in connection with homes and with human capital.
But this is only the beginning of applying the Method to nonhuman
capital spreading. Presumably, as in home and higher education finance, we
will wish to allow credit to originate from already existing, privately
(shareholder-) owned depository institutions, confining ourselves as a
society simply to enhancing that credit's availability by (a) guarantying it
or "jump-starting" private markets in default insurance which effectively
guaranty it and (b) "jump-starting" secondary markets in the resultant debt
instruments with a Fannie Mae / Sallie Mae analogue. But even allowing
for private lenders and markets to take that lead role, we shall have to
contend with some challenges that arise in connection with "capital
homesteading" which do not arise in the cases of "homesteading" or
"human capital homesteading."
One such challenge is that, in order to ensure the actuarial soundness
of any "capital homesteading" ("CH") program, we shall have to impose
quality conditions upon the underlying assets (or the suppliers thereof)
whose acquisition we are facilitating. That, as we saw in Part V, is a key
feature of the Method as applied to housing and education finance, and
appears to be a critical factor in those programs' successes. But imposing
such standards in the case of CH might, of course, smack of government's
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favoring some firms, or kinds of firms, or kinds of investments, over
others. And that kind of perceived "favoritism," "distortion," or
"inappropriate intermingling of politics and investment" is of the kind that
323
we traditionally have sought to disavow, at least rhetorically.
This challenge can be met, of course, so long as it is first
acknowledged. The first thing to note is that virtually all government
interventions in the economy, whether they be packaged as facilitative or
regulatory, of course favor or disadvantage some firms or industries
differently than others. The home finance programs of course afforded
stimulus to the housing industry and thereby "distorted" the
macroeconomy-they did not, for example, stimulate the rental market;
quite the contrary. The education finance programs did the same with
respect to higher education and the macroeconomy-they did not, for
example, stimulate the market for apprenticeships. Contract law "distorts"
persons' capacities to breach agreements, tort law their capacities to work
what we consider to be unjust injury to others, property law their capacities
to engage in what we consider to be illegitimate taking from others. And
laws against murder "distort" the contract killing market, etc. The question,
then, is not whether the government should "distort" what would have been
the workings of "markets" absent government-indeed, it would of course
be absurd to suggest that "markets" as we define and celebrate them could
so much as exist absent government facilitation via bodies of law such as
those just mentioned32 4 -it is rather how, in what forms and to what
degrees it should or should not affect them.
The second thing to note, by way of answering what one suspects
would be most people's answer to that last question, is that we would not
have to evaluate individual businesses or business plans in any
323. This was a key factor, for example, in Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan's and other
opposition to President Clinton's proposals, in 1999 and 2000, to invest government surpluses in the
stock market for the benefit of Social Security solvency. See, e.g., Amy Goldstein & Steven Mufson,
Greenspan Wary of Stock Plan, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 1999, at Al; Carolyn Lochhead, Skepticism over
Planfor Social Security: Greenspan,Analysts Fear Clinton ProposalWon't Do Job, S.F. CHRON., Jan.
21, 1999, at A l; Fred E. Foldvary, Keep Government Out of the Stock Market, PROGRESS REP., 1999,
http://www.progress.org/fold75.htm.
324. This has been a truism at least since the time of David Hume and Adam Smith. See DAVID
HUME, 2 A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 526 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1958) (1888)
(noting three "fundamental laws" requisite not only to the preservation of markets, but also of society
itself-"that of the stability of possession, of its transference by consent, and of the performance of
promises"). ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 213-338 (Edwin Cannan ed., Modem Library
1994) (1776) (stating that public maintenance of institutions providing for the common defense,
dispensation of justice (law), commercial marketplaces, and general education of society is necessary to
attain opulence, or indeed even to endure as a society at all).
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micromanagerial sense in requiring that ownership shares acquired by
citizens through public credit facilitation meet certain minimum quality
standards. Rather, the requirement can simply be that the shares be
"investment grade" per existing bank portfolio-shaping regulations and as
determined by respected intermediaries such as Moody's or Standard &
Poor's. Alternatively, facilitated investments could be required, in toto per
person as whole portfolios, to yield returns subject to no more than some
stipulated variance.325 Or facilitated investments could be required to be
made partly or fully in broad market index funds, such that all (or at any
rate all listed) firms would benefit from new investment in proportion as
they already have grown, while the investments in turn would be no more
risky than the market as a whole. In all such cases, "quality" of the sort that
concerns us will have been reasonably assured, while any "distortion" of
the sort that might reasonably concern anyone would be minimized if not
indeed virtually eliminated.32 6
It might be objected, of course, that federal credit facilitation
involving the aforementioned forms of quality assurance will tend,
nonetheless, disproportionately to benefit well-established, even stodgy
firms seeking finance over smaller, more innovative, high growth (and
high-risk) firms, endowing the program with an inherently conservative
bias. But this is hardly a problem. First, we of course want to be
conservative about the durability of OS-spread endowments, including
ownership shares in firms. We want those stakes, ideally, to be as durable
and reliable as are homes and good educations themselves. But second,
there is no reason to think that this will dry up the financing of smaller,
high-end, more risky and innovative ventures. Such ventures generally
seek, and receive, their financing from institutions and markets quite apart
from depository institutions, even apart from the established stock
exchanges. 327 And their financiers are, of course, more risk-preferring than
the typical stock market participant. Credit for new ownership share
acquisition by the currently capital-disenfranchised would be expected to
come from the more risk-averse-those not expecting to receive
extravagant returns from their investments (the loans they extend), but
willing to accept lower returns in exchange for the preferred safety of direct
325.

In other words, investments that are not too risky. See MARKOWITZ, supra note 109; Tobin,

supra note 113.

326.

See MARKOWITZ, supra note 109; Tobin, supra note 113. See also MALKIEL, supranote 105.

327.
See, e.g., HENRY ENGLER & JAMES ESSINGER, THE FUTURE OF BANKING 3-71 (2000);
HENDRIK S. HOUTHAKKER & PETER J. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 48-109

(1996).
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or indirect public guaranty. It would not, then, be likely to cut significantly
into the financing of innovative new firms.
A second general challenge that CH will face is the avoidance of
publicly facilitating mere "speculation." Though the line between that and
bona fide "investment" can of course be notoriously difficult to draw at the
margin, we would nevertheless not wish simply to be subsidizing or
otherwise facilitating unambiguously "casino-like" behavior of the sort
widely believed to have been a precipitating cause of the 1929 stock market
crash and ensuing depression. 328 But is that not, some might protest, what
facilitating the leveraged purchase of ownership shares would be?
This does not appear to be a particularly difficult challenge to meet.
For one thing, the imposition of quality standards per the preceding
paragraphs will itself significantly dampen any lottery-ticket-like nature of
qualifying credit-facilitated investment. For another, even were that,
improbably, to fail to suffice, it would seem easy enough simply to place
direct limitations, pursuant to the conditions that we attach to the benefit of
public credit facilitation, upon the velocity at which the purchased shares
can be turned over. This would be analogous, of course, to the tax penalties
incurred by early withdrawal of funds from an IRA. We might, for
example, facilitate the extension of less credit at some time t, to any
beneficiary who buys and sells at too rapid a rate at time t,-1. Or we might
impose transaction excises-"Tobin taxes"-upon such behavior, with all
proceeds to return to the public fisc. 329 Again, there are many options here
to ensure the investment-like as distinguished from the "merely
speculative" nature of that true business ownership that we facilitate.
A challenge that is cognate both with the quality-standard and with the
speculation-dampening challenges is that of how best to ensure that creditpurchased ownership shares do indeed yield discounted long-run returns in
excess of their financing costs. In the case of homes and higher education,
328. No one ever has seriously doubted that a large securities portfolio can yield income
substantially complementary or even supplementary of labor income, nor has anyone doubted that such
a portfolio would, over the long run, yield more than the interest costs of its leveraged acquisition. All
that would be doubted would be the prudence of such leveraged acquisition if effected for short-term,
"speculative" purposes. Such, of course, is commonly believed to have been one important source of
the stock bubble leading up to the crash of 1929, as well, of course, as to the disaster that befell the
borrowers once that crash occurred. See, e.g., JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 1-92 (3d
ed. 1972); CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, THE WORLD IN DEPRESSION, 1929-1939, at 95-116 (rev'd &
enlarged ed., 1986). But see BEN S. BERNANKE, ESSAYS ON THE GREAT DEPRESSION (2000) (proposing

new explanations of the Crash of 1929 and the ensuing depression).
329. See James Tobin, A Proposalfor InternationalMonetary Reform, 4 E. ECON. J. 153 (1978).
See generally THE TOBIN TAX: COPING WITH FINANCIAL VOLATILITY (Mahbub ul Haq, Inge Kaul &
Isabelle Grunberg eds., 1996).
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such yield is empirically well established, and there is no reason to expect
that to change in the foreseeable future. 330 Would it be the same for stocks?
The answer, at least over the long run, appears to be "yes." For one
thing, the equities market as a whole has tended toward about an 8%-11%
rate since records have been kept, while lending rates have been
substantially lower than that over time. 33 1 But for another thing, we can
certainly consider, as a corollary to our quality standards, a stipulation that,
say, only dividend-yielding stock will qualify for CH facilitation. 332 We
might indeed consider going yet further, prohibiting, say, the financing of
new projects, by all publicly listed firms that benefit by CH-financing, with
retained earnings. 333 That would both free up funds for dividendspresumably enhancing real incomes and discouraging excessive speculation
in shares 334 -and render management more reliant upon and thus
accountable to outside finance-hence upon and to a broader swathe of our
citizenry once finance begins to come from the newly CH-capitallyenfranchised-than in recent decades has been the case. Requiring
dividend-payments as a matter of federal law would of course constitute a
marked change in the current corporate governance regime, a realm that is
335
commonly claimed to be left, primarily and quite properly, to the states.
But we need not advocate anything of this sort at present, only know that it
is on the table as an option. And in any event, most such firms as might be
affected-the well established firms, per the quality concerns discussed
above-already are federally regulated as to many formerly state-regulated
governance matters by dint of the federal securities laws, under whose
jurisdiction most of them fall by virtue of being publicly listed.336
The fourth and perhaps most important challenge faced by CH comes
through the Part HI constraint having to do with perceived "earning" or
"deservingness." In the case of higher education finance, beneficiaries of
the Method must diligently labor in order to enjoy the benefit; they must
study, learn, and earn their degrees. In the case of home finance,
330. See supra Parts V.A.3, V.C.3.
331. See SIEGEL, supra note 106.
332. In the absence of taxation effects, transaction and agency costs, and asymmetric information,
of course, it is well established that dividends are finance-theoretically irrelevant. See supra note 250.
But of course, those conditions do not always hold, and we might wish to require that firms benefiting
through CH financing have regular recourse to the CH-supplemented capital market in any event.
333. Rajan and Zingales advocate a rule similar to this, in the spirit of Berle and Means, simply as
a matter of federal corporate govemance law more generally. See RAAN & ZINGALES, supra note I11.
334. A principal source of income deriving from ownership shares then would be profit shares,
dividends, rather than exclusively capital gains realized only through share-sale.
335. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 1-31 (1993).
336. Id.
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beneficiaries of the Method must generally labor with firms and make
timely mortgage payments from their wages or salaries. Is there a
counterpart in the case of nonhuman capital?
The answer, again, is "yes," but it is not a simple "yes." To begin
with, "capital mortgages" can be expected in most instances to be like
home mortgages; beneficiaries of federally facilitated "capital mortgage"
insurance and securitization will, presumably, work to pay their "capital
mortgage" debt as surely as they do to pay their home mortgage debt.33 7
While it might prove-and indeed is hoped-to be the case that their doing
so will, gradually, in effect reduce their needs to work at all-as dividends
or capital gains accruing to their stock ownership gradually supplement,
then perhaps partly supplant, labor income-there is no reason to anticipate
that people will simply cease working or otherwise diligently acting
altogether, particularly over the time that is pertinent to Part III
constraints-the time during which they must pay down their "capital
mortgages." For one thing, consumer demand tends to grow with income
and wealth, and thus the perceived need to work continues, particularly in a
world that does not allow for shortened working hours. 33 8 For another
thing, even were consumer demand not to rise in response to rises in
income and wealth wrought by CH, those latter rises, in so far as they are,
after all, partly offset by interest payments that must be made pursuant to
the "capital mortgages," are unlikely to render employment unnecessary
during one's youth and middle age. 339 Finally, even to the degree that rising
wealth would allow for less need of employment, it could be expected to
encourage more people simply to start their own businesses rather than to
cease being productive, a trend seen among the few early retirees we find
today.3 4 ° So it seems highly doubtful that CH would have to offend our
endowment heuristics by appearing to be unearned or rewarding of
indolence.
337. Insofar, that is, as the unemployment rate remains relatively low, the long-term rate from
individual to individual remains yet lower, and earnings will not stagnate or drop more precipitously
than they have been doing for the past three decades. See Paul Krugman, The Dropout Puzzle, N.Y.
TIMES, July 18, 2005, at A19, available at 2005 WLNR 11228703.
338.
See JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN: THE UNEXPECTED

DECLINE OF

LEISURE (1991). Particularly relevant is Schor's discussion of the correlation between the number of
hours worked and the "employment rent"-the value of a job to the worker. Id. at 60-66. See also
JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERSPENT AMERICAN: UPSCALING, DOWNSHtFrING, AND THE NEW CONSUMER

(1998).
339. Kelso's newspaper employees, for example, retired early, but not before reaching their fifties,
and certainly not before the credit extended to their ESOP trust had been paid. See KELSO & KELSO,
supra note 248, at 124.
340.

See generally DANIEL H. PINK, FREE AGENT NATION (2001).
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Second, in the case of "capital mortgages" benefiting the chronically
un- or underemployed, at least where that state is attributable to obvious
ethically exogenous disadvantage such as physical or mental handicap or
poor social circumstances, we are as a society more open to more direct
subsidy in any event, presumably owing to our deep-seated EEOR values
as adumbrated in Part II. That is how we find things in the home- and
education-spreading realms, at any rate, where interest is directly
subsidized rather than indirectly lowered (through default insurance or
guaranty) and tax-deductible. 34 1 Furthermore, there is nothing to prevent
our substituting other opportunities to act diligently in place of missing
employment, as a condition attaching to the subsidy. We might, then,
establish a public service corps for which otherwise unemployed
beneficiaries of "capital mortgage" assistance must work to the best of their
apparent abilities, or require that they work for already existent corps such
as Vista or Americorps. Such corps would serve as useful domestic
analogues to military service, which we saw in Part V currently to
constitute the primary mode of public service that qualifies otherwise
unemployed citizens to receive much in the way of home finance,
education finance, and health care assistance.
Again, there are many possibilities here, and this Article can do little
more than speak broadly. But the time, nevertheless, is much more than
ripe for beginning seriously to sketch in broad outline our preliminary
designs.
C. FROM SOCIAL ENGINEERING TO FINANCIAL ENGINEERING AND
MARKET-MAKING

That, then, is where we will leave things for now. More detailed
designs will await further sequels. It nevertheless bears noting here,
however, that what we are talking about is potentially societytransformative action that is primarily nonetheless privately driven.
Individuals, firms, and financial institutions will, in a comprehensive
American OS, be doing the driving. Markets will be the primary
allocators-as they are now and as any EEOR prescribes that they ought to
be. What "society" does as a whole, what "we" do collectively, then, is
simply to do what we always have done best when we have acted
collectively: to pool and guaranty against risks for the eventuation of which
nobody is individually responsible, and to jump-start markets-those most
venerable of public goods-that individuals alone, owing to rational
341.

See supra Parts V.A.3, V.C.3.
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calculation or reasonable risk-aversion, dare not or cannot create singlehandedly.
If, then, we can collectively insure against default, "mortgages" for the
purchase of business capital, as well as the housing capital and human
capital that we help thus to spread now, and if we can then jump-start the
creation of secondary markets in the resultant "mortgage" debt, we shall
have completed our American OS and afforded to everyone who works
diligently a complete and contemporary "homestead" that is full
counterpart to the full independence-conferring homestead of earlier times.
And we shall have thus allowed private parties financially to engineer what
other societies have failed thus far socially to engineer.
VII. CONCLUSION: AT LAST A JEFFERSONIAN REPUBLIC, BY
HAMILTONIAN MEANS
We have covered much ground here, perhaps too much to summarize
effectively. We have synthesized a set of core American values from three
dominant American political traditions. We have derived from those core
values a rough sketch of that polity upon which our traditions convergean "efficient equal-opportunity republic." We have mapped the legal and
psychological
constraints that bound the set of practicable
operationalizations of that republic. We have translated those constraints
into a financial engineering "Method" by which optimally to spread
property-rule-protected ownership stakes in material opportunities, as is
counseled by the core American values. We have surveyed our own
programmatic history as an ownership-society-in-the-making, finding the
values, the constraints, and the "Method" all operative therein. And we
have found, in that survey, what remains to be done if our ownership
society is to pass from being merely "in-the-making" to being "made."
The devil, of course, is in the details. Much remains to be done, in
filling the gaps, by way of careful programmatic design, modeling, and
testing with a view to the consequences likely to follow upon alternative
courses of action. That will, of course, have to await further sequels to this
Article-as well, no doubt, as the surer steps of others.
Perhaps by way of additional motivation for those more painstaking
steps, however, it is worth pausing briefly to appreciate what we shall have
done once we succeed. We shall have realized the noblest dream of our
most celebrated founders-the dream of a republic of independent, self-
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sufficient, civically responsible, and productive owners. 342 And we shall
have done so in respect of assets foreseen by others of our most celebrated
founders as more promising than mere land, through means recognized by
those other founders to be capable of working near-miracles-the means of
finance, of credit as credere, of faith in the future so long as it is wrought
by industrious citizens. 343 To have done that will be not just extraordinary,
it will be nationally reconciling. For the first set of founders just
mentioned, along with their progeny, alas, have been at odds with the other
set of founders just mentioned, along with their progeny, since the dawn of
our independence as a nation. 344 In effecting a real ownership society, then,
we shall have effected both a great republic of owners and a long-awaited
national unity. We shall have effected, at long last, a Jeffersonian republic
by Hamiltonian means.

342.

See, e.g., THOMAS JEFFERSON, Notes on the State of Virginia, Queries XVIII and XIX, in

WRITINGS, supra note 21, at 288; THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James
Madison, Oct. 28, 1785, in WRITINGS, supra note 21, at 840; THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letterfrom Thomas

Jefferson to Jean Nicolas Dgmeunier, Apr. 29, 1795, in WRITINGS, supra note 21, at 1027. See also
LINCOLN, supra note 229. Lincoln, incidentally, was simultaneously Jeffersonian and Hamiltonian. One
of the great "what ifs" in our history is how much more fully we might have moved in the direction
advocated in the present Article had Lincoln lived out his second term. See generally RICHARD
FRANKLIN BENSEL, YANKEE LEVIATHAN: THE ORIGINS OF CENTRAL STATE AUTHORITY IN AMERICA,
1859-1877 (1990); DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN (1995).
343. See, e.g., ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Report on Public Credit, in WRITINGS 531 (Joanne B.
Freeman ed., 2001); ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Report on a National Bank, in WRITINGS, supra, at 575;
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Report on the Subject of Manufactures,in WRITINGS, supra, at 647.

344.

See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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